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<p><br>
</p>
<p>Hello Steve,</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">"about
50% of the voters are disappointed when using plurality voting,
and over 10% are disappointed when using STV or CPO-STV."</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">This
is about right but it would be false of the original Hare
system, making one constituency of the nation. And it did not
mean the voters would have to make 500 or so preferences. There
would be enough variety in the modest number of preferences made
by each voter, to ensure extreme proportionality of the sort
envisioned by this writer. The only qualification, and an
important one, is that society has a pluralist rather than a
monolithic media.</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">(Some
reformers tagged Condorcet pairing onto STV. I remember that Dr
Hill used a Condorcet pairing supplement to decide a final
run-off between runners up.)</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">With
regard to grading candidates, in my opinion, this is a step
backward from ordinal voting. From the point of view of scales
of measurement, the classificatory scale is more primitive and
less accurate than the ordinal scale.</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Cardinal
numbers are more powerful than ordinal numbers. But that is why
the vote also has a count, and is not a reason for abolishing
the ordinal vote, determining the preferential sequence of the
count, (as in the Cumulative vote family of election systems).</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Regards,</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Richard
Lung.</span></p>
<p><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 19/03/2024 04:49, steve bosworth
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:DBAP195MB0922086082A60D501AB2482EB62C2@DBAP195MB0922.EURP195.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<style type="text/css" style="display:none;">P {margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;}</style>
<p class="elementToProof"
style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 16pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><b><br>
</b></span></p>
<p class="elementToProof"
style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 16pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><b>Needless
disappointments result from electing legislative bodies
using plurality, STV, or CPO-STV</b></span></p>
<p
style="direction: ltr; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.1in;"
class="elementToProof" align="left">
<span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><br>
</span></p>
<p
style="direction: ltr; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.1in;"
class="elementToProof" align="left">
<span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Structurally,
different portions of all the voters fail to help elect their
favored candidate for a legislative body. For example, when
electing a seven-member city council; about 50% of the voters
are disappointed when using plurality voting, and over 10% are
disappointed when using STV or CPO-STV. However, all these
disappointments are needless because a new and better way of
voting guarantees that
<u>every voter</u> is most likely to see one of the elected
members as representing their hopes and concerns. This system
is called evaluative-proportional representation (EPR):
<i><a
href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/"
target="_blank"
id="OWAed2ab933-7f47-066e-313e-44df54cb470a"
class="OWAAutoLink"
style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-</a><a
href="https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/"
target="_blank"
id="OWA911e9cf9-3cbb-0312-e7c3-c0c17db3d878"
class="OWAAutoLink"
style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"
moz-do-not-send="true">algorithm-v3/</a></i></span><span
style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><i>.</i></span></p>
<p
style="direction: ltr; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.1in;"
class="elementToProof" align="left">
<span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Each
EPR ballot invites the voter to grade the suitability for
office of at least one of the candidates as either Excellent,
Very Good, Good, or Acceptable. Voters can grade as many of
the candidates as they want, and give the same grade to more
than one candidate.
</span><span
style="font-family: "Liberation Serif", "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"></span></p>
<p
style="direction: ltr; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.1in;"
class="elementToProof" align="left">
<span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">All
these grades are counted to assure each voter that their one
vote is add to the total of the elected candidate who received
their highest available grade.</span></p>
<p
style="direction: ltr; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.1in;"
align="left">
<span
style="font-family: Poppins, serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">What
do you think of the arguments detailed in the above link?</span></p>
<p
style="direction: ltr; line-height: 115%; margin-bottom: 0.1in;"
align="left">
<span
style="font-family: "Liberation Serif", "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><br>
<br>
</span></p>
<div
style="font-family: Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 14pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<hr style="display: inline-block; width: 98%;">
<div dir="ltr" id="divRplyFwdMsg"><span
style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><b>From:</b> Election-Methods
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com></a> on
behalf of <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 13, 2024 9:40 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 24</span>
<div> </div>
</div>
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Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ: Election-Methods<br>
Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18 (steve bosworth)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 04:40:16 +0000<br>
From: steve bosworth <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com"><stevebosworth@hotmail.com></a><br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">"election-methods@lists.electorama.com"</a><br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
Subject: [EM] Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ:<br>
Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:DBAP195MB09225D904967554FD76DB43BB62B2@DBAP195MB0922.EURP195.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM"><DBAP195MB09225D904967554FD76DB43BB62B2@DBAP195MB0922.EURP195.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM></a><br>
<br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"<br>
<br>
<br>
Today's Topics:<br>
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a
provisional prime minister<br>
Stephen: The following responds to the two responses from
Limelike.curves also copied below, in addition to a copy of my
first suggestions, bellow.<br>
<br>
Thank you Limelike for the Wikipedia link to the following
example and information:<br>
<br>
"Highest median rules violate the Archimedean property<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property"
id="OWA5867df9a-8b08-8c4a-68ee-96b3cbd2dfee"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property</a>>
(a much weaker form of the majority criterion<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion"
id="OWA70094039-1736-4932-2fa3-ffea8a050a4c"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion</a>>).
