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<p>Robert,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""> What advantage does Benham have that BTR-IRV does not have?</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Your question is answered here:<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Bottom-Two-Runoff_IRV">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Bottom-Two-Runoff_IRV</a><br>
<br>
I've never liked this BTR method. It always struck me as an
arbitrary dinky method that has no point other than trying to
smuggle Condorcet past people who like the idea of eliminating
weak candidates. For example I never understood how it was
supposed to be better that just repeatedly eliminate the pairwise
loser between two of the remaining candidates selected at random.
But I may have been a bit too harsh.<br>
<br>
Benham interferes with Hare less than BTR and so keeps its
Dominat Mutual Third Burial Resistance and Clone Independence.<br>
<br>
On this page I found something I violently disagree with:<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method</a><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><font size="4"><span
style="color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline !important; float: none;">When
voters are allowed to equally rank candidates, Benham's
method can either be implemented by equally splitting each
voter's vote between each candidate they equally ranked
highest, or giving each equally-highest-ranked candidate one
vote. See the<span> </span></span><a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal-ranking_methods_in_IRV"
class="mw-redirect" title="Equal-ranking methods in IRV"
style="text-decoration: none; color: rgb(51, 102, 204); background: rgb(255, 255, 255); overflow-wrap: break-word; font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal;">Equal-ranking
methods in IRV</a><span
style="color: rgb(32, 33, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; white-space: normal; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline !important; float: none;"><span> </span>page
for more information.</span></font></blockquote>
<br>
As I explained in a recent post I am not in favour of allowing
above-bottom equal ranking in Hare and Benham and similar, but if
they were allowed the "give each equally-highest ranked candidate
one vote" solution is a complete disaster. It opens up outrageous
easy<br>
Pushover incentives for a start. <br>
<br>
The other possibility they mention, giving each of the candidates
ranked (among remaining candidates) equal-top each a fraction of a
vote (summing to 1), is far far less bad but in my opinion not
adequate. As I explained in my recent April post:<br>
<br>
I think that if we allow above-bottom equal-ranking in IRV or
Benham, then if among remaining candidates some ballots rank more
than one candidate equal-top then we make a provisional order of
the candidates by counting those ballots as equal fractions
summing to 1.<br>
(A=B counts as half a vote to each of A and B, A=B=C counts as a
third of a vote to each of A and B and C, and so on. Now it would
be fine for this to be the final order for deciding which
candidate to next eliminate were it not for the fact that it makes
Push-over strategising easier.) Then we count the equal top
(among remaining candidates) ballots again, this time they give a
whole vote to whichever of the ones they equal rank to the one
that was highest in the provisional order. (So an A=B ballot gives
a whole vote to whichever of A and B was higher in the provisional
order, and of course nothing to B.)<br>
<br>
This is fully in the spirit of the Single Transferable Vote but I
think you will agree that it is complex. I don't think allowing
above-bottom equal-ranking in those methods is so important, nor
do I think there would be any significant demand for that from
voters, so I don't advocate allowing it for those methods.<br>
<br>
Chris B<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 25/04/2024 1:07 am, robert
bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1067672256.304449.1713973033022@privateemail.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">On 04/24/2024 11:10 AM EDT Chris Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">The RCIPE advocate only asks for a rule change that seems modest and logical within the context of IRV: If the candidate was destined to lose *in IRV* anyway, then eliminate him sooner.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
Why? All the IRV non-winners were "destined to lose", and the easiest way to identify them is to complete the IRV count. That seems easier than looking for Condorcet Losers.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
Finding the Condorcet winner is easier than finding the Condorcet loser.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">In exchange, RCIPE achieves quite a lot.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
Really? As a modification of IRV how much does it "achieve" in comparison with what it loses? Rescuing the occasional Condorcet winner to make the method a lot more complicated and trash a lot of IRV's popular criterion compliances??
I can't see how looking for Condorcet losers is any way easier than looking for Condorcet winners. So why don't we just do that (before each elimination, among the remaining candidates) instead?
That method (Benham) is a Condorcet method and quite a bit simpler to operate than RCIPE. So the argument for RCIPE versus Benham is ...what??
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
<applause> But Chris, BTR-IRV is even simpler than Benham. What advantage does Benham have that BTR-IRV does not have?
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""> Can anyone show us a single example in which RCIPE appears to give a better result (or in some way behave better than) Benham?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
I'm still trying to figure out why RCIPE or Benham or any of these "Condorcet-IRV hybrid methods" are preferable to just straight-ahead Condorcet with a simple completion method (say Plurality or Top-Two Runoff).
I *do* see why MinMax or Ranked-Pairs or Schulze might be preferable over straight-ahead Condorcet. I can also see why BTR-IRV might be useful, because it is the simplest modification to existing Hare IRV that makes it Condorcet-consistent.
But there are a lotta goofy methods that are complicated flying around out there, and to be honest, I don't get it. The priorities for me are:
1. Fairness (valuing our votes equally - majority rule for single-winner)
2. Simplicity and meaningfulness on the ballot
3. Simplicity and meaningfulness in the legislative language to implement
4. Disincentivize tactical voting (compromizing) for the individual voter
5. As much process transparency as we can possibly get
6. Disincentivize strategic voting (burial, etc.) for the campaigns.
For me, those are the things we want to promote, at least for public elections for government office.
Approval is good for 2, 3, and 5. Not so good for 4. Nor for 1.
Score is also bad for 4.
STAR is just weird.
IRV is demonstrably flawed. Not good for either 1, 4, and 5.
Let's just always elect the Condorcet winner for the 99% of the time that such a CW exists. And when the CW does not exist, let's make rules that the public and policy makers can understand the basis of those rules, and elect the candidate that can be best justified to the public.
--
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
.
.
.
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</pre>
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