[EM] Nomination

Richard Moore rmoore4 at home.com
Tue Apr 17 22:35:34 PDT 2001

Is something missing here? Suppose nobody truncates and there is no pairwise
"beats all" winner?


Forest Simmons wrote:

> I would like to nominate Approval Completed Condorcet as a method, and
> give a campaign speech in favor of it.
> In this version of Approval Completed Condorcet, regular preference
> ballots are used with no special marks.
> All ranked candidates are considered approved and all unranked (truncated)
> candidates are considered unapproved (and for pairwise comparison
> purposes, below all of the ranked candidates).
> If pairwise comparisons yield a "beats all" winner, then that's our
> guy/gal.
> Otherwise, the most truncated (least approved) candidates are eliminated
> from the contest one by one (starting with the worst) until there remains
> a unique "beats all" winner.
> Campaign Speech:
> This method has the main advantages of Condorcet and Approval without
> their main commonly perceived disadvantages:
> It is the only Condorcet method satisfying the Favorite Betrayal Criterion
> while allowing more expressivity than plain Approval (the only other
> contender that satisfies the FBC).
> Majority defense by truncation works as well in this method as any other.
> Even the low utility accidental Condorcet Winners will be cut off by the
> natural disapproval manifest in truncation.
> No complicated, confusing Condorcet completion method needs to be sold to
> the voting public.
> The strategy is easy: just sincerely rank all of the candidates down to
> and including the one you would vote for under plurality. Be sure to leave
> the most evil front runner unranked.
> This is the only method in the running so far that completely solves the
> spoiler problem in the psychology of Green IRVies, since they think that
> having to approve Gore as well as Nader (under plain Approval) is a form
> of spoilage.
> Vote for the best, vote ACC !
> Forest

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