<div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 19:56 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>

  
    
  
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    <p dir="auto">So simulation information that casts light on how methods vary on
      that score would be interesting.</p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Absolutely.  …& important to find-out. …about all familiar proposed Condorcet-complying methods.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><br>
      <br>
      Chris B.<br>
      <br>
    </p>
    <div>On 30/04/2024 5:06 am, Michael Ossipoff
      wrote:<br>
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      <div dir="auto">When you do that simulation, I hope that you’ll
        repeat each simulated election, but with the largest
        losing-faction burying the CW. </div>
      <div dir="auto"><br>
      </div>
      <div dir="auto">…recording & reporting, for each
        Condorcet-complying method, the ratio of burial’s successes to
        burial’s backfires (in which it elects someone whom the buriers
        like less than the CW).</div>
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          <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at
            05:48 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>>
            wrote:<br>
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          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">On
            2024-04-27 14:10, Chris Benham wrote:<br>
            > Kristofer,<br>
            > <br>
            > How did Approval interpret these fully ranked ballots?<br>
            <br>
            That's part of why I'm just referring to JGA. To do the
            simulation <br>
            myself, I would have to implicitly code a guideline that
            says where the <br>
            cutoff should be placed, given candidate-voter distances
            (which stand in <br>
            for absolute utilities). (The other part is that my
            simulator doesn't <br>
            support forcing the strategic ballots to be approval-style
            either yet.)<br>
            <br>
            Unfortunately, James doesn't say just how he did it, so I'm
            CCing this <br>
            post to him. How were the approval ballots generated in
            "Four <br>
            Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?<br>
            <br>
            In the absence of any information, I'd guess he used
            above-mean utility <br>
            thresholding. The strategic ballots (used to try to flip the
            winner) <br>
            don't have to care about utility at all: that process just
            tries <br>
            approval ballots at random until something works.<br>
            <br>
            -km<br>
            ----<br>
            Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a>
            for list info<br>
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