[EM] wv equivalent to margins when unranked pairs given 1/2 vote each?

[Adam Tarr]

matt at tidalwave.net wrote:
>My conjecture is:  If you give multiple unranked candidates 1/2 vote each 
>then both wv and margins have the no strategic truncation incentive (NSTI) 
>property.

Sorry matt, it's not true.  If you give equally ranked candidates half a 
vote against one another (which, I think, is what you are suggesting), then 
you effectively turn winning votes into margins.  This is, more or less, 
what margins does.  The reason you see no truncation incentive in this 
example is just because this particular example has no truncation 
incentive.  Try this example (which I call "my standard example" because it 
has proven so illustrative).  Sincere preferences are as follows:

49%: George>Al>Ralph
12%: Al>George>Ralph
12%: Al>Ralph>George
27%: Ralph>Al>George

Al is the Condorcet winner.  If the George voters truncate in a margins 
method (or winning votes with half votes for and against equal ranked 
candidates), then George wins the election.  Try it out.

-Adam
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