[EM] Unequally ranking equally-preferred candidates

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Mon Apr 30 22:02:58 PDT 2001

Blake has said that people who unequally rank candidates whom they
prefer equally can steal the election in wv, just as truncators &
order-reversers can do so in Margins. Oh yes?

Let's go back to my example #2, my order-reversal example, the
201,200,100 example.

And let's say that the 201 A voters are, this time, indifferent between
B & C. But say that they, having heard Blake's suggestion, decide to
insincerely rank C over B, though they have no preference between B & C.

Result: The same. B is still the sincere CW. If everyone voted sincerely, B 
would win. But when these voters who are indifferent between B & C decide to 
vote C over B, they thereby steal the election
from B.

And, again, for the same reason, that doesn't work in wv. Contrary
to Blake's claim, falsification between equally-preferred candidates,
a sort of half-strength relative of order-reversal, can't succeed
in wv unless its victims trust & help their victimizers, just as is
the case with order-reversal.

I haven't checked tonight's e-mail yet, but, for now, I'll repeat
my request that Blake, Rob LG, or Richard post an example in which
wv fails as badly as Margins fails in my 2 Margins examples. Actually,
now it's 3 Margins examples, if we count the one in this message, which
consists of example 2, but with the A voters indifferent between
B & C. I'll call that new one "example 3".

Mike Ossipoff

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