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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">I think a basic summary in this list of how the method actually works would be good. Then we can read the paper with the background and arguments for it at our leisure.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Saturday 17 May 2025 at 13:00:49 BST, Chris Benham via Election-Methods <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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<div><div dir="ltr">Dan,<br clear="none"><br clear="none">I had a look at your paper and (probably partly due to my lack of <br clear="none">academic maths background) I found it almost completely opaque.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">And the bits I do understand sound very unpromising. Why should we be <br clear="none">interested in the "concerns" of Borda (whatever they are)? And so much <br clear="none">that we should embrace a method that fails the Condorcet criterion?<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Do you propose allowing above-bottom equal ranking or truncation?<br clear="none"><br clear="none">> Importantly, the K-count satisfies the ‘sincere favorite’ criterion: a <br clear="none">> voter is<br clear="none">> never incentivized to place their favorite candidate in any position <br clear="none">> other than<br clear="none">> 1st. This is a particularly perverse form of strategic voting that the <br clear="none">> K-count<br clear="none">> avoids. Notably, it is not avoided by one of the most popular ranked <br clear="none">> choice<br clear="none">> methods, instant runoff.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">That somewhat increases my interest in finding out how this method <br clear="none">works. Meeting that criterion is difficult for methods trying to be <br clear="none">better than simple Approval.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Who does your method elect in this example?<br clear="none"><br clear="none">46 A<br clear="none">44 B>C<br clear="none">10 C<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Chris Benham<br clear="none"><br clear="none">On 16/05/2025 8:54 am, Daniel Kirslis via Election-Methods wrote:<br clear="none">> Hello!<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> I am a newcomer to this mailing list, so please forgive me if this <br clear="none">> message violates any norms or protocols that the members of this list <br clear="none">> adhere to.<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> I have recently developed a novel method for tabulating ranked-choice <br clear="none">> elections that attempts to reconcile the concerns of Borda and <br clear="none">> Condorcet. I believe that it maintains the simplicity and mathematical <br clear="none">> elegance of the Borda count while incorporating Condorcet's concern <br clear="none">> with pairwise dominance. Intuitively, it can be understood as ordering <br clear="none">> candidates by how close they come to being unanimously selected when <br clear="none">> plotted in Cartesian coordinate space. Here is a link to the paper:<br clear="none">> <a shape="rect" href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/152eNheS2qkLHJbDvG4EwW3jdO4I_NwcX/view?usp=sharing" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://drive.google.com/file/d/152eNheS2qkLHJbDvG4EwW3jdO4I_NwcX/view?usp=sharing</a><br clear="none">><br clear="none">> Given its simplicity, I have been very surprised to discover that this <br clear="none">> method has never been proposed before. I am hoping that some of you <br clear="none">> all will take a look at the paper and share your comments, questions, <br clear="none">> and critiques. Ultimately, it is my hope that ranked-choice voting <br clear="none">> advocates can arrive at a consensus about the best method for RCV and <br clear="none">> thus strengthen efforts to adopt it and deliver much needed democratic <br clear="none">> improvements. But even if you don't find the system itself compelling, <br clear="none">> you may find the method of plotting electoral outcomes elucidated in <br clear="none">> the paper to be useful for the analysis of other electoral systems.<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> Thank you!<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> -Dan<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> ----<br clear="none">> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a shape="rect" href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<div class="ydp4949ef28yqt6960840729" id="ydp4949ef28yqtfd19953"><br clear="none">----<br clear="none">Election-Methods mailing list - see <a shape="rect" href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br clear="none"></div></div></div>
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