<div><div dir="auto">I think Minimal Defense can be justified as strongly desirable without any reference to strategy at all: it's just the majority loser criterion with truncation. In other words, if a majority of voters refuse to rank a candidate at all, that candidate cannot win (unless all candidates are rejected by a majority).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 7:57 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div></div><div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at 19:04 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>

  
    
  
  <div dir="auto">
    It [SDC] doesn't talk about just any "Condorcet winner".  It says that if
    A is the sincere CW and more than half the voters vote A above B,
    then the voters who prefer B to A can't make B win just by
    truncating.</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Exactly. That was what I meant to say. Forgive me if I didn’t say it.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">But maybe they can if less than half the voters vote A over B (with
    A still being the sincere CW and pairwise-beating B) and maybe they
    can by order-reversal Burial.</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Of course.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">Sincere Defense  [Minimal Defense (MDC)] says that if more than half the voters prefer A to
    B, they can stop B from winning by voting A over B and truncating
    against B.  From a Kevin Venzke webpage:<br>
    <br>
    <a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005" target="_blank">https://votingmethods.net/em2005</a><br>
    <br>
    <blockquote type="cite"><a name="m_9179938696402931512_m_-4506383311352659287_m_-1614108149935120492_critmd" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">
        <h3 style="font-family:"Times New Roman""><b style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">Minimal Defense</b>.<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">(Due to Steve
            Eppley.)</i></h3>
        <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman""><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">If more than half of the voters rank candidate A above
            candidate B, and don't rank candidate B above anyone, then
            candidate B must be elected with 0% probability.</i></p></a></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Yes.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><a name="m_9179938696402931512_m_-4506383311352659287_m_-1614108149935120492_critmd" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><p dir="auto" style="font-family:"Times New Roman""><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman""></i></p>
      </a>
      <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><a name="m_9179938696402931512_m_-4506383311352659287_m_-1614108149935120492_critmd" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">Steve Eppley has defined and discussed Minimal
          Defense<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span></a><a href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">here [broken link]</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>and<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/Strategic%20Indifference.htm" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">here
          [broken link]</a>. Satisfaction of this criterion implies
        compliance with Mike Ossipoff's<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">strong defensive
          strategy criterion</i>, although the reverse is not
        necessarily true. That criterion can be found<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/stfree.html" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">here
          [broken link]</a>.</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Yes, it’s true that they aren’t the same, because MDC requires stipulation of a balloting (usually ranked)…but SDSC is universally applicable, because it’s a preference-&-sincere </div><div dir="auto">criterion.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto">Note
        that the ballot must accept all preference orders; in
        particular, the voter must be able to rank multiple candidates
        above no one (usually by truncation), and to<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">strictly</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>rank
        any number of candidates. If the word "strictly" were dropped,
        then<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Approval</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>would
        satisfy, as could other methods using a "limited slot" ballot</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Yes, Approval doesn’t pass SDSC, due to the definition of “sincere” for the preference-sincere criteria, though SDSC applies to Approval.  …& I didn’t apply MDC to Approval.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Because I prefer preference-sincere criteria, I didn’t define a version of MDC for Approval-balloting. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Anyway, MDC was Eppley’s version. …& the version that was generally-accepted. …& therefore the one that I usually refer to.  …which is fine, because we only use it for comparison of rank-methods.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto">. (<a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Approval</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>satisfies
        Mike Ossipoff's<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">weak defensive strategy
          criterion</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>for this reason.) In my opinion,
        the word "strictly" should be dropped, since<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Approval</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>can
        already be made to satisfy Minimal Defense just by allowing the
        voter to number his approved candidates, without analyzing the
        ballot any differently.</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Sure, if that would make the votes-only criteria apply to Approval, Score & STAR.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p>
      <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">Minimal
        Defense deals with the issue of what a majority need to do to
        get their opinion counted. Specifically, if they are united in
        preferring candidate A to candidate B, all they have to do is
        not rank B. They need not do anything special regarding A. For
        instance, on these ballots:</p>
      <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font face="Courier" style="font-family:Courier;color:rgb(0,0,0)">49 B<br>
          13 C>A<br>
          13 D>A<br>
          13 E>A<br>
          12 F>A<br>
        </font></p>
      <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto">The
        A>B voters (i.e., the voters preferring A to B) are a
        majority, and do not rank B at all, so that Minimal Defense
        guarantees that B won't win. However, candidate B is the winner
        in e.g.<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methfpp" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Plurality</a>,<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methirv" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Instant Runoff</a>,
        and<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methdsc" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Descending
          Solid Coalitions</a>. Under these methods, if the A>B
        majority want to prevent B from being elected, they need to
        insincerely raise candidate A in their rankings.</p></blockquote></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">—& that problem remains to some significant degree with any Condorcet version that isn’t autodeterent.</div></div></div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p></blockquote></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p></blockquote></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)" dir="auto"></p>
      <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">A
        more general way to view this problem is by noting that this
        election is primarily a contest between A and B. In that light,
        it would be very undesirable for the election method to elect
        the<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><i style="font-family:"Times New Roman"">wrong one</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>of these two.
