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<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
"ICT" stands for "Improved Condorcet//Top-ratings".
"Symmetrical ICT" is someone's eccentric idea that I never
understood and/or saw the point of.<br>
<br>
ICA typically uses 3-slot ratings ballots (I'm sure that was the
version first proposed). If counting tied at the top ballots such
as A=B counting as both A>B and B>A there are some
candidates that pairwise beat all the others (it is now possible
that A and B will "pairwise beat" each other), disqualify all the
others then elect the candidate that is rated above bottom on most
ballots. If there are no such pairwise "beats all" candidates then
do the same thing.<br>
<br>
ICT is the same except that where ICA elects the not-disqualified
candidate that is rated above bottom on the highest number of
ballots, ICT elects the candidate that's rated top on the highest
number of ballots.<br>
<br>
The classic multi-purpose scenario:<br>
<br>
49 A (sincere might be A>B)<br>
24 B (sincere might be B>C)<br>
27 C>B (sincere)<br>
<br>
Chicken Dilemma specifies that is this scenario the B voters must
not be able to get away with a Defection strategy against B and so
B mustn't win, while Sincere Defense specifies that the A voters
must not be able to get away with their "offensive truncation"
against the presumed "sincere CW" B and so A must not win, in
large part to save the C>B voters the regret of not having
Compromised by voting B>C or B.<br>
<br>
Sincere Defense (or the simplest version of it) says that if more
than half the voters vote X above Y and Y no higher than
equal-bottom then Y can't win. And Woodall's Plurality criterion
says that C can't win because A has more first-place votes than C
has any sort of (above bottom) votes.<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Chicken_dilemma">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Chicken_dilemma</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h2
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin: 1em 0px 0.25em; padding: 0px; overflow: hidden; border-bottom: 1px solid rgb(162, 169, 177); font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: normal; font-family: "Linux Libertine", Georgia, Times, serif; line-height: 1.375; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><span
class="mw-headline" id="Definition">Definition</span></h2>
<p
style="margin: 0.5em 0px; color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">Each
voter is either an A voter, a B voter, or a C voter. Each
faction votes its candidate (strictly) over everybody else.</p>
<h3
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin: 0.3em 0px 0px; padding-top: 0.5em; padding-bottom: 0px; overflow: hidden; font-size: 1.2em; line-height: 1.6; font-weight: bold; font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><span
class="mw-headline" id="Premise">Premise</span></h3>
<ol
style="margin: 0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em; padding: 0px; list-style-image: none; color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">There are 3 candidates: A,
B, and C.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">The A voters and the B
voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in
the election.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">The A voters are more
numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous
than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">The A voters vote B over C.
The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">None of the C voters vote A
or B over the other.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h3
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin: 0.3em 0px 0px; padding-top: 0.5em; padding-bottom: 0px; overflow: hidden; font-size: 1.2em; line-height: 1.6; font-weight: bold; font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><span
class="mw-headline" id="Requirement">Requirement</span></h3>
<p
style="margin: 0.5em 0px; color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">B
doesn't win</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
I thought I recalled that CD says that C in the "premise" ( A in
my example) must win. In any case you can't have compliance with
all three of Sincere Defense, Chicken Dilemma and Plurality.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 29/04/2024 10:08 am, Closed Limelike
Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+euzPgq85Y-1CSEWLWBqzQb4_3bM14E5BzyJ+AgWOe65oLGBA@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The
way you describe ICT I find a bit odd.</blockquote>
</div>
<div>
<div>Yes, I think I made a few mistakes, including confusing ICT
with symmetrical ICT (I have no idea what ICT is, assuming
they're different; electowiki doesn't have an article).</div>
</div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Kevin's
ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets
Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I
think I recall was motivated by some example where the MCA
winner looked quite odd.</blockquote>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">Could you clarify how the chicken criterion is
incompatible with Minimal Defense? Intuitively I thought
median ratings would do well against both.</div>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at
12:34 PM Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><br>
<div>Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer
with this poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank
mechanisms, have substantial support on this email
list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working,
attempt at satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force
the method to comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far as
I can tell, no.<br>
<br>
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's ICA
method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets
Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I
think I recall was motivated by some example where the MCA
winner looked quite odd.<br>
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<div>On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="auto">
<div>Hi Chris, thanks for your response!</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> I
came to the conclusion that any good more
sophisticated FBC methods need to use
Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.<br>
</blockquote>
<div>Yes, that's the main question I'm
looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank
mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying
Minimal Defense as well.)</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">There
is some small movement and enthusiasm for
Condorcet compliance, but none that I
discern for strict FBC compliance. I would
think most voters would satisfied with the
massive reduction in Compromise incentive
compared to FPP afforded by properly
implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
reduction we get from Condorcet.<br>
</blockquote>
<div>There's a major IRV-repeal effort
underway in Alaska at the moment because
they had one (!) election with a
favorite-betrayal incentive. I'm also not
aware of any movements for strict
relative-majority Condorcet compliance. The
organization that comes closest is EVC (with
their Copeland//Borda proposal), but even
they're not very purist about it.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">And
I'm generally allergic to, and find very
silly, methods that fail Irrelevant
Ballots Independence like Median Ratings
methods and this "Majority-Condorcet"
idea.</blockquote>
<div>I fully agree with you that this is a
big problem for median ratings. A voter
who shows up and says they think all the
candidates are bad isn't provide any new
information about the relative quality
of the candidates.</div>
</div>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div dir="auto">However, I don't think an
all-equal ballot is providing no
information in every situation. As an
example, say we had a system like approval,
but with a 50% threshold for election (and
elections with <50% support for the
winner resulting in reopening nominations).
