# [EM] Poll Ballots, from poll-topics poll

Richard Moore rmoore4 at home.com
Thu Apr 5 23:04:53 PDT 2001

```MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

> For your Approval votes in the final Approval count, extend your
> approval set down to...
>
> 1. To your most preferred of the winners chosen by your designated
>    method.
> 2. To the candidates above the median or midrange of the winners by
> 3. To the candidates above the mean of the candidates that you
>    ranked higher than your least preferred of the winners chosen by
> 4. Apply Richard's 1st few-voters Approval strategy approximation
>    to the winners chosen by the method that you designated.
> 5. Apply Richard's 2nd few-voters Approval strategy approximation
>    to the winners chosen by the method that you designated.
>    (Get your estimate for the number of votes cast by other voters
>    by applying Richard's 1st Approval strategy approximation to all
>    the ballots, based on their expressed ratings of the candidates).
>
> Richard, do you have a clear favorite among these? Maybe this calls
> for a procedural vote.

If we consider that the two tied candidates are likely to be front-runners
in the final count, then any method that expresses a preference between
them is better than one that doesn't. All the suggestions listed meet that
criterion.

The question is, how much insurance does a voter need? If A>B>C>D,
and A and D are tied, and A is automatically selected for the voter's
final ballot, what if the final count shifts to the point where B and C
are front runners?

I like 3 because it's close to zero-info Approval strategy for many voters;
4 and 5 would just add more math with probably little benefit. Since 3