[EM] Most YES tiebreaker

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Wed Apr 25 14:41:43 PDT 2001

I like this ACMA method. It requires more marks on the ballot, but they
are easy to make, and their purpose is clear. The thing I like best is
that it is an Approval completed Condorcet method, so it satisfies the
Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC) and more.

In fact, if I am not mistaken, it satisfies these two symmetrically
related conditions, the first of which might be called the Strong FBC:

(1) There is no strategic advantage to ranking another candidate as high
as your favorite.

(2) There is no strategic advantage to ranking another candidate as low as
your most despised.

The first of these is paramount in Oregon Green psychology. If they
thought it through, they would realize that the second is just as
important in certain situations.

See my next posting in the "None of the Above" thread for some thoughts on
how to simplify the ballot, namely giving None of the Above a place on the
ballot, and going with the following conventions:

(1) All candidates ranked before "None of the Above" get a Demorep Yes=1.

(2) All candidates ranked after "None of the Above" get a Demorep No=-1.

(3) "None of the Above" gets a Demorep Neutral=0.

In the first step of ACMA, a Demorep count is taken. All the candidates
that score below zero (the level of "None of the Above") are washed out.

Continue as Demorep describes below.


On Mon, 23 Apr 2001 DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

> A simpler variant --
> 1. Vote YES or NO (default) on each choice and use Number Votes (1, 2, etc.) 
> on each choice.
> 2. Choices getting a YES majority go head to head using the Number Votes.
> 3. If there is no Condorcet Winner (CW) using the Number Votes, then the 
> choice with the most YES votes wins.
> Approval- Condorcet- Most Approval (ACMA)

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