[EM] Poll Ballots, from poll-topics poll

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Apr 5 22:31:13 PDT 2001

```
My 1st reply to this didn't get sent, so I'm sending again:

>MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> > 1. I should specify that if the method that you've designated returns
> >    a tie, then, instead of using Random Ballot to solve that tie, your
> >    ballot simply gives an Automatic Approval vote to each of the winners
> >    that your designated method has returned, and to everyone whom
> >    you've ranked higher than at least one of those winners.
>
>That rule works OK for cases where I rated the two tied candidates
>closely.
>
>What if I vote A>B>C>D, and there is a tie in the method I designate
>between A and D? Voter's Choice would end up executing a poor
>Approval voting strategy on my behalf. Random is somewhat better in
>that I get at least a 50/50 chance of having an A-only vote placed.
>
>Maybe a better method would be to pick the midpoint between my
>A and D ratings (or whichever two candidates tied), and approve those
>candidates I rate at or higher than this midpoint.
>
>I wonder if this method might also encourage voters to rate the
>candidates more sincerely? Say I rate A=100, B=70, C=50, and
>D=0. Then a tie between A and D would select A, B, and C,
>and a tie between A and C would select A only. A tie between
>B and C would select A and B. And so on.
>
>Another possibility -- Take the mean of all the candidates I ranked
>higher than the lowest tied candidate, and choose the candidates that
>are above the mean.

How about these possible ways of dealing with it?:

set is extended down to:

["winners" means "winners chosen by your designated method, when
it returns more than 1 winner]

1. Your most preferred of the winners.
2. The median or midrange of the winners.
3. The mean of the candidates that you ranked above your least
preferred of the winners.
4. Apply Richard's 1st Approval strategy approximation to the winners.
5. Apply Richard's 2nd Approval strategy approximation to the winners.
(The number of votes cast by other voters, needed by that
approximation, is determined by applying Richard's 1st Approval
strategy approximation to all the ballots of the other voters,
based on their ratings of the candidates.

If Richard's 2nd approximation is better than his 1st one, then
I prefer #5, of these 5 alternatives. #4 is 2nd best.

Which of these do you prefer? If there's consensus then we have
an answer to this issue. If not, then a procedural vote seems
appropriate.

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________