<div><div dir="ltr"></div></div><div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd.</blockquote></div><div><div>Yes, I think I made a few mistakes, including confusing ICT with symmetrical ICT (I have no idea what ICT is, assuming they're different; electowiki doesn't have an article).</div></div><div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Kevin's ICA method easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets Chicken Dilemma (incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall was motivated by some example where the MCA winner looked quite odd.</blockquote></div><div><div dir="auto">Could you clarify how the chicken criterion is incompatible with Minimal Defense? Intuitively I thought median ratings would do well against both.</div></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Apr 28, 2024 at 12:34 PM Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p>CLC,<br>
<br>
</p><blockquote type="cite"><br>
<div>Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with
this poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank
mechanisms, have substantial support on this email list? (ICT
is a similar, but not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying
Minimal Defense as well.)</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
I assume by "mechanisms" you mean * mechanisms to force the
method to comply with Favorite Betrayal*. As far as I can tell,
no.<br>
<br>
The way you describe ICT I find a bit odd. Kevin's ICA method
easily meets Minimal Defense. ICT instead meets Chicken Dilemma
(incompatible with Minimal Defense) but I think I recall was
motivated by some example where the MCA winner looked quite odd.<br>
I don't recall it but can probably find it later.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<p></p>
<div>On 28/04/2024 12:40 pm, Closed Limelike
Curves wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="auto">
<div>Hi Chris, thanks for your response!</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"> I
came to the conclusion that any good more
sophisticated FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied
at the Top Rule" mechanism.<br>
</blockquote>
<div>Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to
answer with this poll: do tied-at-the-top, or other
tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but
not-quite-working, attempt at satisfying Minimal
Defense as well.)</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">There
is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC
compliance. I would think most voters would satisfied
with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive
compared to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV,
let alone the still greater reduction we get from
Condorcet.<br>
</blockquote>
<div>There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in
Alaska at the moment because they had one (!) election
with a favorite-betrayal incentive. I'm also not aware
of any movements for strict relative-majority
Condorcet compliance. The organization that comes
closest is EVC (with their Copeland//Borda proposal),
but even they're not very purist about it.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">And
I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly,
methods that fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence
like Median Ratings methods and this
"Majority-Condorcet" idea.</blockquote>
<div>I fully agree with you that this is a big
problem for median ratings. A voter who shows up
and says they think all the candidates are bad
isn't provide any new information about the
relative quality of the candidates.</div>
</div>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div dir="auto">However, I don't think an all-equal
ballot is providing no information in every situation.
As an example, say we had a system like approval, but
with a 50% threshold for election (and elections with
<50% support for the winner resulting in reopening
nominations). Then, a fully-blank ballot is a way for
voters to meaningfully express their preference
for somebody else,<i> </i>other than the current crop
of candidates. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Something similar applies to the
tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who ties two candidates
is saying they want these two candidates to be
compared using the tiebreaking mechanism, <i>rather
than</i> the relative-Condorcet mechanism.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at
5:00 AM Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite">There was some advantage of ICA
& ICT that I really liked, but public proposals have
to be as simple as possible. </blockquote>
<br>
In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than
Approval. I came to the conclusion that any good more
sophisticated FBC methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at
the Top Rule" mechanism.<br>
<br>
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC
compliance. I would think most voters would satisfied
with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive
compared to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let
alone the still greater reduction we get from Condorcet.<br>
<br>
In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in
terms of being compatible with other criteria) than
Condorcet. I went off my own "Irrelevant-Ballot
Independent Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't "very
simple") when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's
Plurality criterion.<br>
<br>
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly,
methods that fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like
Median Ratings methods and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.<br>
<br>
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then
a few extra ballots that vote for nobody are found and
then the winner changes because the "majority" threshold
goes up. Absurd and potentially embarrassing.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>
<div>On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">There was some advantage of ICA &
ICT that I really liked, but public proposals have to
be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here
are simple enough for public proposal.</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Apr 26,
2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr
24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves
<<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div><i><span style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;color:rgb(49,49,49);display:inline">Does
"Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW
needs to have a majority over every
other</span><br style="color:rgb(49,49,49);font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none">
<span style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;color:rgb(49,49,49);display:inline">candidate?</span></i></div>
<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes: a CW needs more than
50% of the vote, including tied ranks, <span style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)">to
defeat every other candidate. This
version of Condorcet is compatible with
FBC.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t
be getting elected.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The best Condorcet methods
don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can
only lose by offensive strategy, & the
better Condorcet methods well-deter
offensive strategy. No need for any
defensive strategy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Was it you who once said that
people would try offensive strategy? The
whole point of strategy is action based on
an analysis of what the result will be. It’s
a strategist’s business to find that out
first.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Anyway when it’s noticed to
usually backfire…</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span></div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer
Munsterhjelm <<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On
2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
<br>
> The second option doesn't offer
Smith, but if it did, I would note
that Smith is a<br>
> poor guarantee of quality. Here's
a 1025-voter election where a 2-vote
candidate is<br>
> in the Smith set (along with all
other candidates):<br>
> <br>
> 2:
A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 1:
B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 2:
C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 4:
D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 8:
E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 16: F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 32: G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 64: H>I>J>K<br>
> 128: I>J>K<br>
> 256: J>K<br>
> 512: K<br>
> <br>
> While this is not realistic, I do
think it is realistic that a candidate
of limited<br>
> interest to most voters would
sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a
more viable<br>
> candidate. And we should be ready
to interpret this as noise.<br>
<br>
That was phrased a bit oddly in the
context of the rest of your post, <br>
but I understand you to be saying "the
worst method that passes Smith <br>
may still be pretty bad", not
necessarily that proposed methods
passing <br>
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?<br>
<br>
-km<br>
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</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
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for list info<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<pre style="font-family:monospace">----
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</pre>
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