<div><div dir="auto">I think Minimal Defense can be justified as strongly desirable without any reference to strategy at all: it's just the majority loser criterion with truncation. In other words, if a majority of voters refuse to rank a candidate at all, that candidate cannot win (unless all candidates are rejected by a majority).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 7:57 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div></div><div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 19:04 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>
<div dir="auto">
It [SDC] doesn't talk about just any "Condorcet winner". It says that if
A is the sincere CW and more than half the voters vote A above B,
then the voters who prefer B to A can't make B win just by
truncating.</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Exactly. That was what I meant to say. Forgive me if I didn’t say it.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">But maybe they can if less than half the voters vote A over B (with
A still being the sincere CW and pairwise-beating B) and maybe they
can by order-reversal Burial.</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Of course.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">Sincere Defense [Minimal Defense (MDC)] says that if more than half the voters prefer A to
B, they can stop B from winning by voting A over B and truncating
against B. From a Kevin Venzke webpage:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005" target="_blank">https://votingmethods.net/em2005</a><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><a name="m_9179938696402931512_m_-4506383311352659287_m_-1614108149935120492_critmd" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<h3 style="font-family:"Times New Roman""><b style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">Minimal Defense</b>.<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">(Due to Steve
Eppley.)</i></h3>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman""><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">If more than half of the voters rank candidate A above
candidate B, and don't rank candidate B above anyone, then
candidate B must be elected with 0% probability.</i></p></a></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Yes.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><a name="m_9179938696402931512_m_-4506383311352659287_m_-1614108149935120492_critmd" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><p dir="auto" style="font-family:"Times New Roman""><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman""></i></p>
</a>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><a name="m_9179938696402931512_m_-4506383311352659287_m_-1614108149935120492_critmd" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">Steve Eppley has defined and discussed Minimal
Defense<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span></a><a href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">here [broken link]</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>and<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/Strategic%20Indifference.htm" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">here
[broken link]</a>. Satisfaction of this criterion implies
compliance with Mike Ossipoff's<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">strong defensive
strategy criterion</i>, although the reverse is not
necessarily true. That criterion can be found<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/stfree.html" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">here
[broken link]</a>.</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Yes, it’s true that they aren’t the same, because MDC requires stipulation of a balloting (usually ranked)…but SDSC is universally applicable, because it’s a preference-&-sincere </div><div dir="auto">criterion.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto">Note
that the ballot must accept all preference orders; in
particular, the voter must be able to rank multiple candidates
above no one (usually by truncation), and to<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">strictly</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>rank
any number of candidates. If the word "strictly" were dropped,
then<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Approval</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>would
satisfy, as could other methods using a "limited slot" ballot</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Yes, Approval doesn’t pass SDSC, due to the definition of “sincere” for the preference-sincere criteria, though SDSC applies to Approval. …& I didn’t apply MDC to Approval.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Because I prefer preference-sincere criteria, I didn’t define a version of MDC for Approval-balloting. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Anyway, MDC was Eppley’s version. …& the version that was generally-accepted. …& therefore the one that I usually refer to. …which is fine, because we only use it for comparison of rank-methods.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto">. (<a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Approval</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>satisfies
Mike Ossipoff's<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">weak defensive strategy
criterion</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>for this reason.) In my opinion,
the word "strictly" should be dropped, since<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Approval</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>can
already be made to satisfy Minimal Defense just by allowing the
voter to number his approved candidates, without analyzing the
ballot any differently.</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Sure, if that would make the votes-only criteria apply to Approval, Score & STAR.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">Minimal
Defense deals with the issue of what a majority need to do to
get their opinion counted. Specifically, if they are united in
preferring candidate A to candidate B, all they have to do is
not rank B. They need not do anything special regarding A. For
instance, on these ballots:</p>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face="Courier" style="font-family:Courier;color:rgb(0,0,0)">49 B<br>
13 C>A<br>
13 D>A<br>
13 E>A<br>
12 F>A<br>
</font></p>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto">The
A>B voters (i.e., the voters preferring A to B) are a
majority, and do not rank B at all, so that Minimal Defense
guarantees that B won't win. However, candidate B is the winner
in e.g.<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methfpp" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Plurality</a>,<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methirv" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Instant Runoff</a>,
and<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methdsc" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Descending
Solid Coalitions</a>. Under these methods, if the A>B
majority want to prevent B from being elected, they need to
insincerely raise candidate A in their rankings.</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">—& that problem remains to some significant degree with any Condorcet version that isn’t autodeterent.</div></div></div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p></blockquote></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p></blockquote></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">A
more general way to view this problem is by noting that this
election is primarily a contest between A and B. In that light,
it would be very undesirable for the election method to elect
the<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">wrong one</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>of these two.
