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<p><br>
(This is a resend with a typo corrected.)<br>
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<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
"ICT" stands for "Improved Condorcet//Top-ratings".
"Symmetrical ICT" is someone's eccentric idea that I never
understood and/or saw the point of.<br>
<br>
ICA typically uses 3-slot ratings ballots (I'm sure that was
the version first proposed). If counting tied at the top
ballots such as A=B counting as both A>B and B>A there are
some candidates that pairwise beat all the others (it is now
possible that A and B will "pairwise beat" each other),
disqualify all the others then elect the candidate that is rated
above bottom on most ballots. If there are no such pairwise
"beats all" candidates then do the same thing.<br>
<br>
ICT is the same except that where ICA elects the
not-disqualified candidate that is rated above bottom on the
highest number of ballots, ICT elects the candidate that's rated
top on the highest number of ballots.<br>
<br>
The classic multi-purpose scenario:<br>
<br>
49 A (sincere might be A>B)<br>
24 B (sincere might be B>C)<br>
27 C>B (sincere)<br>
<br>
Chicken Dilemma specifies that is this scenario the B voters
must not be able to get away with a Defection strategy against C
and so B mustn't win, while Sincere Defense specifies that the A
voters must not be able to get away with their "offensive
truncation" against the presumed "sincere CW" B and so A must
not win, in large part to save the C>B voters the regret of
not having Compromised by voting B>C or B.<br>
<br>
Sincere Defense (or the simplest version of it) says that if
more than half the voters vote X above Y and Y no higher than
equal-bottom then Y can't win. And Woodall's Plurality
criterion says that C can't win because A has more first-place
votes than C has any sort of (above bottom) votes.<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Chicken_dilemma"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Chicken_dilemma</a><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h2
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin: 1em 0px 0.25em; padding: 0px; overflow: hidden; border-bottom: 1px solid rgb(162, 169, 177); font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: normal; font-family: "Linux Libertine", Georgia, Times, serif; line-height: 1.375; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><span
class="mw-headline" id="Definition">Definition</span></h2>
<p
style="margin: 0.5em 0px; color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">Each
voter is either an A voter, a B voter, or a C voter. Each
faction votes its candidate (strictly) over everybody else.</p>
<h3
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin: 0.3em 0px 0px; padding-top: 0.5em; padding-bottom: 0px; overflow: hidden; font-size: 1.2em; line-height: 1.6; font-weight: bold; font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><span
class="mw-headline" id="Premise">Premise</span></h3>
<ol
style="margin: 0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em; padding: 0px; list-style-image: none; color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">There are 3 candidates: A,
B, and C.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">The A voters and the B
voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in
the election.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">The A voters are more
numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous
than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">The A voters vote B over C.
The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.</li>
<li style="margin-bottom: 0.1em;">None of the C voters vote A
or B over the other.</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h3
style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin: 0.3em 0px 0px; padding-top: 0.5em; padding-bottom: 0px; overflow: hidden; font-size: 1.2em; line-height: 1.6; font-weight: bold; font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;"><span
class="mw-headline" id="Requirement">Requirement</span></h3>
<p
style="margin: 0.5em 0px; color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">B
doesn't win</p>
</blockquote>
<br>
I thought I recalled that CD says that C in the "premise" ( A in
my example) must win. In any case you can't have compliance with
all three of Sincere Defense, Chicken Dilemma and Plurality.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 29/04/2024 10:08 am, Closed
Limelike Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CA+euzPgq85Y-1CSEWLWBqzQb4_3bM14E5BzyJ+AgWOe65oLGBA@mail.gmail.com">
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<div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The
way you describe ICT I find a bit odd.</blockquote>
</div>
<div>
<div>Yes, I think I made a few mistakes, including confusing
ICT with symmetrical ICT (I have no idea what ICT is,
assuming they're different; electowiki doesn't have an
article).</div>
</div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Kevin's
ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets
Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I
think I recall was motivated by some example where the MCA
winner looked quite odd.</blockquote>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">Could you clarify how the chicken criterion is
incompatible with Minimal Defense? Intuitively I thought
median ratings would do well against both.</div>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at
12:34 PM Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><br>
<div>Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to
answer with this poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other
tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying Minimal
Defense as well.)</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force
the method to comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far
as I can tell, no.<br>
<br>
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's
ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead
meets Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal
Defense) but I think I recall was motivated by some
example where the MCA winner looked quite odd.<br>
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<div>On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike Curves
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="auto">
<div>Hi Chris, thanks for your response!</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> I
came to the conclusion that any good
more sophisticated FBC methods need to
use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule"
mechanism.<br>
</blockquote>
<div>Yes, that's the main question I'm
looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank
mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying
Minimal Defense as well.)</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">There
is some small movement and enthusiasm for
Condorcet compliance, but none that I
discern for strict FBC compliance. I
would think most voters would satisfied
with the massive reduction in Compromise
incentive compared to FPP afforded by
properly implemented IRV, let alone the
still greater reduction we get from
Condorcet.<br>
</blockquote>
<div>There's a major IRV-repeal effort
underway in Alaska at the moment because
they had one (!) election with a
favorite-betrayal incentive. I'm also not
aware of any movements for strict
relative-majority Condorcet compliance.
