<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body>
<p><br>
</p>
<p>Thank you Toby</p>
<p>As far as I understand your argument, I think the answer is that
the lower preferences do not preclude the higher preferences. The
lower preferences do not count against the higher preferences for
other candidates. Higher preferences make candidates more likely
to be elected (up to the number of seats). Lower preferences make
other candidates more likely to be excluded.</p>
<p>The converse is the case as we move from the election count to an
exclusion count. Here the higher preferences make certain
candidates more likely to be excluded. The lower preferences (up
to the total number of candidates) make the candidates more
likiely to be elected.</p>
<p>Thus an exclusion count may actually help a candidate to be
elected, under certain conditions. Suppose a candidate wins
something like an election quota. Suppose they also do not have
many exclusion votes (with the preferences reversed); much less
than an exclusion quota. The exclusion quota is inverted to give a
second opinion election quota. Then it is used to give an over-all
keep value for the candidate. Multiplying the election keep value
by the inverted exclusion keep value can improve the candidates
over-all keep value, to unity or less than unity, signifying
election.</p>
<p>My programmer (of whose work I do not understand the first thing)
said it works fine. Your list manager recently released the link.
I added a manual, as an attachment to that e-mail.</p>
<p>If I have not fully answered your quetion or you have more
questions, please let me know.<br>
</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18/04/2024 22:18, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1373683007.1612719.1713475085781@mail.yahoo.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div class="ydp13bee348yahoo-style-wrap"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;">
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">If a voter's lower ranks
exclude candidates as much as higher ranks count in their
favour, then I can't see how the result will end up looking
anything like proportional representation, which I believe is
still your goal. Take a simple case with two parties (or
factions as parties don't need to be explicit), the larger of
which has 2/3 of the support and the smaller 1/3. The
candidates from the smaller party will be at the top on 1/3 of
the ballots, and in a normal PR method would get about a third
of the seats. But with this binomial count, they would be
excluded and more besides by the 2/3 ranking them at the
bottom.</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ydp5ac544d3yahoo_quoted_4247567425"
class="ydp5ac544d3yahoo_quoted">
<div
style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> On Friday, 5 April 2024 at 21:33:52 BST, Richard Lung
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"><voting@ukscientists.com></a> wrote: </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Thank you, Filip,<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">The first order Binomial STV is one election
count and one exclusion <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">count, exactly like it (being symmetrical; an
iteration). For the <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">election count I use Meek method of surplus
transfers. The distinction, <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">of that computer count, over the traditional
hand counts, is that <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">preferences, for an already elected
candidate, with a quota, are still <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">recorded. Meek did that by updating the
candidate keep value (the quota <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">divided by a candidates total transferable
vote).<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Unlike Meek method, I do keep values for
every candidate, losers as well <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">as winners. Candidates in deficit of a quota
have keep values of more <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">than unity, signifying they are excluded. The
exclusion count is run <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">exactly like the election count but with the
preferences reversed, so a <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">quota now becomes an exclusion quota. The
rule is simple: an election <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">count elects candidates reaching the quota.
An exclusion count excludes <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">candidates reaching a quota. One voters
preferences is another voters <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">unpreferences. There is no difference in
principle between them.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Binomial STV (symbolised as STV^; first order
Binomial STV would be <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">STV^1. Any order bimomial STV would be STV^n.
Preceding forms of STV, <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">including Meek method, are STV^0. The ballot
paper looks just like any <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Ranked Choice Vote. But the instructions are
different. Every voting <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">method has voters instructions.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">The instructions are, in the case of your
example: There are four seats <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">available and ten candidates to choose from.
Your first four preferences <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">would more or less help to elect candidates.
Your next 6 preferences (if <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">you choose to make them) would less or more
help to exclude those <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">candidates. So, a tenth preference counts as
much against a candidate, <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">as your first preference would count for a
candidate. But you don't have <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">to give any order of preference. A carte
blanche is equivalent to NOTA. <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">If a quota of abstentions is reached, one of
the seats is left empty. <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">This election also gives voters the rational
power to exclude candidates.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Some candidates may be both popular and
unpopular enough to gain both <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">election and exclusion quotas. They are both
"alive" and "dead" to the <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">electorate. (A case of "Schrodingers
candidate" according to Forest <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Simmons.) Whether they are elected or
excluded is determined by a <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Quotient of the exclusion quota divided by
the election quota. If the <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">ratio is one or less, they are elected; if
not, excluded. (The Quotient <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">is the square of a geometric mean.)<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">When inverted, the exclusion count is like a
second-opinion election. <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">The geometric means of the candidates
election keep values and inverse <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">exclusion keep value establish the over-all
order of popularity of the <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">candidates (from lowest to highest over-all
keep values.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">All the voters abstentions have to be
counted, to establish whether they <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">care more to elect or exclude candidates.
This also means there is no <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">reduction of the quota with abstentions, as
in Meek method. Counting <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">abstentions observes the conservation of
(preferential) information.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">I hired a programmer for first order Binomial
STV, which, unlike the <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">higher orders, should be much simpler than
Meek method, and simpler in <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">conception than the hand counts. However I
have always supported them <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">all my adult life, and am now an old man.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Kristofer found the GitHub link to the
programmers coding, which he sent me:<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><a
href="https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master"
rel="nofollow" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://github.com/Esrot-Clients/STV_CSV/tree/master</a><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">The programmer also sent me a "frontend" for
the use of voters:<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><a href="https://votingstv.cloud/"
rel="nofollow" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://votingstv.cloud/</a><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">And he sent me two manuals, which I cannot
attach, in case useful to a <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">technical person, unlike myself, because the
moderator doen't allow <br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">messages over a certain size. I think it was
a different reason last time.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Regards,<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Richard Lung.<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">----<br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Election-Methods mailing list - see <a
href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="nofollow"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electorama.com/em</a>
for list info<br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>