<div><br></div><div dir="auto">You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable candidates too.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial with most non wv Condorcet.)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very long way from the voter-median, which is Progressive.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.</div><div dir="auto"><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="auto">IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of
winnability. …trying & hoping to match the ranking-order
of the other preferrers of some of your acceptables.<br></div></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are
no known clear front-runners</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would work fine.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"> </div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">and the supporters of the candidates
you deem acceptable don't<br>
fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and
which are not.<br>
<br>
Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
same set of acceptable candidates above all the others </div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to combine on, then VF1 would work fine.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem (admittedly worse in VF1.).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a complex count & its consequences.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">and benefit
from the method's compliance with<br>
Clone-Winner. And if there are known front-runners and you insist
on voting super-safe then I suppose you can top-rank the same
Compromise candidate you<br>
would in FPP.</div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
nightmare. Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare
is much lower.<p></p></div><div><p></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods, including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud insecurity & vulnerability.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in which I’ve just now voted.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something even simpler than RP.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><br>
<br>Michael <br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael
Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at
18:04 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p>Michael wrote:<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">But STAR is better than Hare because:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It retains some amount Score’s merit.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
No it doesn't. Score meets Favorite Betrayal and
Participation. STAR trashes those just for Condorcet
Loser. </div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I said “some”, not “all”.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates,
then just give max to the acceptables, & zero to the
unacceptables.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of
winnability. …trying & hoping to match the ranking-order
of the other preferrers of some of your acceptables.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Questionable guesswork. An intractable
strategic morass.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate
the horror of STAR.<br>
<br>
The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:<br>
<br>
*Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote
their sincere favourite as low as possible*.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff?
It occurred to me too, I don’t like it. I much prefer Score
to STAR. … completely reject runoff with Approval. …unless
a jurisdiction insists on it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I much prefer Approval to Score, for
minimalness & unarbitrariness.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto"><br>
Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any
intelligence or common sense because STAR is obviously<br>
so silly and arbitrary.</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">See above.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single
Non-Transferable Vote with the Single Transferable Vote,
keeping compliance<br>
with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser,
Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help but losing Participation
and Mono-Raise to gain <br>
Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid
Coalitions) and Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.<br>
<br>
It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of
properties". It's ok not to like it if you are a
fundamentalist about some criterion<br>
compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not
to suggest that complete garbage like STAR is in some way
preferable.</div>
<div>
<p><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Apr 9,
2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">[quote]</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Score is Approval
with a "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
for the sake of being more sincere/expressive"
box/button.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">[/quote]</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">If that’s how you
want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">The right use of
Score:</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Use only min &
max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">…with the
difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or
not a candidate deserves approval, you can give
hir partial approval, by an intermediate
point-rating.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Nice, sometimes
convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to
give someone partial approval would be
probabilistically.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">But Score loses
Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
unarbitrariness.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">Much better to let
the voters deal with such things for themselves
with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use
some arbitrary & (somewhat or greatly)
complicated definition, rule & count. …with
the consequent expense & count-fraud
vulnerability.</div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p dir="auto"> So it is strategically
equivalent to Approval while being more
complicated and less fair.</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto">More complicated, yes.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I strongly oppose a runoff for
Approval, but some jurisdictions might insist on
one. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…likewise Score. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s true that it somewhat increases
Condorcet-efficiency & Social-Utility (SU),
but it brings great strategy-complication,
including the loss of FBC compliance.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But STAR is better than Hare
because:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It retains some amount Score’s
merit.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much, much simpler than Hare,
resulting in much better count-fraud security.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much less expensive to
administer & implement than Hare.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s much simpler to describe its
workings when proposing it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p dir="auto"><br>
<br>
And Approval has a quite good reputation
here because it meets Favorite Betrayal
(aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner<br>
will strongly tend to have higher social
utility and be much more likely a sincere
Condorcet winner. Also, and not
unrelatedly, <br>
it has a bias toward centrists that some
people think is wonderful.<br>
<br>
But some people seem to think that adding a
Top-Two Runoff (automated in the case of
STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just<br>
a harmless little gimmick that just makes
the method "a bit more accurate", brings it
into compliance with Condorcet Loser<br>
and so must make it more "Condorcet
efficient". ("Sky-high" according to CLC
here).<br>
<br>
