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<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">An equal-ranking isn’t a way to express
indifference..</blockquote>
<br>
Of course that is exactly what it is.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">...(or else equal-ranks would never
happen) ..<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
(For this email I'll refrain from subtle sarcasm.) That doesn't
make any sense.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Learning that a voter refuses to say
whether they prefer Bob or Bill provides an important piece of
information.</blockquote>
<br>
I can't imagine what that might be if it was the case, but we
haven't "learn't" any such thing. The voter hasn't expressed a
preference between Bob and Bill. Sans mind-reading technology I
don't see that we have any choice other than following the Occam's
Razor principle and assume the voter has no preference between Bob
and Bill.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p class="gmail-first:mt-0 gmail-last:mb-0" dir="ltr"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">Here's an example of
a realistic situation where this applies. Say we have a
paired matchup where Donald Trump defeats Mitt Romney by
36%-29%, because most Republicans prefer Trump. Most
Democrats truncate their ballots and refuse to rank either,
which might hurt them: if they support Romney, he might
defeat the Democratic candidate.</span></p>
<span style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">In this situation,
we have to work out what </span>their<span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"> opinions are.</span></blockquote>
<br>
I don't see why. And how? And who exactly is this "we"?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">So, isn't it
reasonable to say this isn't a real victory for Trump at all?
</span></blockquote>
<br>
No, it is not reasonable.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">It's perfectly
reasonable—probable, even—that Romney is much more popular
than he looks here, and the only reason Trump looks like he
beats is because he has a small but extreme base of
supporters. </span></blockquote>
<br>
It may or may not be an accurate guess, but I can't see anything
"reasonable" about it.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"> </span><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">Similarly, what if
some Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez voters bullet-vote for moral
reasons or because they're overconfident in their chances of
victory, and don't want to give a win away to a more moderate
Democrat? Wouldn't it reasonable to infer that these AOC
supporters, despite ranking all the viable candidates equally,
</span><i style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">do</i><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"> actually support
Clinton as their second choice?</span><br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Same answer: No.<br>
<br>
There is more than one way to define "popular". And the
incentives of the method are obviously a big factor in our
guessing about how well the ballots reflect the voters' sincere
preferences.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 23/06/2024 8:01 am, Closed Limelike
Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+euzPhMdTxqa3M_fSC9iU+kiicQCGDz8QB++G31z6AO2A+Hhg@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">Chris, sorry if I wasn't clear enough with this
statement:
<div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">An
equal-ranking isn’t a way to express indifference (or else
equal-ranks would never happen); it’s a way of pleading the
fifth. Learng that a voter refuses to say whether they
prefer Bob or Bill provides an important piece of
information.</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="gmail-first:mt-0 gmail-last:mb-0"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">In the United
States, Americans have a constitutional right to refuse
to answer any question they're asked by a police officer
or other government official. This is guaranteed by the
fifth amendment, and is intended to prevent forced
confessions. This extends to guilty pleas, and someone
who invokes this right is described as "pleading the
fifth (amendment)".</span></p>
<p class="gmail-first:mt-0 gmail-last:mb-0"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">Someone who
pleads the fifth, in response to an accusation of the
crime, is saying "I refuse to provide this information,
because it might be harmful to me, or because it </span>might
violate my privacy<span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"> ."</span></p>
<p class="gmail-first:mt-0 gmail-last:mb-0" dir="ltr"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">Here's an
example of a realistic situation where this applies. Say
we have a paired matchup where Donald Trump defeats Mitt
Romney by 36%-29%, because most Republicans prefer
Trump. Most Democrats truncate their ballots and refuse
to rank either, which might hurt them: if they support
Romney, he might defeat the Democratic candidate.</span></p>
<p class="gmail-first:mt-0 gmail-last:mb-0" dir="ltr"><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">In this
situation, we have to work out what </span>their<span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"> opinions are.
