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<p>I think it is quite a bit more egregious if the Condorcet faction
can be successfully buried by a smaller faction, especially if the
Condorcet faction is the largest.<br>
<br>
So simulation information that casts light on how methods vary on
that score would be interesting.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 30/04/2024 5:06 am, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:CAOKDY5ARRYy1DZBv9-NgpjGLCmvCjVcapnauJ_Pax2vZ2VqYAA@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="auto">When you do that simulation, I hope that you’ll
repeat each simulated election, but with the largest
losing-faction burying the CW. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…recording & reporting, for each
Condorcet-complying method, the ratio of burial’s successes to
burial’s backfires (in which it elects someone whom the buriers
like less than the CW).</div>
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<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at
05:48 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On
2024-04-27 14:10, Chris Benham wrote:<br>
> Kristofer,<br>
> <br>
> How did Approval interpret these fully ranked ballots?<br>
<br>
That's part of why I'm just referring to JGA. To do the
simulation <br>
myself, I would have to implicitly code a guideline that
says where the <br>
cutoff should be placed, given candidate-voter distances
(which stand in <br>
for absolute utilities). (The other part is that my
simulator doesn't <br>
support forcing the strategic ballots to be approval-style
either yet.)<br>
<br>
Unfortunately, James doesn't say just how he did it, so I'm
CCing this <br>
post to him. How were the approval ballots generated in
"Four <br>
Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?<br>
<br>
In the absence of any information, I'd guess he used
above-mean utility <br>
thresholding. The strategic ballots (used to try to flip the
winner) <br>
don't have to care about utility at all: that process just
tries <br>
approval ballots at random until something works.<br>
<br>
-km<br>
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</blockquote>
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