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<p>RCV (a.k.a. Instant Runoff) clearly failed in Alaska in 2024
too. The Republican Party learned an important lesson from the
fiasco in August 2022: RCV can easily spoil. So in 2024, one of
the two Republican candidates who qualified for the general
election dropped out to avoid the possibility of being a spoiler.
And the one who didn't drop out -- Nick Begich -- had similarly
pledged to drop out if another Republican finished ahead of him in
the primary election.</p>
<p>A lesson they haven't yet learned is that the kind of pledge that
Begich made -- to drop out if another Republican finished ahead of
him in the primary election -- can lead to spoiling too, because
the candidate who drops out might be the one who could win in the
general election. Suppose Begich had made that pledge ahead of
the August 2022 election. Then he would have dropped out to avoid
the possibility of spoiling Sarah Palin's victory. But it was
Begich, not Palin, who a majority ranked over Democrat Mary
Peltola in the August 2022 election.</p>
<p>(Peltola's majority over Palin was very narrow. That means RCV
came close to electing the extremist.)<br>
</p>
<p>In France in 2024 they didn't use RCV, but a similar dynamic led
to similar pledges to drop out. To avoid spoiling that would help
the right-wing party win in the final round of elections,
candidates of centrist & left-wing parties agreed to drop out
if they finished no higher than third place in the penultimate
round of voting, to avoid spoiling the other's chance of defeating
the right-wing candidate. That's the same mistake as in Begich's
pledge to drop out if another Republican finished ahead of him in
the primary election. The candidate who finished third might be
the one who can win, and in this case the candidate who ought to
drop out is the one who finished second (or possibly even first).</p>
<p>It's also possible that RCV spoiled in the 2021 New York City
Democratic mayoral primary election, which was won by Eric Adams.
It eliminated Maya Wiley after the penultimate round of counting,
and then counted Wiley's votes for either Adams or Garcia. It's
possible that Garcia was a spoiler and that majorities ranked
Wiley over Adams and Garcia. (I don't know NYC political dynamics,
but assuming a subset of voters pay attention mainly to
candidates' gender & race, Garcia voters in that subset would
tend to prefer Wiley over Adams, and Adams voters in that subset
would tend to prefer Wiley over Garcia.) But NYC didn't publish
the voters' rankings, so the possibility that Garcia was a spoiler
can't be checked, except perhaps by a "freedom of information"
request to compel publication. (I wonder whether hiding the
voters' rankings is a lesson learned by proponents of RCV after
the Instant Runoff fiasco in Burlington Vermont in 2009. After
that fiasco, they changed its name from Instant Runoff to Ranked
Choice Voting, so I also wonder whether the reason for the change
of name was to try to hide its track record of spoiling. And I
wonder whether they say an RCV election didn't spoil whenever the
evidence to check it is unavailable.)</p>
<p>We can expect the Democrats too will eventually learn the lesson
that RCV is prone to spoiling. After that, I expect only one
Democrat and one Republican will run in RCV general elections,
plus third party or independent candidates who can't win and might
be spoilers. That seems like the existing two-party system...
which might explain why so many Democratic & Republican
politicians support (or don't oppose) RCV. It would still have
the same terrible flaw that any voting method that counts only one
majority (or one plurality) has: the majority (or plurality) that
gets counted can often be a coalition of minorities on different
issues. That undermines majority rule, undermines politicians'
incentive to support majority-preferred policies, prevents
government policies from being stable, incites political
polarization, and empowers extremists by making their supporters'
votes needed by the rest of their coalition.<br>
</p>
<p>Another possibility we could hope for, but which seems unlikely
because it would require the Democratic party or the Republican
party to place country over party, is that one of the two "big
tent" parties would learn to completely "stand down" (not nominate
a candidate) in elections they might not win, so that a "moderate"
independent candidate could run and defeat the "greater evil"
without a spoiler on the ballot to split the coalition against the
greater evil. We saw examples of this "stand down" strategy in
Utah in 2022 and in Nebraska in 2024, when the Democrats chose not
to nominate candidates for U.S. Senate... that allowed the
independent candidates who ran (Evan McMullin in Utah and Dan
Osborn in Nebraska) to assemble larger anti-Republican coalitions
than any Democratic candidates had assembled in those states. If
those states had been swing states instead of solid red states,
it's a good bet that the independent candidates would have won.