So, isn't it reasonable to say this isn't a real victory
for Trump at all? It's perfectly reasonable—probable,
even—that Romney is much more popular than he looks
here, and the only reason Trump looks like he beats is
because he has a small but extreme base of supporters. </span><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">Similarly, what
if some Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez voters bullet-vote for
moral reasons or because they're overconfident in their
chances of victory, and don't want to give a win away to
a more moderate Democrat? Wouldn't it reasonable to
infer that these AOC supporters, despite ranking all the
viable candidates equally, </span><i
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;">do</i><span
style="white-space-collapse: preserve;"> actually
support Clinton as their second choice?</span><br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jun 10, 2024 at
4:35 AM Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
I assume no-one posts a ballot "intending to be
irrelevant" (and whether they do or not I don't see as
relevant).<br>
<br>
Normally I wouldn't expect irrelevant ballots to be
literally "empty", just containing no information about
any of the remotely viable information.<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">An equal-ranking isn’t a way to
express indifference (or else equal-ranks would never
happen); it’s a way of pleading the fifth</blockquote>
<br>
What?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Learning that a voter refuses to say
whether they prefer Bob or Bill provides an important
piece of information.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
Which is?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Learning a voter has cast a
completely blank ballot is an extreme case, where the
ballot provides a very important piece of information: it
means the voter expects a participation failure, because <span>a</span>
nonempty ballot will hurt them.</blockquote>
<br>
But an empty one might "help" them ?? Hilarious.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">A rational response to this is to
raise the threshold for a defeat, because setting the bar
for a defeat closer to 50% prevents cycles (and therefore
participation failures). In other words, these ballots are
<i>very</i> relevant.</blockquote>
<br>
Of course, you anonymous STAR Voting advocate.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
<div>On 7/06/2024 1:33 am, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">Yeah, MAMPO seems like it might behave
more sensibly there.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">IIB doesn’t make sense to me outside of
positional voting systems (which trivially satisfy it).
If an empty ballot was genuinely intended to be
irrelevant, the voter wouldn’t have cast it in the
first place. An equal-ranking isn’t a way to express
indifference (or else equal-ranks would never happen);
it’s a way of pleading the fifth. Learning that a voter
refuses to say whether they prefer Bob or Bill provides
an important piece of information.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Learning a voter has cast a completely
blank ballot is an extreme case, where the ballot
provides a very important piece of information: it means
the voter expects a participation failure, because <span>a</span>
nonempty ballot will hurt them.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A rational response to this is to raise
the threshold for a defeat, because setting the bar for
a defeat closer to 50% prevents cycles (and therefore
participation failures). In other words, these ballots
are <i>very</i> relevant.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jun 6, 2024
at 7:40 AM Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p>Kevin,<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="font-family:monospace">I would not like to see SFC as totally obsolete, since it was one of the motivating
criteria (along with MD and weak FBC) for my methods MDDA and MAMPO :)</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Inventing those methods was some achievement as a
thought experiment to demonstrate that certain
criteria are mutually compatible. <br>
<br>
But MDDA spectacularly fails the maximum-absurdity
criterion Mono-add-Plump, a very interesting fact
that isn't mentioned on its electowiki page.<br>
<br>
<a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Majority_Defeat_Disqualification_Approval"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Majority_Defeat_Disqualification_Approval</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h2
style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom:1px solid rgb(162,169,177);font-size:1.5em;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
id="m_451518903132665058m_7234359816249269230Procedure"
style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Procedure</span></h2>
<p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">The
voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The
candidates explicitly ranked are considered<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">approved</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>by
that voter.</p>
<p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">A
candidate is<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">dominated</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>if
more than half of the voters rank some other
candidate strictly above him.</p>
<p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">All
dominated candidates are eliminated, unless
this would eliminate all the candidates.</p>
<p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">Of
remaining candidates, the one approved by the
most voters is elected.</p>
<h2
style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom:1px solid rgb(162,169,177);font-size:1.5em;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
id="m_451518903132665058m_7234359816249269230Criteria"
style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Criteria</span></h2>
<p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><b
style="font-family:sans-serif">MDDA</b><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>satisfies
the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Favorite_Betrayal_criterion"
title="Favorite Betrayal criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Favorite
Betrayal criterion</a>,<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-Free_criterion"
title="Strategy-Free criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Strategy-Free
criterion</a>, the<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strong_Defensive_Strategy_criterion"
title="Strong Defensive Strategy criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Strong
Defensive Strategy criterion</a><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>(and<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimal_Defense_criterion"
title="Minimal Defense criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Minimal
Defense criterion</a>), and<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Monotonicity_criterion"
title="Monotonicity criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">monotonicity</a>.</p>
<p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">It
fails<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategic_nomination"
title="Strategic nomination"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Clone-Winner</a>,
the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Plurality_criterion"
title="Plurality criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Plurality
criterion</a>, the<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Generalized_Strategy-Free_criterion"
title="Generalized Strategy-Free criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Generalized
Strategy-Free criterion</a>, the<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Condorcet_criterion"
title="Condorcet criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Condorcet
criterion</a>, the<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Smith_set"
title="Smith set"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Smith
criterion</a>,<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Participation_criterion"
title="Participation criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Participation</a>,
the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Majority_criterion"
title="Majority criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Majority
criterion for solid coalitions</a>, and<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Later-no-harm_criterion"
title="Later-no-harm criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;background:repeat;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Later-no-harm</a>.</p>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre
style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">25: A>B
26: B>C
23: C>A
04: C
78 ballots (majority threshold = 40)
B>C 51-27, C>A 53-25, A>B 48-26. Implicit Approval scores: C 53, B 51, A 48.
