[EM] A method that satisfies GSFC, FBC and SDSC.

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Tue Apr 3 14:45:56 PDT 2001

The ballots for this method are ordinary preference ballots with one
extra mark to be intercalated into the preference order according to the
voter's discretion.

The ballots are compared pairwise to find the Smith set.

The winner is chosen from the Smith set (thereby satisfying GSFC) as

Every member of the Smith set gets one point for each ballot on which she
is found on the higher preference level side of the special mark. 

The candidate with the greatest number of points is the winner of the
election. (Resolve a tied number of points by random ballot.)

To see that the method satisfies SDSC, consider that a majority preferring
A over B can prevent B from winning by putting the special mark anywhere
between candidates A and B.

To see that the method satisfies FBC, consider that the winner is chosen
from the Smith set by a method that satisfies FBC (Approval in disguise).



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