[EM] Examples: Margins, strategy pushover

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Sun Apr 29 09:37:18 PDT 2001

Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part-

Example 1, truncation:

40: A[B=C]
20: B[A=C]
30: CB[A]

Example 2, order-reversal:

201: AC[B]
200: B[A=C]
100: CB[A]

[truncations added]
D-  Who has a YES majority in either example ???

If the truncations are deemed half votes in pairings, then there is

Example 1

40 AB 50
40 BC 50
40 CA 50

Circular tie

Example 2

201 AB 300
100 BC 401
100 CA 301

Circular tie

Problems happen with *ANY* divided majority.
26 A
25 B
49 Z

A and B have some sort of connection (such as being 2 liberals or 
conservatives) -- Z is the opposing conservative or liberal.

Who makes a second choice vote if there is no majority requirement ???

Who, if any of the choices, can get a YES (i.e. *acceptable*) majority ???

If there is a majority requirement, then there will be insincere/ strategy 

The heavens will NOT fall if some of the voters make second insincere/ 
strategy/ compromise votes based on 

Desired > Compromise > Unacceptable.

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