[EM] Optimal methods for multimember elections

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Fri Dec 13 14:20:10 PST 2002


Forest Simmons said:
> Each voter marks one candidate on the ballot.  These candidates become
> proxies (for the voters that marked their names) in an Election
> Completion Convention.
>
> If there are n seats to be filled, and there is a subset of n candidates
> each of which receives more than 1/(n+1) of the vote, then automatically
> they distribute all of their proxy votes to self, and they win the
> seats.
>
> Otherwise, since each proxy knows how many votes are controlled by every
> other proxy, the candidates with common interests can get together and
> decide on how to distribute their votes for best effect, i.e. so that
> not too many votes, if any , get wasted.

Am I correct in assuming that the candidates would essentially use
something akin to cumulative voting?

This seems to be similar to closed party list systems, except that with a
closed list the vote sharing among like-minded candidates has been decided
in advance.  If the list gets enough votes for one seat the winner will be
A.  If they get enough for 2 seats then B will also win, etc.  With your
proposed system, there is more uncertainty.  I don't see any advantages
favoring proxy PR over closed party list.

However, I do see a few advantages favoring proxy approval over regular
approval (although I admit to preferring regular approval).



Alex


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