But actually it makes the method profoundly
different and very bad. It seems to me that
the inventors of STAR must have been <br>
motivated by three priorities:<br>
<br>
(1) the method isn't Hare, <br>
<br>
(2) the method, in a purely technical and
completely useless way, apparently meets
Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).<br>
<br>
(3) subject to being saleable to and
understood by not-so-deep thinkers, the
method be as bad as possible.<br>
<br>
From the "equal-vote" website: <a href="https://www.equal.vote/" target="_blank">https://www.equal.vote/</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">Ranked
Choice Voting, where voters rank
candidates in order of preference has been
lauded as a solution, but in elections
where the third candidate is actually
competitive,<span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </span></span><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s" style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">vote-splitting
remains a serious issue</a><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)"><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"> </span>and
RCV only offers a marginal improvement
compared to a primary and general
election with Choose-One Plurality voting.</span></blockquote>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">Luckily,
many voting methods are can effectively
prevent vote-splitting. As it turns out,
when voters can weigh in on each candidate
individually, when all ballot data is
counted, and when voters are able to show
equal preference, vote-splitting can be
eliminated. All voting methods which do
this pass the</span><span style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)"> </span><a rel="noopener" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion" style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Equal
Vote Criterion</a><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">,
including </span><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.us/star" style="box-sizing:border-box;margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:underline;font-size:16px;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">STAR
Voting</a><span style="font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:16px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(47,47,47)">,...</span></blockquote>
<br>
The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just propaganda
nonsense: <a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">The
Equal Vote Criterion or<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a rel="nofollow" href="https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:url("");background-size:0.857em;padding-right:1em;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204);background-position:right center;background-repeat:no-repeat no-repeat" target="_blank">Equality
Criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>is
a<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion" title="Voting system criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">voting
method criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>which
requires that a voting method ensure that
every voter may cast a vote which is as
powerful as a vote cast by any other
voter. Voting methods which pass the Equal
Vote Criterion do not exhibit<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting" title="Vote-splitting" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">vote-splitting</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>or
the "Spoiler Effect," ensuring that every
vote can cast an<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote" title="Equally Weighted Vote" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">equally
weighted vote</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">.</span></blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">Choose-One
Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and
Instant Runoff Voting (often referred to
as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
the Equal Vote Criterion.</span></blockquote>
<br>
This is just dishonest blather. If anything
meets this very vague and confused "criterion"
IRV (aka Hare) certainly does. <br>
<br>
The classic scenario that motivated some
people get negative about Hare (and also
methods like Min-Max Margins):<br>
<br>
49 Bush<br>
24 Gore<br>
27 Nader>Gore<br>
<p>Gore>Bush 51-49, Bush>Nader 49-27,
Nader>Gore 27-24.<br>
<br>
Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the
Nader voters whose Gore> Bush preference
was strong had incentive to use the
Compromise <br>
strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying"
their sincere favourite). If the method was
Approval they could have approved both Nader
and<br>
Gore, preventing the election of Bush
without having to vote their sincere
favorite below equal-top.<br>
<br>
But in this type of scenario STAR does no
better than Hare. The Nader voters would
have incentive to give Nader zero points.<br>
<br>
"Traditionally" Hare's vulnerability to
Push-over strategy has said to be a result
of it's failure of Mono-raise. But STAR is
much more vulnerable<br>
to Push-over.<br>
<br>
Say you are sure that your favourite will
make the final two. In that case then you
have incentive to give every candidate that
you are sure your<br>
favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars. If 5 stars
then you are relying on you favourite
winning the runoff without your help, but if
4 stars then you might<br>
fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser
turkeys into the final.<br>
<br>
In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the
strategists rely on their favourite winning
the runoff against their own votes, i.e.
with their votes supporting<br>
the turkey against their favourite. This
makes it much more risky (more likely to
backfire) and difficult to coordinate than
is the case with STAR.<br>
<br>
The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok
video on the Favorite Betrayal Criterion. I
find that weird and misleading, because STAR
badly fails FBC.<br>
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ</a><br>
<br>
From <a href="https://www.starvoting.org/" target="_blank">https://www.starvoting.org/</a><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h2 style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;font-family:Montserrat,sans-serif;font-weight:700;line-height:1.2;font-size:2.25rem;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(2,106,134)">Why
STAR Voting? </h2>
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">Voting
reform is the keystone. A single cause
with the potential to empower us to be
more effective on every other issue we
care about. </span></p>
<ul style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:left;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<li style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting" style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Honesty is
the best strategy. Strategic voting
is not incentivized.</a></p>
</li>
<li style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote" style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Even if your
favorite can’t win, your vote helps
prevent your worst case scenario.</a></p>
</li>
<li style="box-sizing:border-box;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif">
<p style="box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem;line-height:1.7;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif"><a rel="noopener" href="https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy" style="box-sizing:border-box;text-decoration:none;font-family:Verdana,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;color:rgb(42,162,179)" target="_blank">Highly
accurate, no matter how many
candidates/parties are in the race.</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
<br>
I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is
supposed to mean, but I refute the suggestion
that these claims are more true of STAR than
they are of Hare.<br>
<br>
In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and
Approval and all the Condorcet methods.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode"><br>
<p>Chris<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div>