[EM] Unranked-IRV, Cumulative, and Normalized Ratings
mcnh2 at cam.ac.uk
Tue Apr 10 12:10:57 PDT 2001
Richard Moore wrote:
> ...unless the voters let the system do the strategizing for them.
> would the voters have any reason to give insincere ratings
> (assuming they understand and trust the system)?
They might want to give insincere ratings to try and distort the strategies of
their co-voters, in the same way that (say) in Approval polls you reduce your
willingness to compromise. The fact that you have to make the same vote in the
'poll' as in the final vote reduces such options, though - which'd make it harder
to do - but not impossible.
Isn't there a theorem in game theory which says that all games must have at least
one attractor? Does this apply to the 'game' of voting, which'd show that we'd
always get convergence?
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