As shown below, it is possible for Alice<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob"
id="OWAb2e4a11a-cb1b-eccb-4069-e830cf16ef41"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob</a>>
to defeat Bob<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob"
id="OWAa97a1358-ea11-b576-f99c-0fc0d455c7b6"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice_and_Bob</a>>
in an election, even if only one voter thinks Bob is better than
Alice, and a very large number of voters (up to 100% of them)
give Alice a higher rating.<br>
<br>
Ballots (Bolded medians)<br>
<br>
# ballots<br>
<br>
Alice<br>
<br>
Bob<br>
<br>
Charlie<br>
<br>
Many<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large"
id="OWA2021f258-408d-a6d6-f964-cf68cfd2edde"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large</a>><br>
<br>
100/100<br>
<br>
52/100<br>
<br>
0/100<br>
<br>
1<br>
<br>
50/100<br>
<br>
51/100<br>
<br>
1/100<br>
<br>
Many<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large"
id="OWA79dc2fd2-4ff2-24f6-531f-88f003ab7345"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrarily_large</a>><br>
<br>
49/100<br>
<br>
0/100<br>
<br>
100/100<br>
<br>
In this election, Bob has the highest median score (51) and
defeats Alice, even though every voter except for one (perhaps
Bob himself) thinks Alice is a better candidate. This is true no
matter how many voters there are. As a result, even a single
voter's weak preferences can override the strong preferences of
the rest of the electorate.<br>
<br>
The above example restricted to candidates Alice and Bob also
serves as an example of highest median rules failing the
majority criterion<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion"
id="OWA90b5b54b-33f4-02c1-b284-3a2baba03fd6"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion</a>>,
although highest medians can pass the majority criterion with
normalized ballots (i.e. ballots scaled to use the whole 0-100
range). However, normalization still cannot recover the
Archimedean criterion.?<br>
<br>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><br>
<br>
Correct me if I?m mistaken: Belinski?s way of breaking ties
avoids the use of the infinitesimals as addressed by the
Archimedean property<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property"
id="OWA9e81537d-3d49-8f2f-b48e-f74b2ea58f3f"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archimedean_property</a>>
as presented in Wikipedia.<br>
<br>
At the same time, Belinski?s use of adding and subtracting whole
numbers, alone, to discover the median winner makes it much
easier for ordinary votes to understand the MJ count than to
understand the details of any Condorcet count. Also, Belinski?s
grades are much more expressive than Condorcet?s preferences. In
addition, MJ allows voter to give the same grade to more than
one candidate.<br>
<br>
Secondly, we seem to understand the majority criterion<<a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion"
id="OWAa5dcf065-4b57-aefc-404b-8f0f0c0a6578"
class="OWAAutoLink moz-txt-link-freetext"
data-auth="NotApplicable" moz-do-not-send="true">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion</a>>
differently. Initially, both Alice and Bob (and each candidate)
received the same total number of grades (see below). Ordering
all the grades received by each candidate from highest to
lowest, we initially discover that Alice and Bob have the same
median grade. In order to break this tie using Belinski?s
method, one grade having the same value as this median grade is
temporarily removed from each of their lists of grades
repeatedly until one of them is seen to have the highest median
grade. This will be Bob in this example. Bob?s majority is
determined by a higher median grade than received by Alice, and
that is why he is elected. One voter judged him to be more
suitable for office.<br>
<br>
At the same time, I accept that it would be hard objectively to
claim that either Bob or Alice would be most suitable for the
office. I also accept that Alice has a higher average. At the
same time, I agree with Belinski?s wider argument that averaging
all the grades is less informative for an active democracy
because averaging is more likely to prompt voters not to vote
honestly -- to exaggerate their grades: perhaps, only to give
Excellent to the one or several candidates they judge only to be
Acceptable, and then, indiscriminately to Reject the rest.<br>
<br>
To the extent that such less than truthful voting occurs, both
the public and any analysts are deprived of the much richer
data-base and education that Belinski?s MJ count otherwise
enables its post-election reports to supply. Carefully analyzed,
these reports would enable commentators to report on the
comprehensive snapshot of the number and intensity of support
that every candidate seems to have received, and similarly, the
number and intensity with which many of the contentious issues
in the relevant society are being supported or opposed. This
information would seem to help strength any democracy.<br>
<br>
What do you think?<br>
<br>
Stephen<br>
<br>
________________________________<br>
From: steve bosworth <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com"><stevebosworth@hotmail.com></a><br>
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 1:13 PM<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
