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<p>Here is a paper I recently presented at the <a href="https://publicchoicesociety.org/conference/2024" style="text-decoration: none;" moz-do-not-send="true">61st
Public Choice Society Conference</a>, containing results from
analysis of tens of thousands of polls run on the CIVS system
since 2003.<br>
</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/">The
Frequency of Condorcet Winners in Real Non-Political Elections</a></p>
<p>Andrew C. Myers<br>
</p>
Condorcet-consistent voting is attractive because it follows the
principle that the will of a majority of voters should not be
denied. However, it is in general possible that there is no
Condorcet winner: a cycle of candidates might exist in which each
candidate is preferred to the next. The possibility that such a
cycle occurs, and the uncertainty about how to handle it, have been
an obstacle to the adoption of Condorcet methods. This paper reports
on the experience from CIVS, a long-running open-source voting
service that supports Condorcet-consistent voting methods. Over a
period of about twenty years, users have conducted tens of thousands
of polls using CIVS, including many with real-world consequences.
During this time, CIVS has thus accumulated probably the largest
existing corpus of data about how Condorcet voting functions in
practice. CIVS supports multiple completion methods for handling
cycles, but the data show that it usually does not matter which
completion method is used, because there is rarely a cycle in polls
with a large enough number of voters.<br>
<p>Full text here: <a href="https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/"><https://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/></a></p>
<p>Cheers,<br>
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<p>-- Andrew<br>
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