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<p>Not meaningfully. Firstly because it would be beside the point to
have a method to choose methods, which would be a paradox, (which
is not clear from KM discourse). Secondly, the method I would
use, is only realistic for a recognisable normal distribution of
voters, say 32 voters (2^5). <br>
</p>
<p>A point I was trying to make was that holding such a ballot on
ballots does not in any way decide an appropriate ballot, tho it
is used as such in referendums. Of course it may give some
information. That was not the point I was making. It just is
paradoxical as a definitive solution the voters are landed with in
a referendum.</p>
<p>Lastly, I have no technical knowledge to implement a Binomial
STV, and its computer count requirements (a Meek-style election
count, and the same for an exclusion count). No quota reduction.
All abstentions counted, to weigh relative importance of election
and exclusion.<br>
</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 20/05/2024 17:08, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:694102984.166741.1716221320853@mail.yahoo.com">
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style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;">
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Could you run the ballots
through your method? It would be interesting to see.</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div>
<div><br>
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<div id="ydpcd39eff6yahoo_quoted_7164038387"
class="ydpcd39eff6yahoo_quoted">
<div
style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> On Monday 20 May 2024 at 10:33:45 BST, Richard Lung
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"><voting@ukscientists.com></a> wrote: </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380">
<div>
<p><br clear="none">
</p>
<p> </p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">I
noticed you used a points system to count the votes
in your ballot. This is characteristic of
non-proportional counts. In statistics, it is the
difference between weighting in arithmetic
progression (akin to Borda method) and weighting in
arithmetic proportion (akin to Gregory method). The
former is only used when a guess or estimate has to
be made of the latter, in weighting classes of data.
</span></p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Proportional
counting is more accurate. But mathematics has
become politicised by the Machine, particularly in
their ruthless routing of all but </span><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Cambridge</span><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">
city elections. (A similar political spirit has kept
Kris Maharaj, an innocent man, in a </span><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Florida</span><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">
jail, since the early nineteen eighties.)</span></p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"> Furthermore,
the use of which voting method, to count a ballot on
voting methods, has already decided the best
available option. But a conventional count of
single-member systems cannot use the best available
method.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">However
this does involve preference voting or ranked choice
voting, which is a rebuff to single-preference votes
or the stub vote, commonly called “the vote.”Voting
for one-choice preferences, in a many-preference
ballot, is as much to say that personal opinion
over-rules the realities of the matter.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">This
is in flat contradiction to the HG Wells statement,
that voting methods, like anything else, are capable
of scientific (knowledgeable) treatment. Voting
method is not a matter of opinion but a matter of
demonstration. It is demonstrated that the vote is
an ordinal vote, not least by the denunciation of
“wasted votes,” and the urging of tactical/strategic
voting.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Regards,</span></p>
<p class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Richard
Lung.<br clear="none">
</span></p>
<p><br clear="none">
</p>
<p><br clear="none">
</p>
<div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqtfd22963"
class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqt4881810723">
<div class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380moz-cite-prefix">On
19/05/2024 17:40, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:<br
clear="none">
</div>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqtfd09554"
class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqt4881810723">On
2024-05-18 21:20, Toby Pereira wrote: <br
clear="none">
<blockquote type="cite">Thanks for doing this
Kristofer. If I counted correctly Ranked Pairs
beat Benham 5-4 with two ties, so not a
particularly significant result in that respect.
But it must have had at least two more approvals
given that Minmax is between them. <br
clear="none">
</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
That's a good point - I should post the Approval
counts too :-) <br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Here they are: <br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Ranked Pairs (wv) 8 <br
clear="none">
Minmax (wv) 7 <br
clear="none">
Benham 6 <br
clear="none">
STAR 6 <br
clear="none">
Woodall 6 <br
clear="none">
Approval 5 <br
clear="none">
Approval with manual runoff 4 <br
clear="none">
Margins-Sorted Approval 4 <br
clear="none">
Schulze 4 <br
clear="none">
Schwartz Woodall 3 <br
clear="none">
Smith//Approval (explicit) 3 <br
clear="none">
Smith//Approval (implicit) 3 <br
clear="none">
Smith//Score 3 <br
clear="none">
Baldwin 2 <br
clear="none">
BTR-IRV (write-in) 2 <br
clear="none">
Condorcet//Borda (Black) 2 <br
clear="none">
Condorcet//Plurality (write-in) 2 <br
clear="none">
Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin) 2 <br
clear="none">
Double Defeat, Hare 2 <br
clear="none">
IRV 2 <br
clear="none">
Majority Judgement 1 <br
clear="none">
Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes 1 <br
clear="none">
Max Strength Transitive Beatpath 1 <br
clear="none">
Raynaud 1 <br
clear="none">
RCIPE 1 <br
clear="none">
Score (write-in) 1 <br
clear="none">
Smith//DAC 1 <br
clear="none">
Borda (write-in) 0 <br
clear="none">
Plurality 0 <br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
-km </div>
<br clear="none">
---- <br clear="none">
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<div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqtfd50549"
class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqt4881810723"><br
clear="none">
</div>
</blockquote>
<div id="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqtfd72849"
class="ydpcd39eff6yiv2232379380yqt4881810723"> </div>
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