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        <div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Could you run the ballots through your method? It would be interesting to see.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div><div><br></div>
        
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                        On Monday 20 May 2024 at 10:33:45 BST, Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:
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    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">I
        noticed you used a points system to count the votes in your
        ballot. This is
        characteristic of non-proportional counts. In statistics, it is
        the difference
        between weighting in arithmetic progression (akin to Borda
        method) and weighting
        in arithmetic proportion (akin to Gregory method). The former is
        only used when
        a guess or estimate has to be made of the latter, in weighting
        classes of data.
      </span></p>
    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Proportional
        counting is more accurate. But mathematics has become
        politicised by the
        Machine, particularly in their ruthless routing of all but </span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Cambridge</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">
        city elections. (A
        similar political spirit has kept Kris Maharaj, an innocent man,
        in a </span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Florida</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">
        jail, since the early
        nineteen eighties.)</span></p>
    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"> Furthermore,
        the use of which voting method, to count a ballot on voting
        methods, has
        already decided the best available option. But a conventional
        count of
        single-member systems cannot use the best available method.</span></p>
    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">However
        this does involve preference voting or ranked choice voting,
        which is a rebuff
        to single-preference votes or the stub vote, commonly called
        “the vote.”Voting
        for one-choice preferences, in a many-preference ballot, is as
        much to say that
        personal opinion over-rules the realities of the matter.</span></p>
    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">This
        is in flat contradiction to the HG Wells statement, that voting
        methods, like
        anything else, are capable of scientific (knowledgeable)
        treatment. Voting
        method is not a matter of opinion but a matter of demonstration.
        It is
        demonstrated that the vote is an ordinal vote, not least by the
        denunciation of
        “wasted votes,” and the urging of tactical/strategic voting.</span></p>
    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Regards,</span></p>
    <p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Richard
        Lung.<br clear="none">
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    <div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqtfd22963" class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqt4881810723"><div class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380moz-cite-prefix">On 19/05/2024 17:40, Kristofer
      Munsterhjelm wrote:<br clear="none">
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    </div><blockquote type="cite"><div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqtfd09554" class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqt4881810723">On
      2024-05-18 21:20, Toby Pereira wrote:
      <br clear="none">
      <blockquote type="cite">Thanks for doing this Kristofer. If I
        counted correctly Ranked Pairs beat Benham 5-4 with two ties, so
        not a particularly significant result in that respect. But it
        must have had at least two more approvals given that Minmax is
        between them.
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      That's a good point - I should post the Approval counts too :-)
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      Here they are:
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      Ranked Pairs (wv)                    8
      <br clear="none">
      Minmax (wv)                          7
      <br clear="none">
      Benham                               6
      <br clear="none">
      STAR                                 6
      <br clear="none">
      Woodall                              6
      <br clear="none">
      Approval                             5
      <br clear="none">
      Approval with manual runoff          4
      <br clear="none">
      Margins-Sorted Approval              4
      <br clear="none">
      Schulze                              4
      <br clear="none">
      Schwartz Woodall                     3
      <br clear="none">
      Smith//Approval (explicit)           3
      <br clear="none">
      Smith//Approval (implicit)           3
      <br clear="none">
      Smith//Score                         3
      <br clear="none">
      Baldwin                              2
      <br clear="none">
      BTR-IRV (write-in)                   2
      <br clear="none">
      Condorcet//Borda (Black)             2
      <br clear="none">
      Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)      2
      <br clear="none">
      Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)       2
      <br clear="none">
      Double Defeat, Hare                  2
      <br clear="none">
      IRV                                  2
      <br clear="none">
      Majority Judgement                   1
      <br clear="none">
      Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes  1
      <br clear="none">
      Max Strength Transitive Beatpath     1
      <br clear="none">
      Raynaud                              1
      <br clear="none">
      RCIPE                                1
      <br clear="none">
      Score (write-in)                     1
      <br clear="none">
      Smith//DAC                           1
      <br clear="none">
      Borda (write-in)                     0
      <br clear="none">
      Plurality                            0
      <br clear="none">
      <br clear="none">
      -km
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      ----
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