        Minimal Defense ensures that the method can't be "confused" by
        the introduction of weaker candidates preferred to the major
        candidates.</p>
      <p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(208,208,208);color:rgb(0,0,0)">As
        for the methods which satisfy Minimal Defense,<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methsch" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Schulze</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>elects
        A in the above scenario (as would any<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methcond" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Condorcet
          method</a>), and<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methcdtt" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Equal
          Majorities</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>elects either C, D, E, or F. (This
        is because all candidates besides B are in the CDTT; when<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methrb" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Random Ballot</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>is
        used to break the tie, only these four candidates have any first
        preferences.<span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span><a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methmmpo" style="font-family:"Times New Roman"" target="_blank">Minimum
          Opposition</a><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span>gives the same result,
        incidentally, although it doesn't satisfy Minimal Defense when
        there are more than three candidates.)</p>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    <br>
    <div>On 1/06/2024 8:38 am, Closed Limelike
      Curves wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite">
      
      <div dir="auto">OK, so SFC prevents offensive truncation from
        defeating the Condorcet winner, while minimal defense provides a
        simple way to stop order-reversal?</div></blockquote></div><div><blockquote type="cite">
      <div><br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">
          <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at
            4:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
            wrote:<br>
          </div>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
            <div dir="auto">Evidently, then,  SFC merely says that the
              candidate can’t win without order-reversal, while
              Minimal-Defense says he can’t win at all if the minimal
              defensive-strategy is used.</div>
            <div dir="auto"><br>
            </div>
            <div dir="auto">It seems to me that Eppley’s Minimal-Defense
              was the votes-only criterion based on SDSC.</div>
            <div dir="auto"><br>
            </div>
            <div dir="auto">…& that SDSC was the original,
              preference-&-sincerity version.</div>
            <div dir="auto"><br>
            </div>
            <div dir="auto">I preferred preference-&-sincerity
              because of its universal applicability, where votes-only
              had to stipulate a balloting.</div>
            <div><br>
              <div class="gmail_quote">
                <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024
                  at 12:33 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
                  wrote:<br>
                </div>
                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
                  <div>
                    <p><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)">Why are we having a public
                        discussion about a voting method criterion
                        without anyone giving its definition, and with
                        apparently most of the participants in the
                        discussion knowing nothing about it besides its
                        name?</font><br>
                      <br>
                      <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion</a><br>
                      <br>
                    </p>
                    <blockquote type="cite">
                      <p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">The<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><b style="font-family:sans-serif">strategy-free
                            criterion</b><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is a<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion" title="Voting system criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">voting
                            system criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>for
                          evaluating<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system" title="Voting system" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">voting
                            systems</a>.</font></p>
                      <h2 style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom-width:1px;border-bottom-style:solid;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom-color:rgb(162,169,177);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font size="4" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span id="m_9179938696402931512m_-4506383311352659287m_-1614108149935120492m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496Definitions" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Definitions</span></font></h2>
                      <p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">A sincere vote is one with no
                          falsified preferences or preferences left
                          unspecified when the election method allows
                          them to be specified (in addition to the
                          preferences already specified).</font></p>
                      <p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">One candidate is preferred over
                          another candidate if, in a one-on-one
                          competition, more voters prefer the first
                          candidate than prefer the other candidate.</font></p>
                      <p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">If one candidate is preferred over
                          each of the other candidates, that candidate
                          is called "Condorcet candidate" or "Condorcet
                          winner".</font></p>
                      <h2 style="margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom-width:1px;border-bottom-style:solid;font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom-color:rgb(162,169,177);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><font size="4" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span id="m_9179938696402931512m_-4506383311352659287m_-1614108149935120492m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496Statement_of_criterion" style="font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif">Statement
                            of criterion</span></font></h2>
                      <blockquote style="border-left-width:4px;border-left-style:solid;padding:8px 32px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(249,249,249);border-left-color:rgb(234,236,240);color:rgb(32,33,34)">
                        <p style="margin:0px;font-family:sans-serif"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">If a
                            Condorcet candidate exists, and if a
                            majority prefers this candidate to another
