<div dir="auto">Right!! That’s something I wanted to say. I’m removing Schulze from the upper part of my ranking for that reason, & replacing it with Smith//Approval(implicit).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">How about we say to rank in order of overall merit for public proposal…which includes proposability?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Then the unproposably complex methods could be left unranked or ranked near bottom.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Or take it a step further & trim the candidate-set to only include proposable methods? But might it be quicker to just let that be a voting judgment, instead of having to do that evaluation as a separate preliminary collective evaluation, which would delay the voting?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:41 Michael Garman <<a href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us">michael.garman@rankthevote.us</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Agreed. If the purpose of this is to inform the public, we’ve also lost the plot — how many of these methods have a chance of being widely understood, let alone implemented, anywhere outside this bubble?</div><div dir="auto"><br clear="all">On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 7:38 PM Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="ltr">This seems like far more methods than anyone could rank, and all of them are starting to blend together for me. I think we're just splitting Hares at this point.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 9:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">On 2024-04-11 23:52, Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:<br>
> I suggest creating a list of links to the associated Wikipedia or <br>
> Electowiki articles, one for each method. One person supplying all the <br>
> links will save time for the rest of us. Personally I'm going to need <br>
> to read about some of these methods.<br>
<br>
Good idea. Here are some links and brief descriptions. I've tried to be <br>
neutral; I may post later with my thoughts about the methods, and what <br>
notable criteria they pass and fail that I know of.<br>
<br>
I've only done the methods that have a wiki page. At the bottom is a <br>
list of those methods that don't. Their proposers have already described <br>
them, but they might need a more clear description; in any case, I'll <br>
leave that to them :-)<br>
<br>
Smith//Score:<br>
This is a composite method. <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods</a><br>
It takes rated ballots.<br>
It first eliminates every candidate not in the Smith set, and then does <br>
Range voting (Score voting) on the remaining candidates. No <br>
normalization is done after the elimination, so a vote A: 10, B: 7, C: 0 <br>
still gives B 7 points and C 0 even if A isn't in the Smith set.<br>
In Daniel Carrera's words: "The ballot would look like a Score ballot. <br>
To process the ballots, the scores are converted into rankings (equal <br>
rankings allowed), and the highest scoring candidate inside the Smith <br>
set is elected." See also Toby's last post.<br>
<br>
Approval with manual runoff:<br>
First do a round of Approval voting. Determine the top two candidates, <br>
then hold a later second round to determine who of the two wins. This is <br>
like STAR, but spacing the rounds apart makes it possible to hold <br>
debates, discuss the differences between the finalists, and so on. On <br>
the other hand, it's more expensive.<br>
<br>
Smith//Approval (explicit - specified approval cutoff):<br>
This is a composite method. It takes a ranked ballot with an approval <br>
cutoff marked.<br>
Every voter approves of (gives a point to) every candidate ranked above <br>
his approval cutoff. The Smith set member with the most points wins.<br>
<br>
Smith//Approval (implicit):<br>
Like Smith//Approval, except the voter can't specify an approval <br>
cutoff. Instead, every candidate ranked is counted as approved, and <br>
every candidate not ranked as not approved. The intent is to deter burial.<br>
<br>
Woodall:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Woodall%27s_method" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Woodall%27s_method</a><br>
This method takes ranked ballots. First make a note of the initial <br>
Smith set. Then keep doing IRV until only one candidate of the initial <br>
Smith set remains. Elect that candidate. Note: This is not Benham - the <br>
initial Smith set never changes.<br>
<br>
Schwartz-Woodall:<br>
The same as Woodall, but with the Schwartz set. The Schwartz set is <br>
slightly less prone to ties.<br>
<br>
Copeland//Borda:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Robin" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Robin</a><br>
This method takes ranked ballots.<br>
First eliminate every candidate not in the Copeland set. Then calculate <br>
the Borda scores of the remaining candidates and elect its winner. This <br>
can be done by using the Condorcet matrix alone.<br>
<br>
Minmax(wv):<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method</a><br>
This method takes ranked ballots.<br>
Based on the ballots, consider each one-on-one matchups between <br>
candidates. Elect the candidate who has the most comfortable lead <br>
against the candidate who does best against him, one on one.<br>
<br>
Plurality:<br>
You know this one. Choose-one ballots, equal rank not allowed, most <br>
first preferences wins.<br>
<br>
Majority Judgement (category):<br>
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment</a><br>
Various tiebreakers exist, e.g.<br>
<br>
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_median_voting_rules#Tiebreaking_procedures" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_median_voting_rules#Tiebreaking_procedures</a><br>
<br>
This takes graded ballots. The candidates give each candidate a grade, <br>
