<div dir="ltr"><div dir="auto">Ahh, yeah, any PR method will outperform winner-take-all on this metric. If cities are using STV for their city councils, that might imply single-winner IRV actively reduces minority representation.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That said, my guess is the effect of STV is probably going to be limited compared to other methods, because STV is only proportional for solid coalitions, i.e. voting blocs moving in perfect lockstep with each other, and only if they exceed a full quota. So, for example, if ethnic minorities tend to vote for a mix of white and minority candidates, or if they're split across party lines (e.g. Hispanics only go about 60-40 for Democrats), this will tend to break up and dilute their interests. It's not enough to have a quota of Hispanics who rate Hispanic Republicans and Hispanic Democrats highly; you need to have a full quota rank <i>either</i> a Hispanic Republican or a Hispanic Democrat at the top of their ballots. The effect is the same as center-squeeze, where your vote gets "stuck" with a weak candidate who nevertheless has enough first preferences to stay in the race for several rounds. By the time this candidate is eliminated, the more-electable candidates with fewer first preferences have been defeated.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div>But from what I can tell, this is much trickier to resolve than center-squeeze; proportional Condorcet methods don't seem to have any guarantees on how out-of-whack a coalition can get, although I think Schulze STV has a nice local stability property.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Most ethnic minorities aren’t solid coalitions, although African-Americans happen to be so overwhelmingly Democratic they might act like one. Something like PAV that approximately satisfies the core property should do better at giving minority voters more representation.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 8:40 PM Richard, the VoteFair guy <<a href="mailto:electionmethods@votefair.org">electionmethods@votefair.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On 7/11/2024 10:47 AM, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:<br>
> ... given there's no theoretical basis to think IRV would affect<br>
> city council and mayoral seats differently. ...<br>
<br>
In the new Portland elections, "ranked choice voting" for city-council <br>
seats is STV (the Single Transferable Vote) with three seats per <br>
district, whereas "ranked choice voting" for Portland mayor is <br>
single-winner IRV (instant-runoff voting).<br>
<br>
Of course Portland's three-seats-per-district STV city-council elections <br>
are going to yield more gender and racial diversity compared to <br>
single-winner IRV for electing Portland's mayor.<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
<br>
<br>
On 7/11/2024 10:47 AM, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:<br>
> I'm going to go ahead and say I'm skeptical either of these results will <br>
> replicate, given there's no theoretical basis to think IRV would affect <br>
> city council and mayoral seats differently. My guess is both results <br>
> would disappear if you used a hierarchical/partial pooling model to <br>
> reduce the noise in the estimates.<br>
> <br>
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 10:45 AM Michael Garman <br>
> <<a href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us" target="_blank">michael.garman@rankthevote.us</a> <mailto:<a href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us" target="_blank">michael.garman@rankthevote.us</a>>> <br>
> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> And that’s bad! But it doesn’t negate the point I made. In council<br>
> races it helps. And that’s good!<br>
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 1:44 PM Closed Limelike Curves<br>
> <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a><br>
> <mailto:<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> > In mayoral elections, RCV seems to *decrease* gender and<br>
> racial/ethnic diversity.<br>
> Sounds substantial!<br>
> <br>
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 10:28 AM Michael Garman<br>
> <<a href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us" target="_blank">michael.garman@rankthevote.us</a><br>
> <mailto:<a href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us" target="_blank">michael.garman@rankthevote.us</a>>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> > In city council elections, RCV has a small but positive<br>
> effect on racial/ethnic diversity<br>
> Sounds substantial!<br>
> <br>
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2024 at 1:26 PM Closed Limelike Curves<br>
> <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a><br>
> <mailto:<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> Empirically, IRV adoption has no substantial effects on<br>
> diversity<br>
> <<a href="https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/rcv-impact-on-candidate-entry-and-representation/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/rcv-impact-on-candidate-entry-and-representation/</a>>. In theory, I'd expect a small decrease in representation for minorities, because people of color tend to have higher rates of spoiled ballots, so IRV should hit them the hardest.<br>
> <br>
> In general, the theoretical advantages of IRV over FPP<br>
> are outweighed by its practical costs (spoiled ballots,<br>
> lower trust in elections, cost, etc.).<br>
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> for list info<br>
> <br>
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</blockquote></div>