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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Yes, arguably the complexity of a 0 to 99 scale would be too much for the benefits of a rated ballot to be worth it. This could be seen as an argument for something like a 0 to 9 ballot. This could mean that there aren't enough scores available in certain elections for voters to distinguish between every candidate, which you might find unacceptable. However, all voting methods compromise in one way or another. You gain this criterion by sacrificing that one. You gain simplicity but lose something elsewhere. I don't think it would be that common for a voter to have such specific a preference over all the candidates that they would need more than 10 rating slots, and for the few voters that do in a given election, it's unlikely to change the result very often.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Obviously a ranked ballot would work, but there are still the advantages I mentioned for a rated ballot.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Saturday, 13 April 2024 at 21:20:34 BST, Chris Benham <cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
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</p><blockquote type="cite">This would also be the same as for your
proposal with double the number of ratings slots, as I
understand it.</blockquote>
Yes.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
There will be some people who take voting seriously who want to
vote sincerely without even knowing what the voting algorithm is.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
If the method is just Smith//Approval(specified) then why don't we
simply ask them for their ranking and their approval
cutoff/threshold instead of burdening<br clear="none">
them with deciding if they should score some candidate (on say a
0-99 scale) 77 or 78 or 76?<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<div id="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677yqt24455" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677yqt6749194197"><div class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677moz-cite-prefix">On 14/04/2024 4:56 am, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br clear="none">
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<div dir="ltr">Chris</div>
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<div dir="ltr">Primarily, the scores are
there to determine the ranks and therefore the Condorcet
winner, or the Smith Set if there's no Condorcet winner. The
reason for scores is what I've said previously - I think it
works as protection against burial, and also I think with a
large number of candidates it's easier for the voter. With
rankings, they really have to write in the ranks in numerical
order, and if they accidentally miss someone out, it can mess
up the whole ordering. Scores can be done in any order as long
they have a general idea of the best and worst candidates.</div>
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<div dir="ltr">I don't think your suggestion
is too bad in theory, but it might be a bit opaque to most
voters. So I'm not saying I dislike it.</div>
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<div dir="ltr">Yes, based on how people
approve, some will have more influence in the approval run-off
under what I proposed. This would also be the same as for your
proposal with double the number of ratings slots, as I
understand it. There is also some merit in allowing voters to
choose who they approve, even if there are some drawbacks.</div>
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<div dir="ltr">Toby</div>
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<div> On Saturday, 13 April 2024 at 16:22:10 BST, Chris Benham
<a shape="rect" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a> wrote: </div>
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<p>Toby,<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">Voters could even enter the
score that every candidate scoring that score or above
counts as approved. </blockquote>
<br clear="none">
If the scores are only used to imply ratings, with the
voters manually entering their approval cutoffs, then
what is the point of them versus simple ranking??<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
My suggestion perfectly simulates the voters using
rational zero-info approval strategy among the Smith set
candidates. What is wrong with that?<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
With the approvals manually entered and fixed as you
suggest, you are doing nothing to address the unfairness
of voters who happen to make some approval<br clear="none">
distinction among the candidates who make it into the
Smith set having more influence on the result than those
that don't.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
One crude and simple solution is to have a grading or
score ballot with enough slots to accommodate twice the
number of candidates, and the top half of them<br clear="none">
are labelled "Approved" and the bottom half labelled
"Not Approved" and the scores given interpreted
accordingly.<br clear="none">
<p>These ballots could be used for Smith//Approval or
Margins Sorted Approval.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Another idea that has been suggested it to have the
approval cutoff represented by a virtual candidate on
a ranked ballot. Ballots are interpreting as approving<br clear="none">
the candidates they rank above this "candidate". I
don't mind that.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris<br clear="none">
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<div class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187moz-cite-prefix">On
13/04/2024 9:45 pm, Toby Pereira wrote:<br clear="none">
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<blockquote type="cite"> </blockquote>
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<div dir="ltr">I was thinking at least 0 to 9,
although 0 to 99 would be better in terms of being
able to distinguish between all candidates. Most
approved among the Smith Set definitely has merit,
but it's a question of how you would determine
whether a candidate is approved. I'm not sure an
above average score seems like the right measure.
I think I'd prefer something more explicit. Voters
could even enter the score that every candidate
scoring that score or above counts as approved. If
left blank, maybe highest scored candidates only -
I know you seem to have moved in that direction
for candidates implicitly approved on ranked
ballots.</div>
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<div dir="ltr">Toby</div>
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<div> On Saturday, 13 April 2024 at 03:13:14 BST,
Chris Benham <a shape="rect" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a>
wrote: </div>
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<p>Toby,<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
What range of scores do you have in mind?