But good luck persuading the Democrats to stand down in a swing
state or swing district, which would be the opposite of the "50
state strategy" that some of them advocate. The "Democrats stand
down" strategy makes sense not only in solid red states &
districts where a Democrat would be a sure loser; it also makes
sense in states & districts where the Democrat isn't a sure
winner if election of the Republican would be catastrophic. (Two
examples of catastrophes are Trump 2025 and single-party
domination of all branches of a state government -- such as in
Texas or Florida -- or all branches of the federal government.)
By a symmetric argument, the "Republicans stand down" strategy can
make sense for Republicans in states & districts where an
independent candidate has a better chance to defeat the Democrat
than a Republican would have.</p>
<p>If the Democrats hadn't nominated a candidate for President in
2024, I think it's likely that No Labels would have been able to
persuade Larry Hogan to run. Hogan was the popular two-term
"moderate" Never-Trump Republican former governor of solid blue
Maryland, and it seems likely that he would have been a Condorcet
winner in 2024. He declined No Labels' invitation because he knew
the Democrats would nominate a candidate (expected to be Biden),
which would have given Hogan no chance to win and only a chance to
be a spoiler. But in a Hogan versus Trump election with no
Democrat on the ballot to split the anti-Trump coalition, Hogan
could have been able to assemble a winning coalition: in addition
to "lesser of evil" votes from Democratic-leaning voters, Hogan
would have been favored by swing voters, moderate Republican
voters, and some of the voters who vote R only because they've
been led to believe the D party is socialist or whatever. (I think
the only real questions about whether Hogan would have defeated
Trump are whether too many Democratic-leaning voters would fail to
vote for the "lesser of evils" and either abstain or "waste" their
vote on a sure-loser third party spoiler, and whether donors would
have adequately funded Hogan's independent campaign.)<br>
</p>
Years ago, an advocate of Instant Runoff presented empirical
statistics (from Australia, I think) that seemed to show Instant
Runoff doesn't spoil much in practice and rarely defeats a Condorcet
winner. But those statistics are misleading, because they neglect
potential candidates who are deterred from running either to avoid
being a spoiler or because Instant Runoff would create the false
impression that they're very unpopular. It also ignores the effect
of voter preference information that the parties gain when STV
Proportional Representation
elections are run alongside Instant Runoff... information that can
be useful for predicting Instant Runoff spoiling and avoiding the
spoiling by standing down or by a party nominating only one
candidate. Particularly noteworthy is Instant Runoff's deterrent
effect against potential Condorcet winners who would lose and appear
to be very unpopular given Instant Runoff because they would be
sandwiched between two other candidates, one of whom would be
classified as a spoiler if the Condorcet winner chose to run &
lose. An Instant Runoff winner who's said to be a Condorcet winner
based solely on the candidates who chose to run and the actual votes
cast, but who would have lost pairwise to a potential candidate who
didn't run, should not be deemed the sincere Condorcet winner.
<p>Greg Dennis asks "why leave out the November 2022 election where
RCV elected the Condorcet winner Peltola?" Because we're not
claiming RCV always defeats the Condorcet winner. However, was
Peltola really the *sincere* Condorcet winner in November 2022?
It's impossible to know for certain, because RCV may have deterred
potential candidates from competing, or the primary election may
have prevented potential candidates from competing in the general
election.</p>
<p>By the way, my definition of "spoiler" is narrower than RBJ's
definition. He calls X a spoiler if X, by running, causes the
winner to change from some Y to some Z. I call X a spoiler if
both of the following conditions hold: (1) X, by running, causes
the winner to change from some Y to some Z. (2) The number of
voters whose order of preference has X > Y > Z exceeds the
number of voters whose order of preference has X > Z > Y.