The organization that comes closest is EVC
(with their Copeland//Borda proposal), but
even they're not very purist about it.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">And
I'm generally allergic to, and find
very silly, methods that fail
Irrelevant Ballots Independence like
Median Ratings methods and this
"Majority-Condorcet" idea.</blockquote>
<div>I fully agree with you that this is
a big problem for median ratings. A
voter who shows up and says they think
all the candidates are bad isn't
provide any new information about the
relative quality of the candidates.</div>
</div>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div dir="auto">However, I don't think an
all-equal ballot is providing no
information in every situation. As an
example, say we had a system like
approval, but with a 50% threshold for
election (and elections with <50%
support for the winner resulting in
reopening nominations). Then, a
fully-blank ballot is a way for voters to
meaningfully express their preference
for somebody else,<i> </i>other than the
current crop of candidates. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Something similar applies to
the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who ties
two candidates is saying they want these
two candidates to be compared using the
tiebreaking mechanism, <i>rather than</i> the
relative-Condorcet mechanism.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 27,
2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite">There was some
advantage of ICA & ICT that I really
liked, but public proposals have to be as
simple as possible. </blockquote>
<br>
In that case I say forget about FBC methods
other than Approval. I came to the
conclusion that any good more sophisticated
FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the
Top Rule" mechanism.<br>
<br>
There is some small movement and enthusiasm
for Condorcet compliance, but none that I
discern for strict FBC compliance. I would
think most voters would satisfied with the
massive reduction in Compromise incentive
compared to FPP afforded by properly
implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
reduction we get from Condorcet.<br>
<br>
In general FBC is much more slippery and
"expensive" (in terms of being compatible with
other criteria) than Condorcet. I went off my
own "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back
Approval" idea (which isn't "very simple")
when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's
Plurality criterion.<br>
<br>
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very
silly, methods that fail Irrelevant Ballots
Independence like Median Ratings methods and
this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.<br>
<br>
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet"
winner, and then a few extra ballots that vote
for nobody are found and then the winner
changes because the "majority" threshold goes
up. Absurd and potentially embarrassing.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>
<div>On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">There was some advantage of
ICA & ICT that I really liked, but
public proposals have to be as simple as
possible. Few methods proposed here are
simple enough for public proposal.</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael
Ossipoff <<a
href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02
Closed Limelike Curves <<a
href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div><i><span
style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;color:rgb(49,49,49);display:inline">Does
"Majority-Condorcet"
mean the CW needs to
have a majority over
every other</span><br
style="color:rgb(49,49,49);font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none">
<span
style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;color:rgb(49,49,49);display:inline">candidate?</span></i></div>
<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes: a CW needs
more than 50% of the vote,
including tied ranks, <span
style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)">to
defeat every other
candidate. This version of
Condorcet is compatible with
FBC.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I guess a lot of
CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The best Condorcet
methods don’t importantly fail
FBC. A sincere CW can only lose
by offensive strategy, & the
better Condorcet methods
well-deter offensive strategy.
No need for any defensive
strategy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Was it you who
once said that people would try
offensive strategy? The whole
point of strategy is action
based on an analysis of what the
result will be. It’s a
strategist’s business to find
that out first.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Anyway when it’s
noticed to usually backfire…</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto"><span
style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span></div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr"
class="gmail_attr">On Wed,
Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<<a
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>> wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On
2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin
Venzke wrote:<br>
<br>
> The second option
doesn't offer Smith, but
if it did, I would note
that Smith is a<br>
> poor guarantee of
quality. Here's a
1025-voter election where
a 2-vote candidate is<br>
> in the Smith set
(along with all other
candidates):<br>
> <br>
> 2:
A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 1:
B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 2:
C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 4:
D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 8:
E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 16:
F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 32:
G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 64: H>I>J>K<br>
> 128: I>J>K<br>
> 256: J>K<br>
> 512: K<br>
> <br>
> While this is not
realistic, I do think it
is realistic that a
candidate of limited<br>
> interest to most
voters would sometimes
manage to pairwise defeat
a more viable<br>
> candidate. And we
should be ready to
interpret this as noise.<br>
<br>
That was phrased a bit
oddly in the context of
the rest of your post, <br>
but I understand you to be
saying "the worst method
that passes Smith <br>
may still be pretty bad",
not necessarily that
proposed methods passing <br>
Smith are actually bad. Is
that right?<br>
<br>
-km<br>
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