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    <p>Yes, I don't know where my "Sincere Defense" brain-fart came
      from.  I meant *Minimal Defense*.   (I corrected it below).<br>
      <br>
      Chris B.<br>
      <br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/06/2024 11:34 am, Chris Benham
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:4cd62221-fb17-4a13-bd3b-8ad50364cfab@yahoo.com.au">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      It doesn't talk about just any "Condorcet winner".  It says that
      if A is the sincere CW and more than half the voters vote A above
      B, then the voters who prefer B to A can't make B win just by
      truncating.<br>
      <br>
      But maybe they can if less than half the voters vote A over B
      (with A still being the sincere CW and pairwise-beating B) and
      maybe they can by order-reversal Burial.<br>
      <br>
       Minimal Defense says that if more than half the voters prefer A
      to B, they can stop B from winning by voting A over B and
      truncating against B.  From a Kevin Venzke webpage:<br>
      <br>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
        href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005" moz-do-not-send="true">https://votingmethods.net/em2005</a><br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite"><a name="critmd"
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"
          moz-do-not-send="true">
          <h3><b>Minimal Defense</b>.<span> </span><i>(Due to Steve
              Eppley.)</i></h3>
          <p><i>If more than half of the voters rank candidate A above
              candidate B, and don't rank candidate B above anyone, then
              candidate B must be elected with 0% probability.</i></p>
        </a>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><a
            name="critmd" moz-do-not-send="true">Steve Eppley has
            defined and discussed Minimal Defense<span> </span></a><a
            href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/"
            moz-do-not-send="true">here [broken link]</a><span> </span>and<span> </span><a
href="http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/Strategic%20Indifference.htm"
            moz-do-not-send="true">here [broken link]</a>. Satisfaction
          of this criterion implies compliance with Mike Ossipoff's<span> </span><i>strong
            defensive strategy criterion</i>, although the reverse is
          not necessarily true. That criterion can be found<span> </span><a
            href="http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/stfree.html"
            moz-do-not-send="true">here [broken link]</a>.</p>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">Note
          that the ballot must accept all preference orders; in
          particular, the voter must be able to rank multiple candidates
          above no one (usually by truncation), and to<span> </span><i>strictly</i><span> </span>rank
          any number of candidates. If the word "strictly" were dropped,
          then<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Approval</a><span> </span>would
          satisfy, as could other methods using a "limited slot" ballot.
          (<a href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Approval</a><span> </span>satisfies
          Mike Ossipoff's<span> </span><i>weak defensive strategy
            criterion</i><span> </span>for this reason.) In my opinion,
          the word "strictly" should be dropped, since<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methappr"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Approval</a><span> </span>can already
          be made to satisfy Minimal Defense just by allowing the voter
          to number his approved candidates, without analyzing the
          ballot any differently.</p>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">Minimal
          Defense deals with the issue of what a majority need to do to
          get their opinion counted. Specifically, if they are united in
          preferring candidate A to candidate B, all they have to do is
          not rank B. They need not do anything special regarding A. For
          instance, on these ballots:</p>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><font
            face="Courier">49 B<br>
            13 C>A<br>
            13 D>A<br>
            13 E>A<br>
            12 F>A<br>
          </font></p>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">The
          A>B voters (i.e., the voters preferring A to B) are a
          majority, and do not rank B at all, so that Minimal Defense
          guarantees that B won't win. However, candidate B is the
          winner in e.g.<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methfpp"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Plurality</a>,<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methirv"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Instant Runoff</a>, and<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methdsc"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Descending Solid Coalitions</a>.
