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<p>Toby,<br>
<br>
What range of scores do you have in mind? Proposals have varied
between 0-2 (i.e. 3 rating slots) and 0-99 (100 rating slots).<br>
<br>
I think your suggestion has merit as a response to Score fans that
boast of Score's "high Condorcet efficiency". You are in effect
responding:<br>
<br>
"Well if that is such a good thing, why not make the method a
little bit more complicated and raise that efficiency to 100% ?"<br>
<br>
I agree that this much better than SCORE or STAR. But I don't
like deciding things by just adding up (or averaging) raw Score
scores, even just<br>
within the Smith set, because of the same reason I prefer Approval
to Score. Naive sincere voters are unfairly disadvantaged
compared to strategic<br>
exaggerators.<br>
<br>
Here is a variant I very much like but didn't nominate it because
I didn't think it was "propose-able" enough in say the US.<br>
<br>
*Voters score the candidates on a range large enough to strictly
rank all the candidates plus leave several large-ish gaps. Default
score is zero.<br>
Eliminate all the candidates not in the Smith set.<br>
Interpreting ballots as approving remaining candidates they score
above average (of the scores they give to remaining candidates),
elect<br>
the most approved member of the Smith set*.<br>
<br>
So this is like a "Declared Strategy" method that simulates: first
use rankings to identify the members of the Smith set and then
hold an Approval<br>
election among those candidates.<br>
<br>
What do you think? <br>
<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 13/04/2024 12:49 am, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1438853110.534185.1712935145735@mail.yahoo.com">
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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">I will mention why I
nominated Smith//Score. This method uses rated ballots, but
uses them to infer a ranking. If there is a Condorcet winner,
they are elected. Otherwise, elect the score winner of the
Smith Set (the top cycle). I previously put why I think rated
ballots work well for Condorcet (see below). And given a rated
ballot, electing the highest scored candidate given no
Condorcet winner seems the most simple and logical option, and
shouldn't damage independence of clones or monotonicity. It
also sidesteps any worry/complications over whether
margins/winning votes etc. are the best thing to look at.</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
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</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">
<div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; outline: none !important;">>I
think one problem of burial-resistant methods is that they
assume the electorate are aware of the consequences of it
and will act accordingly. I think it might be a bit
optimistic to expect the average voter to behave any
differently using any method that uses a specific ballot
type. Using a ranked ballot, if A and B are the
frontrunning candidates, then supporters of A might rank B
bottom because it's the obvious thing to do (which has
been pointed out on here before I believe). Do you think
the adoption of a specific Condorcet method will prevent
that? I'm not convinced.</div>
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style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; outline: none !important;"><br
style="outline: none !important;" clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; outline: none !important;">>Also,
if there are two frontrunning candidates, A and B, it's
quite likely anyway that supporters of A will see B as the
worst candidate anyway, below the ones they know very
little about. So it wouldn't really even be an act of
burial, and therefore honest voting behaviour could cause
a non-entity to win, because this is what burial-resistant
methods do.</div>
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style="outline: none !important;" clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr"
style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; outline: none !important;">>I've
said this before, but possibly the best solution for a
Condorcet method would to be to use rated ballots. In this
case B is less likely to be buried by the A supporters,
because they would be likely to score the non-entity
candidates 0 as well.</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<div><br>
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<div id="ydp4029d99dyahoo_quoted_3095126709"
class="ydp4029d99dyahoo_quoted">
<div
style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> On Thursday, 11 April 2024 at 08:37:54 BST, Michael
Ossipoff <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com"><email9648742@gmail.com></a> wrote: </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div id="ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr"
class="ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_attr">On Wed,
Apr 10, 2024 at 23:45 Chris Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"
rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
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class="ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br>
Have the nominations closed? </blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, at 5:14:59 GMT, April 12th.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<blockquote
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);"
class="ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote">Not that
I want to nominate another method.<br>
<br>
There has been very little electioneering, with I
think most of the <br>
nominated methods not even being mentioned.<br>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Yes, we weren’t given any information on most of
the nominees. People should have told the
advantages/merits of their nominees.</div>
<blockquote
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);"
class="ydp4029d99dyiv5861860071gmail_quote"><br>
Some haven't even been explained let alone discussed
or promoted.</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Exactly. That’s why I ranked most of them all
together at the same rank-position. The ones I know
about & like ranked in order of merit, then the
ones that I don’t know equal-ranked, & then,
below them, the ones I know that I don’t like.
Pluraity was at bottom, as everyone agrees, & so
there was no reason to rank it.</div>
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</blockquote>
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