Proposals have varied between 0-2 (i.e. 3
rating slots) and 0-99 (100 rating slots).<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I think your suggestion has merit as a
response to Score fans that boast of
Score's "high Condorcet efficiency". You
are in effect responding:<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
"Well if that is such a good thing, why
not make the method a little bit more
complicated and raise that efficiency to
100% ?"<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I agree that this much better than SCORE
or STAR. But I don't like deciding
things by just adding up (or averaging)
raw Score scores, even just<br clear="none">
within the Smith set, because of the same
reason I prefer Approval to Score. Naive
sincere voters are unfairly disadvantaged
compared to strategic<br clear="none">
exaggerators.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Here is a variant I very much like but
didn't nominate it because I didn't think
it was "propose-able" enough in say the
US.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
*Voters score the candidates on a range
large enough to strictly rank all the
candidates plus leave several large-ish
gaps. Default score is zero.<br clear="none">
Eliminate all the candidates not in the
Smith set.<br clear="none">
Interpreting ballots as approving
remaining candidates they score above
average (of the scores they give to
remaining candidates), elect<br clear="none">
the most approved member of the Smith
set*.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
So this is like a "Declared Strategy"
method that simulates: first use rankings
to identify the members of the Smith set
and then hold an Approval<br clear="none">
election among those candidates.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
What do you think? <br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris<br clear="none">
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<div class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083moz-cite-prefix">On
13/04/2024 12:49 am, Toby Pereira wrote:<br clear="none">
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<blockquote type="cite"> </blockquote>
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<div dir="ltr">I will mention why I
nominated Smith//Score. This method
uses rated ballots, but uses them to
infer a ranking. If there is a
Condorcet winner, they are elected.
Otherwise, elect the score winner of
the Smith Set (the top cycle). I
previously put why I think rated
ballots work well for Condorcet (see
below). And given a rated ballot,
electing the highest scored candidate
given no Condorcet winner seems the
most simple and logical option, and
shouldn't damage independence of
clones or monotonicity. It also
sidesteps any worry/complications over
whether margins/winning votes etc. are
the best thing to look at.</div>
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<div dir="ltr">Toby</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br clear="none">
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<div>
<div dir="ltr" style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;">>I
think one problem of
burial-resistant methods is that
they assume the electorate are
aware of the consequences of it
and will act accordingly. I think
it might be a bit optimistic to
expect the average voter to behave
any differently using any method
that uses a specific ballot type.
Using a ranked ballot, if A and B
are the frontrunning candidates,
then supporters of A might rank B
bottom because it's the obvious
thing to do (which has been
pointed out on here before I
believe). Do you think the
adoption of a specific Condorcet
method will prevent that? I'm not
convinced.</div>
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<div dir="ltr" style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;">>Also,
if there are two frontrunning
candidates, A and B, it's quite
likely anyway that supporters of A
will see B as the worst candidate
anyway, below the ones they know
very little about. So it wouldn't
really even be an act of burial,
and therefore honest voting
behaviour could cause a non-entity
to win, because this is what
burial-resistant methods do.</div>
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<div dir="ltr" style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;outline:none !important;">>I've
said this before, but possibly the
best solution for a Condorcet
method would to be to use rated
ballots. In this case B is less
likely to be buried by the A
supporters, because they would be
likely to score the non-entity
candidates 0 as well.</div>
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<div id="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyahoo_quoted_3095126709" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyahoo_quoted">
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<div> On Thursday, 11 April 2024 at
08:37:54 BST, Michael Ossipoff <a shape="rect" href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><email9648742@gmail.com></a>
wrote: </div>
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<div dir="ltr" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_attr">On
Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:45
Chris Benham <<a shape="rect" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083moz-txt-link-freetext ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187moz-txt-link-freetext ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br clear="none">
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<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br clear="none">
Have the nominations
closed? </blockquote>
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<div>Yes, at 5:14:59 GMT,
April 12th.</div>
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<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote">Not
that I want to nominate
another method.<br clear="none">
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There has been very little
electioneering, with I think
most of the <br clear="none">
nominated methods not even
being mentioned.<br clear="none">
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<div>Yes, we weren’t given any
information on most of the
nominees. People should have
told the advantages/merits
of their nominees.</div>
<blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);" class="ydp8cffc578yiv1157099677ydpdb931c6yiv1775628187ydp521131ayiv6863008083ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br clear="none">
Some haven't even been
explained let alone
discussed or promoted.</blockquote>
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<div>Exactly. That’s why I
ranked most of them all
together at the same
rank-position. The ones I
know about & like ranked
in order of merit, then the
ones that I don’t know
equal-ranked, & then,
below them, the ones I know
that I don’t like. Pluraity
was at bottom, as everyone
agrees, & so there was
no reason to rank it.</div>
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