          Under these methods, if the A>B majority want to prevent B
          from being elected, they need to insincerely raise candidate A
          in their rankings.</p>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">A
          more general way to view this problem is by noting that this
          election is primarily a contest between A and B. In that
          light, it would be very undesirable for the election method to
          elect the<span> </span><i>wrong one</i><span> </span>of these
          two. Minimal Defense ensures that the method can't be
          "confused" by the introduction of weaker candidates preferred
          to the major candidates.</p>
        <p
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(208, 208, 208); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">As
          for the methods which satisfy Minimal Defense,<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methsch"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Schulze</a><span> </span>elects A in
          the above scenario (as would any<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methcond"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Condorcet method</a>), and<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methcdtt"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Equal Majorities</a><span> </span>elects
          either C, D, E, or F. (This is because all candidates besides
          B are in the CDTT; when<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methrb"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Random Ballot</a><span> </span>is
          used to break the tie, only these four candidates have any
          first preferences.<span> </span><a
            href="https://votingmethods.net/em2005#methmmpo"
            moz-do-not-send="true">Minimum Opposition</a><span> </span>gives
          the same result, incidentally, although it doesn't satisfy
          Minimal Defense when there are more than three candidates.)</p>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      <br>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/06/2024 8:38 am, Closed Limelike
        Curves wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+euzPi+VNW5xdJxPV9dCVx-q38SX8ar=E-CZWrRA+=nDuiNdg@mail.gmail.com">
        <meta http-equiv="content-type"
          content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
        <div dir="auto">OK, so SFC prevents offensive truncation from
          defeating the Condorcet winner, while minimal defense provides
          a simple way to stop order-reversal?</div>
        <div><br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024 at
              4:01 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a
                href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com"
                moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
              wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div dir="auto">Evidently, then,  SFC merely says that the
                candidate can’t win without order-reversal, while
                Minimal-Defense says he can’t win at all if the minimal
                defensive-strategy is used.</div>
              <div dir="auto"><br>
              </div>
              <div dir="auto">It seems to me that Eppley’s
                Minimal-Defense was the votes-only criterion based on
                SDSC.</div>
              <div dir="auto"><br>
              </div>
              <div dir="auto">…& that SDSC was the original,
                preference-&-sincerity version.</div>
              <div dir="auto"><br>
              </div>
              <div dir="auto">I preferred preference-&-sincerity
                because of its universal applicability, where votes-only
                had to stipulate a balloting.</div>
              <div><br>
                <div class="gmail_quote">
                  <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, May 31, 2024
                    at 12:33 Chris Benham <<a
                      href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
                      target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
                      class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
                    wrote:<br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                    <div>
                      <p><font size="4">Why are we having a public
                          discussion about a voting method criterion
                          without anyone giving its definition, and with
                          apparently most of the participants in the
                          discussion knowing nothing about it besides
                          its name?</font><br>
                        <br>
                        <a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion"
                          target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
                          class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Strategy-free_criterion</a><br>
                        <br>
                      </p>
                      <blockquote type="cite">
                        <p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4">The<span> </span><b>strategy-free
                              criterion</b><span> </span>is a<span> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion"
                              title="Voting system criterion"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(51,102,204);background:none"
                              target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">voting
                              system criterion</a><span> </span>for
                            evaluating<span> </span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system" title="Voting system"
style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(51,102,204);background:none"
                              target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">voting
                              systems</a>.</font></p>
                        <h2
style="color:rgb(0,0,0);margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom:1px solid rgb(162,169,177);font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4"><span
id="m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496Definitions">Definitions</span></font></h2>
                        <p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4">A sincere vote is one with no
                            falsified preferences or preferences left
                            unspecified when the election method allows
                            them to be specified (in addition to the
                            preferences already specified).</font></p>
                        <p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4">One candidate is preferred over
                            another candidate if, in a one-on-one
                            competition, more voters prefer the first
                            candidate than prefer the other candidate.</font></p>
                        <p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4">If one candidate is preferred over
                            each of the other candidates, that candidate
                            is called "Condorcet candidate" or
                            "Condorcet winner".</font></p>
                        <h2
style="color:rgb(0,0,0);margin:1em 0px 0.25em;padding:0px;overflow:hidden;border-bottom:1px solid rgb(162,169,177);font-weight:normal;font-family:"Linux Libertine",Georgia,Times,serif;line-height:1.375;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4"><span
id="m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496Statement_of_criterion">Statement
                              of criterion</span></font></h2>
                        <blockquote
style="background:rgb(249,249,249);border-left:4px solid rgb(234,236,240);padding:8px 32px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
                          <p style="margin:0px"><font size="4">If a
                              Condorcet candidate exists, and if a