Subject: Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18<br>
<br>
<br>
Today's Topics:<br>
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a
provisional prime minister<br>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><br>
> > On 03/11/2024 11:22 PM EDT Closed Limelike Curves <<br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> ><br>
> > I wonder if what we really want is to take pairwise
differences in<br>
> scores, then calculate the median difference for each pair
of candidates.<br>
> That might give you a system that behaves like Condorcet
but still accounts<br>
> for intensity of preferences. (Is that a thing?)<br>
> ><br>
> Do you actually think that in a competitive partisan
political election<br>
> where voters have a stake in the outcome, want to prevail
politically, and<br>
> vote by secret ballot that they would mark their ballots
honestly about<br>
> intensity of preference?<br>
><br>
> "My system is only intended for honest men." Jean-Charles
de Borda<br>
><br>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><br>
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2024 23:54:34 -0700<br>
From: Closed Limelike Curves
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com"><closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com></a><br>
To: steve bosworth <<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com">stevebosworth@hotmail.com</a><br>
In response to my suggestion that MJ be used to election a
provisional prime minister,<br>
Limelike Currves wrote:I<br>
>"I think a Condorcet method would be most likely to do that
(since it<br>
>maximizes the chances that the elected candidate will have
majority<br>
>support). Majority Judgment can actually do arbitrarily
badly at this--a<br>
>candidate can win even if only one voter supports them. (It
lacks the<br>
>Archimedean property.)"<br>
<br>
Stephen: At the same time, MJ's grades are more expressive than
Condorcet's preferences. Grades allow each voter more
informatively to express their different judgments about the
suitability for office of as many of the candidates they want.<br>
<br>
Also, I think it is MJ that maximizes the chances for the winner
to be elected by a majority of all the ballots cast. This
majority is discovered by comparing all the grades given to all
the candidates by all the ballots cast. The one candidate who is
found to continue to have received the highest median grade is
supported by this majority.<br>
What do you think?<br>
Stephen<br>
<br>
On Sat, Mar 9, 2024 at 12:52?PM steve bosworth
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com"><stevebosworth@hotmail.com></a><br>
wrote:<br>
<br>
> 3/9/2024<br>
> From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com">stevebosworth@hotmail.com</a><br>
><br>
> What do you think of using Majority Judgment to elect the
provisional<br>
> prime minister.<br>
> As a result, this winner would have received the largest
number of highest<br>
> grades regarding their suitability for this office? This
number would also<br>
> be a majority of all the votes in the elected parliament.
Such a winner<br>
> would seem to be the one most likely to be able to
negotiate the formation<br>
> of a unified cabinet that would receive the needed majority
vote of<br>
> confidence.<br>
<br>
<br>
________________________________<br>
From: steve bosworth <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com"><stevebosworth@hotmail.com></a><br>
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2024 1:13 PM<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
Subject: Re: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 236, Issue 18<br>
<br>
Today's Topics:<br>
Re: Electing Cabinets, starting by using MJ to elect a
provisional prime minister<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2024 23:54:34 -0700<br>
From: Closed Limelike Curves
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com"><closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com></a><br>
To: steve bosworth <<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com">stevebosworth@hotmail.com</a><br>
In response to my suggestion that MJ be used to election a
provisional prime minister,<br>
Limelike Currves wrote:I<br>
>"I think a Condorcet method would be most likely to do that
(since it<br>
> maximizes the chances that the elected candidate will have
majority<br>
>support). Majority Judgment can actually do arbitrarily
badly at this--a<br>
>candidate can win even if only one voter supports them. (It
lacks the<br>
>Archimedean property.)"<br>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><br>
<br>
Stephen: At the same time, MJ's grades are more expressive than
Condorcet's preferences. Grades allow each voter more
informatively to express their different judgments about the
suitability for office of as many of the candidates they want.<br>
<br>
Also, I think it is MJ that maximizes the chances for the winner
to be elected by a majority of all the ballots cast. This
majority is discovered by comparing all the grades given to all
the candidates by all the ballots cast. The one candidate who is
found to continue to have received the highest median grade is
supported by this majority.<br>
What do you think?<br>
Stephen<br>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><br>
<br>
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