In other words, X is a spoiler if X, by running, causes the
election of a "greater evil" of most of X's supporters. We can
also define a counterfactual spoiler: someone who would be a
spoiler if s/he runs, but chooses not to run. Similarly, we can
define a counterfactual Condorcet winner: someone who would be the
sincere Condorcet winner if s/he runs, but chooses not to run.</p>
<p>Spoiling (which violates the IIA criterion) isn't necessarily
bad. For instance, if Scissors by running changes the winner from
Paper to Rock, the additional preference information gained when
Scissors runs may suggest Rock is better than Paper. In this
case, we should hope Scissors isn't deterred from running.<br>
</p>
<p>The possibility of rock-paper-scissors preferences shows that
some spoiling and violation of IIA is unavoidable for ANY
plausibly democratic voting method. (That means any voting method
that tends to reduce to majority rule when there are only two
candidates. Cardinal voting systems offer no escape from this
tendency, because voters in the majority who prefer Paper over
Rock have an obvious strategic incentive to vote the maximum for
Paper and the minimum for Rock when only Paper & Rock are
running, which is equivalent to majority rule.)<br>
</p>
<p>--Steve<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/5/2024 12:34 AM, Greg Dennis
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:CAOaqmjqkDLbOqWD642MVa=tLjr_V+yPoYXdeLPY7iZcTCSWLeg@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="ltr">Why leave out the November 2022 election where
Peltola was the Condorcet winner against Begich?</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 4:46 PM
robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">This
is what we've learned from the 2-year history of Ranked-Choice
Voting in Alaska.<br>
<br>
The Instant-Runoff Voting method of RCV failed in Alaska
August 2022 at everything that RCV is supposed to do for us
(as it also did in [Burlington Vermont 2009](<a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jIhFQfEoxSdyRz5SqEjZotbVDx4xshwM/view)" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jIhFQfEoxSdyRz5SqEjZotbVDx4xshwM/view)</a>).<br>
<br>
Essentially, it was a spoiled election with all the bad things
that come with a spoiled election. In August 2022, Sarah
Palin was a loser whose presence in the race materially
changed who the winner was. Had Palin not run, Begich would
meet Peltola in the final round and defeat Peltola. (We know
this from the [tallies](<a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y32bPVmq6vb6SwnMn6vwQxzoJfvrv6ID/view" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y32bPVmq6vb6SwnMn6vwQxzoJfvrv6ID/view</a>)
from the Cast Vote Record.)<br>
<br>
The definition of a Spoiler is a loser whose presence in the
race materially changes who the winner is.<br>
<br>
So then these voters for the spoiler, Palin, they find out
that their second-choice vote was never counted. Their
favorite candidate was defeated and their second-choice vote
was never counted. If just 1 out of 13 of the Palin voters
that marked Begich as their lesser evil (there were 34089 of
them); if about 2600 of these voters voted tactically (the
tactic is called "compromising") and marked their lesser-evil
(Begich) as their first-choice vote, then Begich would have
met Peltola in the final round and beaten Peltola.<br>
<br>
They were promised that it was safe to vote for their
favorite, Sarah Palin, but by doing so they caused the
election of Mary Peltola. But they prevented Begich from
having a head-to-head with Peltola because Palin did instead
and lost.<br>
<br>
There were about 112000 voting GOP and 75000 Dem. The GOP
vote was split and RCV promised that it would resolve the
split vote correctly, but it didn't. IRV propped up the
*weaker* of the two GOP candidates against Peltola and that
candidate lost. If, instead, RCV had put Begich up against
Peltola, Begich would have won.<br>
<br>
They were promised that RCV would let them vote their hopes,
not their fears. But they would have been better off voting
their fears. They were promised their second-choice vote
would count if their favorite candidate couldn't get elected
but that second-choice vote was never counted for these Palin
voters.<br>
<br>
More Alaskans, 87899 to 79461 (an 8438 voter margin),
preferred Begich to Peltola and marked their ballots saying
so. But Mary Peltola was elected instead.<br>
<br>
This November, again, more Alaskan voters marked their ballots
that Begich is preferred to Peltola by nearly the same margin,
8354 (164117 to 155763).<br>
<br>
Both times about 8000 more Alaskans said they would prefer
Begich over Peltola to go to Washington and represent the
state. And, both times, Alaskan voters marked their ballots
saying so. Both times, Instant-Runoff Voting was used.<br>
<br>
What was different?<br>
<br>
Sarah Palin was in the race in 2022 and not in the race in
2024. And different winners resulted.<br>
<br>
--<br>
<br>
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ <a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
<br>
.<br>
.<br>
.<br>
----<br>
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<span class="gmail_signature_prefix">-- </span><br>
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<div dir="ltr"><b>Greg Dennis,
Ph.D. :: Policy Director</b>
<div>Voter Choice Massachusetts</div>
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<div>e :: <a href="mailto:greg.dennis@voterchoicema.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">greg.dennis@voterchoicema.org</a><br>
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<div>w :: <a href="https://www.voterchoicema.org/" style="color:rgb(17,85,204)" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">voterchoicema.org</a></div>
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