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<div style="font-size: 10pt;"><div dir="auto"><div>Limey says:</div><div><br></div><div>>There's two different issues here. The first is we want to be able to release precinct-level data, so we can check it for unusual patterns.</div><div><br></div><div>And for redundantly adding up the same tallies that the election authority adds to determine who won in each race.</div><div><br></div><div>>The second is we want to be sure none of the ballots are tampered with or destroyed in transit (after polls close). Precinct summability implies both (by letting us skip transit entirely), </div><div><br></div><div>It doesn't preclude transit of the ballot physical instruments. It's *redundant*.</div><div><br></div><div>>but isn't needed for either.</div><div><br></div><div>The method(s) of insurance against tampering must be simple enough that the public understands them. Precinct Summability is simple. And it is used already in every election except for IRV e
lections. Candidates or their operatives take smart phone photos of the tallies that get printed out at each polling place. As well as political reporters in the media. Everyone knows on election night who won unless it's so close that a recount will be ordered. No surprises.</div><div><br></div><div>>An easy way to prove ballots weren't tampered with in transport is WDS's receipt proposal.</div><div><br></div><div>The normal way is with ballot storage in sealed bags or boxes with serialized seals and the record of custody. When a ballot bag is opened for a recount, it must have the same seal as the bag was closed with before. Serialized seals are not reusable and, if cut, cannot be repaired without showing evidence of tampering.</div><div><br></div><div>Precinct Summability is for *redundancy*. An additional method to show that at least the tallies of the ballots were not messed with.</div><div><br></div><div>> Print a receipt (exact
copy) of each vote and put it in a box. Every ballot and receipt has a random serial number on it.</div><div><br></div><div>In the US, we have a constitutional right to vote by Secret Ballot. The ballots must not be traceable to the specific voter. They can be serialized until they go into the ballot box Then they must be anonymized. In Illinois, when I lived there, the serial number tab was torn off the ballot card.</div><div><br></div><div>> After the election, the government can post ballots along with randomized serial numbers.</div><div><br></div><div>In the 1990s Iraq had a presidential election and Saddam Hussein was reelected with 99% of the vote. How do you think that happened? It was because the ballots were serialized and voters knew the serial number would eventually be traced back to themselves.</div><div><br></div><div>Secret Ballot (where the government is incapable of tracing the value of the votes back to the voter)
and serialized ballots are not compatible.</div></div></div>
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