usually one of Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject. <br>
For each candidate, calculate the highest grade so that a majority gives <br>
that candidate at least that grade. The candidate with the highest such <br>
majority grade wins.<br>
The method is often indecisive, which means a tiebreaker has to be <br>
used. There are many, but they all try to preserve the dynamics of MJ.<br>
<br>
IRV:<br>
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting</a><br>
This should also be familiar to everybody here. It takes ranked <br>
ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the Plurality loser until a candidate <br>
obtains a majority of the non-exhausted first preferences.<br>
<br>
STAR:<br>
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/STAR_voting</a><br>
This takes rated ballots. The ballot typically has six ratings (zero to <br>
five inclusive), but the method could work with any number. The method <br>
counts the total number of points for each candidate. The pairwise <br>
winner of the two candidates with the most points wins.<br>
<br>
Schulze:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Schulze_method" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Schulze_method</a><br>
This takes ranked ballots. The method is complex but basically amounts <br>
to a cloneproof Smith generalization of Minmax.<br>
Let a beatpath from a candidate A to another candidate Z be a series of <br>
pairwise defeats A beats B beats C beats... beats Y beats Z. The <br>
strength of the path is measured by the strength of its weakest <br>
individual pairwise contest. Let "the" beatpath from A to Z be the <br>
beatpath of strongest strength.<br>
The Schulze winner is the candidate whose beatpath to anybody else is <br>
at least as strong as their beatpath back to him.<br>
<br>
Baldwin:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Baldwin%27s_method" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Baldwin%27s_method</a><br>
This takes ranked ballots.<br>
Baldwin is the Borda analog of IRV. In each round, the candidate with <br>
the lowest Borda count is eliminated. The last man standing wins. Also <br>
called Total Vote Runoff by Foley and Maskin.<br>
<br>
Black:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Black%27s_method" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Black%27s_method</a><br>
This takes ranked ballots.<br>
If there is a Condorcet winner, elect that CW. Otherwise elect the <br>
Borda winner.<br>
<br>
Approval:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_voting" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_voting</a><br>
This takes an Approval ballot: vote for one or more. The candidate with <br>
the most marks wins.<br>
<br>
Benham:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Benham%27s_method</a><br>
This method takes ranked ballots. Repeatedly eliminate the Plurality <br>
loser until there's a Condorcet winner among the remaining candidates. <br>
Elect the Condorcet winner when that happens.<br>
<br>
Smith//DAC:<br>
This is a composite method. <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Composite_methods</a><br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Descending_Acquiescing_Coalitions" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Descending_Acquiescing_Coalitions</a><br>
It takes ranked ballots.<br>
First eliminate every candidate not in the Smith set. Then perform the <br>
DAC algorithm to determine the winner.<br>
The DAC algorithm is complex, with the result being a cloneproof method <br>
otherwise close to Plurality.<br>
Essentially, the DAC algorithm works like this: For each ballot, for <br>
each set of candidates a voter acquiesces to, increase that set's count <br>
by one. Then sort the sets in order of count, descending. Starting at <br>
the top with the current viable set being every candidate, eliminate <br>
from the viable set every candidate who is not in the set at the list's <br>
current position, unless that would eliminate everybody. The candidate/s <br>
remaining once you've traversed the whole list is/are the winner/s.<br>
A voter acquiesces to a set if he doesn't rank any candidate outside <br>
the set strictly above a candidate within the set.<br>
<br>
RCIPE:<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Choice_Including_Pairwise_Elimination" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Choice_Including_Pairwise_Elimination</a><br>
This takes ranked ballots.<br>
Modify IRV to, instead of eliminating the Plurality loser, eliminate <br>
the current Condorcet loser among the remaining (uneliminated) <br>
candidates. Only eliminate the Plurality loser if there is no Plurality <br>
loser. Once a candidate has a majority of the non-exhausted first <br>
preference votes, elect that candidate.<br>
<br>
RP(wv):<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Pairs" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Ranked_Pairs</a><br>
This takes ranked ballots.<br>
First count the pairwise matrix. Create a sorted list of every pairwise <br>
victory, sorted by its strength. Break ties by random ballot.<br>
Proceed from the top down the list, locking in a pairwise relation <br>
unless it would create a cycle.<br>
At the end, the locked-in contests give an order of candidates. This is <br>
the election order: the candidate on top is the winner.<br>
Strictly speaking, the tiebreaking is by random voter hierarchy, but <br>
I've skipped the details about how that is constructed.<br>
<br>
I think that should be correct, but if I forgot something or described <br>
them incorrectly, let me know.<br>
<br>
The methods not described are:<br>
Margins-Sorted Approval<br>
Double Defeat, Hare<br>
Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)<br>
Gross Loser Elimination<br>
Max Strength Transitive Beatpath<br>
<br>
-km<br>
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