Minimal Defense ensures that the method can't be "confused" by
the introduction of weaker candidates preferred to the major
candidates.</p>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">As
for the methods which satisfy Minimal Defense,<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methsch" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Schulze</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>elects
A in the above scenario (as would any<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methcond" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Condorcet
method</a>), and<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methcdtt" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Equal
Majorities</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>elects either C, D, E, or F. (This
is because all candidates besides B are in the CDTT; when<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methrb" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Random Ballot</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>is
used to break the tie, only these four candidates have any first
preferences.<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methmmpo" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Minimum
Opposition</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>gives the same result,
incidentally, although it doesn't satisfy Minimal Defense when
there are more than three candidates.)</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 1/06/2024 8:38 am, Closed Limelike
Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">OK, so SFC prevents offensive truncation from
defeating the Condorcet winner, while minimal defense provides a
simple way to stop order-reversal?</div></blockquote></div><div><blockquote type="cite">
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at
4:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto">Evidently, then, SFC merely says that the
candidate can’t win without order-reversal, while
Minimal-Defense says he can’t win at all if the minimal
defensive-strategy is used.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It seems to me that Eppley’s Minimal-Defense
was the votes-only criterion based on SDSC.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…& that SDSC was the original,
preference-&-sincerity version.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I preferred preference-&-sincerity
because of its universal applicability, where votes-only
had to stipulate a balloting.</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024
at 12:33 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)">Why are we having a public
discussion about a voting method criterion
without anyone giving its definition, and with
apparently most of the participants in the
discussion knowing nothing about it besides its
name?</font><br>
<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">The<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><b style="font-family:sans-serif">strategy-free
criterion</b><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is a<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion" title="Voting system criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">voting
system criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>for
evaluating<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system" title="Voting system" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">voting
systems</a>.</font></p>
<h2 style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom-width:1px;border-bottom-style:solid;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom-color:rgb(162,169,177);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font size="4" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span id="m_9179938696402931512m_-4506383311352659287m_-1614108149935120492m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496Definitions" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Definitions</span></font></h2>
<p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">A sincere vote is one with no
falsified preferences or preferences left
unspecified when the election method allows
them to be specified (in addition to the
preferences already specified).</font></p>
<p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">One candidate is preferred over
another candidate if, in a one-on-one
competition, more voters prefer the first
candidate than prefer the other candidate.</font></p>
<p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">If one candidate is preferred over
each of the other candidates, that candidate
is called "Condorcet candidate" or "Condorcet
winner".</font></p>
<h2 style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom-width:1px;border-bottom-style:solid;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom-color:rgb(162,169,177);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font size="4" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span id="m_9179938696402931512m_-4506383311352659287m_-1614108149935120492m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496Statement_of_criterion" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Statement
of criterion</span></font></h2>
<blockquote style="border-left-width:4px;border-left-style:solid;padding:8px 32px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(249,249,249);border-left-color:rgb(234,236,240);color:rgb(32,33,34)">
<p style="margin:0px;font-family:sans-serif"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">If a
Condorcet candidate exists, and if a
majority prefers this candidate to another
candidate, then the other candidate should
not win if that majority votes sincerely and
no other voter falsifies any preferences.</font></p>
</blockquote>
<p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">In a ranked method, it is nearly
equivalent to say:</font></p>
<blockquote style="border-left-width:4px;border-left-style:solid;padding:8px 32px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(249,249,249);border-left-color:rgb(234,236,240);color:rgb(32,33,34)">
<p style="margin:0px;font-family:sans-serif"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">If more
than half of the voters rank<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">x</i><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>above<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">y</i>,
and there is no candidate<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">z</i><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>whom
more than half of the voters rank above<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">x</i>,
then<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">y</i><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>must
not be elected.</font></p>
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<font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
I think this evolved into the Minimal Defense
criterion, the "votes-only version" of which says
that if more than half the voters vote A over B
and B no higher than equal-bottom then B can't
win.</font></div>
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<div class="gmail_quote">
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<div><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div>On 31/05/2024 9:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">Some time ago, I wrote a criterion
that I called Strategy-Free-Criterion (SFC).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Is that what you were referring
to?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It was about a circumstance in
which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At that
time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">SFC didn’t catch-on, & I
haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I
don’t know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet is
strategy-free in a meaningful sense.</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May
31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
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<div><br>
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<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Wed, May 29, 2024 at 14:15 Closed
Limelike Curves <<a>closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> </div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Ppwrote:<br>
</div>
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<div dir="ltr">
<div>I'm trying to work out how the
strategy-free criterion actually
relates to strategy, because it
just sounds like it means the
majority-Condorcet criterion ("if
a candidate majority-beats every
other, they have to win if
everyone is honest"). <a class="gmail_plusreply" id="m_9179938696402931512m_-4506383311352659287m_-1614108149935120492m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496m_3749243691140155182m_3764866669967271283m_3208403200595893820plusReplyChip-1">@Michael
Ossipoff</a> ?</div>
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</div>
<div dir="auto"> Closed, isn’t
“Strategy-Free Criterion” your new name
for FBC.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s a very inaccurate name.
FBC-complying methods aren’t strategy-free
in any sense.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"> But they’re free of any
need for *drastic* defensive strategy
(favorite-burial or any defensive
order-reversal).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">You want strategy-free? The
wv Condorcet methods, such as RP(wv) &
MinMax(wv), are strategy-free in a
meaningful sense…effectively free of need
for any defensive strategy…due to their
autodeterence.</div>
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<blockquote type="cite"> <br>
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