<div><br></div><div dir="auto">I unblocked you. </div><div dir="auto"><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 05:33 robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div style="margin-bottom:45px">
<div style="font-size:10pt"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I guess this is evidence that Michael has plonked me.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><div dir="auto"><i>Powered by Cricket Wireless</i></div></div></div><div style="font-size:10pt"><div id="m_1030524755889311988LGEmailHeader" dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">------ Original message------</div><div dir="auto"><b>From: </b>Michael Ossipoff<u></u><u></u></div><div dir="auto"><b>Date: </b>Wed, Apr 10, 2024 21:42</div><div dir="auto"><b>To: </b>Chris Benham;</div><div dir="auto"><b>Cc: </b>Forest Simmons;Greg Dennis;James Gilmour;Kevin Venzke;Kristofer Munsterhjelm;Toby Pereira<a href="mailto:;election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">;election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>;robert bristow-johnson;</div><div dir="auto"><b>Subject:</b>Re: Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR</div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><div dir="auto">Or is the prob
lem of that an acceptable runoff-loser knocking the acceptable runoff-winner out of the runoff there in STAR too? That hadn’t occurred to me. If it’s so, it’s another pitfall of STAR’s runoff.</div></div></div><div style="margin-bottom:45px"><div style="font-size:10pt"><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:26 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>
<div>
<p>Michael wrote:<br>
<br>
</p><blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">But STAR is better than Hare because:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It retains some amount Score’s merit.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser. </div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I said “some”, not “all”.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying & hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your acceptables.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the
horror of STAR.<br>
<br>
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:<br>
<br>
*Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
sincere favourite as low as possible*.<br>
</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR. … completely reject runoff with Approval. …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I much prefer Approval to Score, for minimalness & unarbitrariness.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><br>
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence
or common sense because STAR is obviously<br>
so silly and arbitrary.</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">See above.</div></div></div><div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable
Vote with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance<br>
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain <br>
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions)
and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.<br>
<br>
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some
criterion<br>
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to
suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.<p></p></div><div><p><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31
Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">[quote]</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Score is Approval with a "I
wish to weaken the effect of my vote for the sake of being
more sincere/expressive" box/button.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">[/quote]</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">If that’s how you want to
vote in Score, then suit yourself.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">The right use of Score:</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Use only min & max
ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">…with the difference that,
when it’s uncertain whether or not a candidate deserves
approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
intermediate point-rating.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Nice, sometimes convenient,
because, otherwise, the only way to give someone partial
approval would be probabilistically.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">But Score loses Approval’s
absolute minimalness, & unique unarbitrariness.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Much better to let the
voters deal with such things for themselves with the
absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary
& (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule
& count. …with the consequent expense & count-fraud
vulnerability.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p dir="auto"> So it is strategically equivalent to
Approval while being more complicated and less fair.</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto">More complicated, yes.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but
some jurisdictions might insist on one. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…likewise Score. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s true that it somewhat increases
Condorcet-efficiency & Social-Utility (SU), but it
brings great strategy-complication, including the loss of
FBC compliance.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But STAR is better than Hare because:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It retains some amount Score’s merit.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting
in much better count-fraud security.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much less expensive to administer &
implement than Hare.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much simpler to describe its workings
when proposing it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p dir="auto"><br>
<br>
And Approval has a quite good reputation here because
it meets Favorite Betrayal (aka FBC) and compared
with FPP the winner<br>
will strongly tend to have higher social utility and
be much more likely a sincere Condorcet winner.
Also, and not unrelatedly, <br>
it has a bias toward centrists that some people think
is wonderful.<br>
<br>
But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two
Runoff (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to
make STAR) is just<br>
a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method
"a bit more accurate", brings it into compliance with
Condorcet Loser<br>
and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".