                              majority prefers this candidate to another
                              candidate, then the other candidate should
                              not win if that majority votes sincerely
                              and no other voter falsifies any
                              preferences.</font></p>
                        </blockquote>
                        <p
style="margin:0.5em 0px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><font
                            size="4">In a ranked method, it is nearly
                            equivalent to say:</font></p>
                        <blockquote
style="background:rgb(249,249,249);border-left:4px solid rgb(234,236,240);padding:8px 32px;color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
                          <p style="margin:0px"><font size="4">If more
                              than half of the voters rank<span> </span><i>x</i><span> </span>above<span> </span><i>y</i>,
                              and there is no candidate<span> </span><i>z</i><span> </span>whom
                              more than half of the voters rank above<span> </span><i>x</i>,
                              then<span> </span><i>y</i><span> </span>must
                              not be elected.</font></p>
                        </blockquote>
                      </blockquote>
                      <font size="4"><br>
                        I think this evolved into the Minimal Defense
                        criterion, the "votes-only version" of which
                        says that if more than half the voters vote A
                        over B and B no higher than equal-bottom then B
                        can't win.</font></div>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
              </div>
              <div>
                <div class="gmail_quote">
                  <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                    <div><br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <div>On 31/05/2024 9:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff
                        wrote:<br>
                      </div>
                      <blockquote type="cite">
                        <div dir="auto">Some time ago, I wrote a
                          criterion that I called
                          Strategy-Free-Criterion (SFC).</div>
                        <div dir="auto"><br>
                        </div>
                        <div dir="auto">Is that what you were referring
                          to?</div>
                        <div dir="auto"><br>
                        </div>
                        <div dir="auto">It was about a circumstance in
                          which wv Condorcet is strategy-free. At that
                          time, autodeterence hadn’t been considered.</div>
                        <div dir="auto"><br>
                        </div>
                        <div dir="auto">SFC didn’t catch-on, & I
                          haven’t heard mention of it lately, & so I
                          don’t know it’s definition. But wv Condorcet
                          is strategy-free in a meaningful sense.</div>
                        <div><br>
                          <div class="gmail_quote">
                            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri,
                              May 31, 2024 at 05:07 Michael Ossipoff
                              <<a
                                href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com"
                                target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
                                class="moz-txt-link-freetext">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
                              wrote:<br>
                            </div>
                            <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
                              <div><br>
                              </div>
                              <div><br>
                                <div class="gmail_quote">
                                  <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
                                    Wed, May 29, 2024 at 14:15 Closed
                                    Limelike Curves <<a
                                      moz-do-not-send="true">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> </div>
                                  <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Ppwrote:<br>
                                  </div>
                                  <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
                                    <div dir="ltr">
                                      <div>I'm trying to work out how
                                        the strategy-free criterion
                                        actually relates to strategy,
                                        because it just sounds like it
                                        means the majority-Condorcet
                                        criterion ("if a candidate
                                        majority-beats every other, they
                                        have to win if everyone is
                                        honest"). <a
                                          class="gmail_plusreply"
id="m_-5229649647197194953m_-2555177099667943496m_3749243691140155182m_3764866669967271283m_3208403200595893820plusReplyChip-1"
                                          moz-do-not-send="true">@Michael
                                          Ossipoff</a> ?</div>
                                    </div>
                                  </blockquote>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                              <div dir="auto"> Closed, isn’t
                                “Strategy-Free Criterion” your new name
                                for FBC.</div>
                              <div dir="auto"><br>
                              </div>
                              <div dir="auto">It’s a very inaccurate
                                name. FBC-complying methods aren’t
                                strategy-free in any sense.</div>
                              <div dir="auto"><br>
                              </div>
                              <div dir="auto"> But they’re free of any
                                need for *drastic* defensive strategy
                                (favorite-burial or any defensive
                                order-reversal).</div>
                              <div dir="auto"><br>
                              </div>
                              <div dir="auto">You want strategy-free?
                                The wv Condorcet methods, such as RP(wv)
                                & MinMax(wv), are strategy-free in a
                                meaningful sense…effectively free of
                                need for any defensive strategy…due to
                                their autodeterence.</div>
                            </blockquote>
                          </div>
                        </div>
                      </blockquote>
                    </div>
                    <div>
                      <blockquote type="cite"> <br>
                        <fieldset></fieldset>
                        <pre>----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
                        class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
                      </blockquote>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
              </div>
              ----<br>
              Election-Methods mailing list - see <a
                href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer"
                target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
                class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electorama.com/em</a>
              for list info<br>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </div>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
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