Then, a fully-blank ballot is a way for
voters to meaningfully express their
preference for somebody else,<i> </i>other
than the current crop of candidates. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Something similar applies to
the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who ties
two candidates is saying they want these two
candidates to be compared using the
tiebreaking mechanism, <i>rather than</i> the
relative-Condorcet mechanism.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 27,
2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite">There was some advantage
of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but
public proposals have to be as simple as
possible. </blockquote>
<br>
In that case I say forget about FBC methods
other than Approval. I came to the conclusion
that any good more sophisticated FBC methods
need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule"
mechanism.<br>
<br>
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for
Condorcet compliance, but none that I discern
for strict FBC compliance. I would think most
voters would satisfied with the massive
reduction in Compromise incentive compared to
FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let
alone the still greater reduction we get from
Condorcet.<br>
<br>
In general FBC is much more slippery and
"expensive" (in terms of being compatible with
other criteria) than Condorcet. I went off my
own "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back
Approval" idea (which isn't "very simple") when
Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality
criterion.<br>
<br>
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very
silly, methods that fail Irrelevant Ballots
Independence like Median Ratings methods and
this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.<br>
<br>
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet"
winner, and then a few extra ballots that vote
for nobody are found and then the winner changes
because the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd
and potentially embarrassing.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>
<div>On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">There was some advantage of
ICA & ICT that I really liked, but
public proposals have to be as simple as
possible. Few methods proposed here are
simple enough for public proposal.</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri,
Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff
<<a
href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed
Limelike Curves <<a
href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div><i><span
style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;color:rgb(49,49,49);display:inline">Does
"Majority-Condorcet" mean
the CW needs to have a
majority over every other</span><br
style="color:rgb(49,49,49);font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none">
<span
style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;color:rgb(49,49,49);display:inline">candidate?</span></i></div>
<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes: a CW needs
more than 50% of the vote,
including tied ranks, <span
style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)">to
defeat every other candidate.
This version of Condorcet is
compatible with FBC.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I guess a lot of CWs
wouldn’t be getting elected.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The best Condorcet
methods don’t importantly fail
FBC. A sincere CW can only lose by
offensive strategy, & the
better Condorcet methods
well-deter offensive strategy. No
need for any defensive strategy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Was it you who once
said that people would try
offensive strategy? The whole
point of strategy is action based
on an analysis of what the result
will be. It’s a strategist’s
business to find that out first.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Anyway when it’s
noticed to usually backfire…</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto"><span
style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span></div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr"
class="gmail_attr">On Wed,
Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>> wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On
2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin
Venzke wrote:<br>
<br>
> The second option
doesn't offer Smith, but if
it did, I would note that
Smith is a<br>
> poor guarantee of
quality. Here's a 1025-voter
election where a 2-vote
candidate is<br>
> in the Smith set (along
with all other candidates):<br>
> <br>
> 2:
A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 1:
B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 2:
C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 4:
D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 8:
E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 16:
F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 32:
G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 64: H>I>J>K<br>
> 128: I>J>K<br>
> 256: J>K<br>
> 512: K<br>
> <br>
> While this is not
realistic, I do think it is
realistic that a candidate
of limited<br>
> interest to most voters
would sometimes manage to
pairwise defeat a more
viable<br>
> candidate. And we
should be ready to interpret
this as noise.<br>
<br>
That was phrased a bit oddly
in the context of the rest
of your post, <br>
but I understand you to be
saying "the worst method
that passes Smith <br>
may still be pretty bad",
not necessarily that
proposed methods passing <br>
Smith are actually bad. Is
that right?<br>
<br>
-km<br>
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