("Sky-high" according to CLC here).<br>
<br>
But actually it makes the method profoundly different
and very bad. It seems to me that the inventors of
STAR must have been <br>
motivated by three priorities:<br>
<br>
(1) the method isn't Hare, <br>
<br>
(2) the method, in a purely technical and completely
useless way, apparently meets Mono-raise (aka
Monotonicity).<br>
<br>
(3) subject to being saleable to and understood by
not-so-deep thinkers, the method be as bad as
possible.<br>
<br>
From the "equal-vote" website: <a href="https://www.equal.vote/" target="_blank">https://www.equal.vote/</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">Ranked
Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order
of preference has been lauded as a solution, but in
elections where the third candidate is actually
competitive,<span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </span></span><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s" style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">vote-splitting
remains a serious issue</a><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)"><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </span>and
RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a
primary and general election with Choose-One
Plurality voting.</span></blockquote>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">Luckily,
many voting methods are can effectively prevent
vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can
weigh in on each candidate individually, when all
ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
show equal preference, vote-splitting can be
eliminated. All voting methods which do this pass
the</span><span style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)"> </span><a rel="noopener" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion" style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Equal Vote
Criterion</a><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">,
including </span><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.us/star" style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">STAR Voting</a><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">,...</span></blockquote>
<br>
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda
nonsense: <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">The
Equal Vote Criterion or<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a rel="nofollow" href="https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:url("");background-size:0.857em;padding-right:1em;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204);background-position:right center;background-repeat:no-repeat no-repeat" target="_blank">Equality
Criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is a<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion" title="Voting system criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">voting method
criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>which
requires that a voting method ensure that every
voter may cast a vote which is as powerful as a vote
cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting" title="Vote-splitting" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">vote-splitting</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>or the
"Spoiler Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast
an<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote" title="Equally Weighted Vote" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">equally
weighted vote</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">.</span></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">Choose-One
Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice
Voting) do not satisfy the Equal Vote Criterion.</span></blockquote>
<br>
This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this
very vague and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare)
certainly does. <br>
<br>
The classic scenario that motivated some people get
negative about Hare (and also methods like Min-Max
Margins):<br>
<br>
49 Bush<br>
24 Gore<br>
27 Nader>Gore<br>
<p>Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27,
Nader>Gore 27-24.<br>
<br>
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader
voters whose Gore> Bush preference was strong had
incentive to use the Compromise <br>
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their
sincere favourite). If the method was Approval they
could have approved both Nader and<br>
Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having
to vote their sincere favorite below equal-top.<br>
<br>
But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than
Hare. The Nader voters would have incentive to give
Nader zero points.<br>
<br>
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to Push-over
strategy has said to be a result of it's failure of
Mono-raise. But STAR is much more vulnerable<br>
to Push-over.<br>
<br>
Say you are sure that your favourite will make the
final two. In that case then you have incentive to
give every candidate that you are sure your<br>
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars then you
are relying on you favourite winning the runoff
without your help, but if 4 stars then you might<br>
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys
into the final.<br>
<br>
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists
rely on their favourite winning the runoff against
their own votes, i.e. with their votes supporting<br>
the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much
more risky (more likely to backfire) and difficult to
coordinate than is the case with STAR.<br>
<br>
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on
the Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I find that weird
and misleading, because STAR badly fails FBC.<br>
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ</a><br>
<br>
From <a href="https://www.starvoting.org/" target="_blank">https://www.starvoting.org/</a><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h2 style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;font-family:Montserrat,sans-serif;font-weight:700;line-height:1.2;font-size:2.25rem;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(2,106,134)">Why
STAR Voting? </h2>
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Voting
reform is the keystone. A single cause with the
potential to empower us to be more effective on
every other issue we care about. </span></p>
<ul style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<li style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting" style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Honesty
is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
incentivized.</a></p>
</li>
<li style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote" style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Even if
your favorite can’t win, your vote helps
prevent your worst case scenario.</a></p>
</li>
<li style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy" style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Highly
accurate, no matter how many
candidates/parties are in the race.</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<br>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to
mean, but I refute the suggestion that these claims are
more true of STAR than they are of Hare.<br>
<br>
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and
all the Condorcet methods.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode"><br>
<p>Chris<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div>
</div>----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
</blockquote></div></div>