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<p>Toby,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Voters could even enter the score that
every candidate scoring that score or above counts as approved.
</blockquote>
<br>
If the scores are only used to imply ratings, with the voters
manually entering their approval cutoffs, then what is the point
of them versus simple ranking??<br>
<br>
My suggestion perfectly simulates the voters using rational
zero-info approval strategy among the Smith set candidates. What
is wrong with that?<br>
<br>
With the approvals manually entered and fixed as you suggest, you
are doing nothing to address the unfairness of voters who happen
to make some approval<br>
distinction among the candidates who make it into the Smith set
having more influence on the result than those that don't.<br>
<br>
One crude and simple solution is to have a grading or score ballot
with enough slots to accommodate twice the number of candidates,
and the top half of them<br>
are labelled "Approved" and the bottom half labelled "Not
Approved" and the scores given interpreted accordingly.<br>
</p>
<p>These ballots could be used for Smith//Approval or Margins Sorted
Approval.<br>
<br>
Another idea that has been suggested it to have the approval
cutoff represented by a virtual candidate on a ranked ballot.
Ballots are interpreting as approving<br>
the candidates they rank above this "candidate". I don't mind
that.<br>
<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 13/04/2024 9:45 pm, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1210422883.13210561.1713010553804@mail.yahoo.com">
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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">I was thinking at least 0 to
9, although 0 to 99 would be better in terms of being able to
distinguish between all candidates. Most approved among the
Smith Set definitely has merit, but it's a question of how you
would determine whether a candidate is approved. I'm not sure
an above average score seems like the right measure. I think
I'd prefer something more explicit. Voters could even enter
the score that every candidate scoring that score or above
counts as approved. If left blank, maybe highest scored
candidates only - I know you seem to have moved in that
direction for candidates implicitly approved on ranked
ballots.</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ydp521131ayahoo_quoted_3598679997"
class="ydp521131ayahoo_quoted">
<div
style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> On Saturday, 13 April 2024 at 03:13:14 BST, Chris Benham
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a> wrote: </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div id="ydp521131ayiv6863008083">
<div>
<p>Toby,<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
What range of scores do you have in mind? Proposals
have varied between 0-2 (i.e. 3 rating slots) and 0-99
(100 rating slots).<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I think your suggestion has merit as a response to
Score fans that boast of Score's "high Condorcet
efficiency". You are in effect responding:<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
"Well if that is such a good thing, why not make the
method a little bit more complicated and raise that
efficiency to 100% ?"<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I agree that this much better than SCORE or STAR.
But I don't like deciding things by just adding up
(or averaging) raw Score scores, even just<br
clear="none">
within the Smith set, because of the same reason I
prefer Approval to Score. Naive sincere voters are
unfairly disadvantaged compared to strategic<br
clear="none">
exaggerators.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Here is a variant I very much like but didn't nominate
it because I didn't think it was "propose-able" enough
in say the US.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
*Voters score the candidates on a range large enough
to strictly rank all the candidates plus leave several
large-ish gaps. Default score is zero.<br clear="none">
Eliminate all the candidates not in the Smith set.<br
clear="none">
Interpreting ballots as approving remaining candidates
they score above average (of the scores they give to
remaining candidates), elect<br clear="none">
the most approved member of the Smith set*.<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
So this is like a "Declared Strategy" method that
simulates: first use rankings to identify the members
of the Smith set and then hold an Approval<br
clear="none">
election among those candidates.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
What do you think? <br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</p>
<div id="ydp521131ayiv6863008083yqt97851"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083yqt5327030109">
<div class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083moz-cite-prefix">On
13/04/2024 12:49 am, Toby Pereira wrote:<br
clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"> </blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ydp521131ayiv6863008083yqt46554"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083yqt5327030109">
<div>
<div
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydpabd42byahoo-style-wrap">
<div dir="ltr">I will mention why I nominated
Smith//Score. This method uses rated ballots, but
uses them to infer a ranking. If there is a
Condorcet winner, they are elected. Otherwise,
elect the score winner of the Smith Set (the top
cycle). I previously put why I think rated ballots
work well for Condorcet (see below). And given a
rated ballot, electing the highest scored
candidate given no Condorcet winner seems the most
simple and logical option, and shouldn't damage
independence of clones or monotonicity. It also
sidesteps any worry/complications over whether
margins/winning votes etc. are the best thing to
look at.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Toby</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;">>I
think one problem of burial-resistant methods
is that they assume the electorate are aware
of the consequences of it and will act
accordingly. I think it might be a bit
optimistic to expect the average voter to
behave any differently using any method that
uses a specific ballot type. Using a ranked
ballot, if A and B are the frontrunning
candidates, then supporters of A might rank B
bottom because it's the obvious thing to do
(which has been pointed out on here before I
believe). Do you think the adoption of a
specific Condorcet method will prevent that?
I'm not convinced.</div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;"><br
style="outline:none !important;"
clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;">>Also,
if there are two frontrunning candidates, A
and B, it's quite likely anyway that
supporters of A will see B as the worst
candidate anyway, below the ones they know
very little about. So it wouldn't really even
be an act of burial, and therefore honest
voting behaviour could cause a non-entity to
win, because this is what burial-resistant
methods do.</div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;"><br
style="outline:none !important;"
clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;">>I've
said this before, but possibly the best
solution for a Condorcet method would to be to
use rated ballots. In this case B is less
likely to be buried by the A supporters,
because they would be likely to score the
non-entity candidates 0 as well.</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
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<div
id="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyahoo_quoted_3095126709"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyahoo_quoted">
<div
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<div> On Thursday, 11 April 2024 at 08:37:54 BST,
Michael Ossipoff <a shape="rect"
href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" rel="nofollow"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"><email9648742@gmail.com></a>
wrote: </div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div
id="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071">
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
<div
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_attr">On
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:45 Chris Benham
<<a shape="rect"
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083moz-txt-link-freetext moz-txt-link-freetext"
rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote
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class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br
clear="none">
Have the nominations closed? </blockquote>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Yes, at 5:14:59 GMT, April 12th.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
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<blockquote
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);"
class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote">Not
that I want to nominate another method.<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
There has been very little
electioneering, with I think most of the
<br clear="none">
nominated methods not even being
mentioned.<br clear="none">
</blockquote>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Yes, we weren’t given any information
on most of the nominees. People should
have told the advantages/merits of their
nominees.</div>
<blockquote
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class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br
clear="none">
Some haven't even been explained let
alone discussed or promoted.</blockquote>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Exactly. That’s why I ranked most of
them all together at the same
rank-position. The ones I know about
& like ranked in order of merit,
then the ones that I don’t know
equal-ranked, & then, below them,
the ones I know that I don’t like.
Pluraity was at bottom, as everyone
agrees, & so there was no reason to
rank it.</div>
<blockquote
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class="ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br
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</blockquote>
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