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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">And thinking further about the meme: <span><span style="color: rgb(38, 40, 42); font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">"You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same." - a participation failure is an example of the exact opposite happening. You cast an honest ballot, but the election result changes in the wrong direction for you. It's not an accurate claim.</span></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div><br></div>
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On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 16:18:41 GMT, Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Just to add on the Copeland / Ranked Robin thing - given most likely tie (a three-way cycle) and Ranked Robin's next level of tie-breaker (Borda among the tied candidates as far as I understand), Ranked Robin is for the most part Condorcet//Borda. I understand that Copeland was picked by Equal Vote because of its simplicity, but given its reliance on the Borda a tie-breaker, it loses that purity and simplicity as a method. So right now I see Ranked Pairs or River as overall the best Condorcet methods for simplicity and criterion compliance. (I would not be averse to their use on a cardinal ballot.)</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Friday, 1 March 2024 at 10:02:39 GMT, Toby Pereira <tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">So people don't all have to click on the link for the "meme": <span>"You fail participation because you ignore relevant ballot data. I fail participation because I have a strong honesty incentive. We are not the same."</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>It's not particularly useful. It needs backing up mathematically.</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>And as has been said previously regarding Copeland, if there isn't a Condorcet winner, it's probably because there's a three-way cycle, so it's primary tie-breaking method doesn't work.</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>Toby</span></div><div><br></div>
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On Thursday, 29 February 2024 at 19:43:32 GMT, Sass <sass@equal.vote> wrote:
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<div><div id="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266"><div dir="ltr"><div>I recently made a meme relevant to this topic:</div><div><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://www.reddit.com/r/EndFPTP/comments/17y3fsb/pairwise_comparisonsequential_elimination/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>Just like IIA and Cloneproofness and so many other criteria failed by many Condorcet methods, Participation only matters in elections when there is not a Condorcet Winner (CW), which means it only creates an actionable strategy when someone can predict that a given election will not have a CW.</div><div><br></div><div>I tend to prefer cardinal methods because of the increased expressivity and reduced cognitive load on the voter, but the more I think about Condorcet methods, the more impenetrable they seem. It just comes down to explaining it to voters and legal viability. That's why I like "elect the candidate who is preferred over the most others" as a method (i.e. Ranked Robin (i.e. Copeland)).</div><div><br></div><br><div class="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266gmail_attr">On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 1:03 PM <<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex;" class="ydp6fb7e7f4yiv9165088266gmail_quote">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
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Today's Topics:<br>
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1. Question to the Condorcetists (Closed Limelike Curves)<br>
2. Re: Question to the Condorcetists (Michael Ossipoff)<br>
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Message: 1<br>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 10:36:40 -0800<br>
From: Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Subject: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CA+euzPi2VRg_Z_4C32zCE+t=gu4OXAjoffs=_sch=<a href="mailto:UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">UXH6V3CYg@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
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Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods<br>
have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable<br>
to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in<br>
Germany.<br>
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Message: 2<br>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 11:32:43 -0800<br>
From: Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>><br>
Cc: <a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Question to the Condorcetists<br>
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It?s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in<br>
Germany, because, here, even Hare?s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.<br>
<br>
It?s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn?t.<br>
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it?s<br>
participation-failure, a pass.<br>
<br>
I?ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually<br>
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for<br>
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy<br>
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably<br>
irrelevant to strategy.<br>
<br>
But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows that<br>
single-winner elections aren?t perfect. ?making a good argument for<br>
PR?*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.<br>
<br>
Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world?s countries), Germany feels<br>
no need to compromise participation.<br>
<br>
We?re told that list-PR ?hasn?t been tried?. No, just in 2/3 of the world?s<br>
countries for about a century.<br>
<br>
But, with that counterfactual ?hasn?t been tried? excuse, we?re stuck in<br>
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to<br>
democracy.<br>
<br>
On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <<br>
<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods<br>
> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable<br>
> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in<br>
> Germany.<br>
> ----<br>
> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list<br>
> info<br>
><br>
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