                            candidate, then the other candidate should
                            not win if that majority votes sincerely and
                            no other voter falsifies any preferences.</font></p>
                      </blockquote>
                      <p style="margin:0.5em 0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">In a ranked method, it is nearly
                          equivalent to say:</font></p>
                      <blockquote style="border-left-width:4px;border-left-style:solid;padding:8px 32px;font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(249,249,249);border-left-color:rgb(234,236,240);color:rgb(32,33,34)">
                        <p style="margin:0px;font-family:sans-serif"><font size="4" style="font-family:sans-serif;color:rgb(32,33,34)">If more
                            than half of the voters rank<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">x</i><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>above<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">y</i>,
                            and there is no candidate<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">z</i><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>whom
                            more than half of the voters rank above<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">x</i>,
                            then<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span><i style="font-family:sans-serif">y</i><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>must
                            not be elected.</font></p>
                      </blockquote>
                    </blockquote>
                    <font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
                      I think this evolved into the Minimal Defense
                      criterion, the "votes-only version" of which says
                      that if more than half the voters vote A over B
                      and B no higher than equal-bottom then B can't
                      win.</font></div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </div>
            <div>
              <div class="gmail_quote">
                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
                  <div><br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <br>
                    <div>On 31/05/2024 9:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
                    </div>
                    <blockquote type="cite">
                      <div dir="auto">Some time ago, I wrote a criterion
                        that I called Strategy-Free-Criterion (SFC).</div>
                      <div dir="auto"><br>
                      </div>
                      <div dir="auto">Is that what you were referring
                        to?</div>
                      <div dir="auto"><br>
                      </div>
                      <div dir="auto">It was about a circumstance in
                        which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At that
                        time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.</div>
                      <div dir="auto"><br>
                      </div>
                      <div dir="auto">SFC didn’t catch-on, & I
                        haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I
                        don’t know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet is
                        strategy-free in a meaningful sense.</div>
                      <div><br>
                        <div class="gmail_quote">
                          <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May
                            31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
                            wrote:<br>
                          </div>
                          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
                            <div><br>
                            </div>
                            <div><br>
                              <div class="gmail_quote">
                                <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
                                  Wed, May 29, 2024 at 14:15 Closed
                                  Limelike Curves <<a>closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> </div>
                                <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Ppwrote:<br>
                                </div>
                                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
                                  <div dir="ltr">
                                    <div>I'm trying to work out how the
                                      strategy-free criterion actually
                                      relates to strategy, because it
                                      just sounds like it means the
                                      majority-Condorcet criterion ("if
                                      a candidate majority-beats every
                                      other, they have to win if
                                      everyone is honest"). <a class="gmail_plusreply" id="m_9179938696402931512m_-4506383311352659287m_-1614108149935120492m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496m_3749243691140155182m_3764866669967271283m_3208403200595893820plusReplyChip-1">@Michael
                                        Ossipoff</a> ?</div>
                                  </div>
                                </blockquote>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                            <div dir="auto"> Closed, isn’t
                              “Strategy-Free Criterion” your new name
                              for FBC.</div>
                            <div dir="auto"><br>
                            </div>
                            <div dir="auto">It’s a very inaccurate name.
                              FBC-complying methods aren’t strategy-free
                              in any sense.</div>
                            <div dir="auto"><br>
                            </div>
                            <div dir="auto"> But they’re free of any
                              need for *drastic* defensive strategy
                              (favorite-burial or any defensive
                              order-reversal).</div>
                            <div dir="auto"><br>
                            </div>
                            <div dir="auto">You want strategy-free? The
                              wv Condorcet methods, such as RP(wv) &
                              MinMax(wv), are strategy-free in a
                              meaningful sense…effectively free of need
                              for any defensive strategy…due to their
                              autodeterence.</div>
                          </blockquote>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                    </blockquote>
                  </div>
                  <div>
                    <blockquote type="cite"> <br>
                      <fieldset></fieldset>
                      <pre style="font-family:monospace">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" style="font-family:monospace" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
                    </blockquote>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </div>
            ----<br>
            Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a>
            for list info<br>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </div>

</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div>