All the candidates have a majority-strength defeat, so none are eliminated and the most approved candidate, C, wins.
Say we now add 22 ballots that all plump (i.e. bullet vote) for C:
25: A>B
26: B>C
23: C>A
26: C
100 ballots (majority threshold = 51)
B>C 51-49, C>A 75-25, A>B 48-26. Implicit Approval scores: C 75, B 51, A 48.
Now only B is without a "majority-strength defeat", so the winner changes from C to B.
Of course the method also fails Irrelevant Ballots Independence. If we now add 3 ballots that plump for X, the majority threshold rises to 52 and so C's majority-strength defeat goes away and C wins again by being the most approved candidate.
This demonstration of Mono-add-Plump failure doesn't apply to MAMPO, but that method would also fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence. It may be far less bad.
<a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Majority_Approval,_Minimum_Pairwise_Opposition"
style="font-family:monospace" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Majority_Approval,_Minimum_Pairwise_Opposition</a>
<blockquote type="cite" style="font-family:monospace"><h2
style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom:1px solid rgb(162,169,177);font-size:1.5em;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span
id="m_451518903132665058m_7234359816249269230Procedure"
style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Procedure</span></h2><p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">The voter submits a ranking of the candidates. The candidates explicitly ranked are considered<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">approved</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>by that voter.</p><p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">The<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">score</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>for candidate<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">X</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>against candidate<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">Y</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is equal to the number of voters ranking<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">X</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>above<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">Y</i>. The<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">max score</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>of candidate<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">X</i><span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is the largest score of any other candidate against<span
style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i
style="font-family:sans-serif">X</i>.</p><p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">If nobody is approved by more than half of the voters, then the candidate approved by the most voters is elected.</p><p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">Otherwise, the candidate with the lowest max score, who is approved by more than half of the voters, is elected.</p></blockquote>
Chris B.
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<div>On 2/06/2024 7:23 am, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
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<pre style="font-family:monospace">Hi all,
When I test for SFC compliance the rule on cast votes is that if there is no
majority over A, and A has a majority over B, then B can't win.
This is kind of a flip side of MD / SDSC because, if you were forced to explain MD
in terms of a graph of majority-strength defeats, it would say that if A has a
majority over B and B doesn't have a majority over anyone, then B can't win.
MD basically says that if there are two frontrunners and everyone truncates their
less liked frontrunner, then the worse frontrunner won't win. If this property
doesn't hold, it means the majority has done something to stop the method from
"seeing" their majority, which is surely that they ranked other candidates above
the preferred frontrunner. So MD is mostly about compromise incentive.
SFC is probably going to be about truncation. When a method fails it, most likely
it's because the majority gave the election away to a less liked compromise choice.
For example:
20 C>A>B
35 A>B
5 B
40 D
Here B is the implicit approval winner, but by SFC B should not win, because it
means it was not safe for the A voters to rank B.
I would not like to see SFC as totally obsolete, since it was one of the motivating
criteria (along with MD and weak FBC) for my methods MDDA and MAMPO :)
Kevin
<a href="http://votingmethods.net" style="font-family:monospace"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">votingmethods.net</a>
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