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<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">It
seems like the short version is that the winner is the candidate
with the smallest sum of SQUARES of non-victories (defeats plus
ties) against their opponents.</div>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
I take that these numbers you are squaring are the candidate's
opposing and tying vote scores, and not simply the number of such
results. Is that right? <br>
<br>
Because otherwise that would often be very indecisive, like
Copeland.<br>
<br>
<br>
On 19/05/2025 1:40 am, Andrew B Jennings (elections) via
Election-Methods wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:Zk2anWO4nYxeddvB3NLYnvr4Vq5ydJKzf5zLhNVAOHdUIEfCVrvp6GMSS8MNYtj6AhTSZS1LTZJQAqpCBCU-lWh_wQ8CT9aYDrs49MC4XJY=@jenningsstory.com">
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<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Hi
Dan,</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Great
paper. Thank you for posting!</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">It
seems like the short version is that the winner is the candidate
with the smallest sum of SQUARES of non-victories (defeats plus
ties) against their opponents.</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Taking
the square root and dividing can make it meaningful by scaling
it to [0,1] or [0,s] (where s is the number of voters), but
doesn't change the finish order.</div>
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<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
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<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">It
does seem like an interesting attempt to "square the circle"
(great pun) and compromise between Borda and Condorcet. I hadn't
realized that Borda and Minimax are minimizing the one-norm and
infinity-norm in the same geometric space. The two-norm
certainly seems like it should be explored.</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">I
would love to see the proof of non-favorite-betrayal.</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">Best,</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><br>
</div>
<div style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;">~
Andy</div>
<div class="protonmail_quote"> On Thursday, May 15th, 2025 at 4:25
PM, Daniel Kirslis via Election-Methods
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a> wrote:<br>
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<div>Hello!</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I am a newcomer to this mailing list, so please
forgive me if this message violates any norms or
protocols that the members of this list adhere to. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I have recently developed a novel method for
tabulating ranked-choice elections that attempts to
reconcile the concerns of Borda and Condorcet. I believe
that it maintains the simplicity and mathematical
elegance of the Borda count while incorporating
Condorcet's concern with pairwise dominance.
Intuitively, it can be understood as ordering candidates
by how close they come to being unanimously selected
when plotted in Cartesian coordinate space. Here is a
link to the paper:</div>
<div><a rel="noreferrer nofollow noopener"
href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/152eNheS2qkLHJbDvG4EwW3jdO4I_NwcX/view?usp=sharing"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://drive.google.com/file/d/152eNheS2qkLHJbDvG4EwW3jdO4I_NwcX/view?usp=sharing</a></div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Given its simplicity, I have been very surprised to
discover that this method has never been proposed before.
I am hoping that some of you all will take a look at the
paper and share your comments, questions, and critiques.
Ultimately, it is my hope that ranked-choice voting
advocates can arrive at a consensus about the best method
for RCV and thus strengthen efforts to adopt it and
deliver much needed democratic improvements. But even if
you don't find the system itself compelling, you may find
the method of plotting electoral outcomes elucidated in
the paper to be useful for the analysis of other electoral
systems.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thank you!</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-Dan</div>
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