<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jan 22, 2024, 18:57 C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<div lang="x-unicode">
<p>Ted,<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">...you didn't comment on whether ballots
with all Smith candidates below top rating should have their
ratings bumped up: i.e., D > E > A > blank > B (A
and B in Smith) would be recounted as A > blank > B. </blockquote>
<br>
I don't think I left anything ambiguous.<br>
<br>
Assuming in your example we are using say 5-slot ratings ballots
then we interpret it as a score ballot thus: D5, E4, A3, B0. <br>
<br>
If A and B are in Smith then the average score of candidates in
the Smith set is 3+0/2 = 1.5. Only A is scored above 1.5 so
only A is approved.<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Ah, you meant average <i>per ballot</i>. I thought you meant over all ballots. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div lang="x-unicode"><br>
<blockquote type="cite">I also noticed that there were cases where
Smith//ASM(implicit) would get different results (better, IMO)
than Smith//Implicit-approval.
<div><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
What does "ASM" stand for?<br></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval Sorted Margins</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins</a></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div lang="x-unicode">
<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
<br>
<p></p>
<div>On 23/01/2024 10:56 am, Ted Stern
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Chris:
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks for the clarifications, though you didn't comment
on whether ballots with all Smith candidates below top
rating should have their ratings bumped up: i.e., D > E
> A > blank > B (A and B in Smith) would be
recounted as A > blank > B. I think this makes the
most sense as a voter whose favorites are eliminated would
want to ensure that their highest ranked Smith candidate is
counted as approved.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In general I agree with your comments, though I think
Condorcet//Approval with all ranked ballots approved is
probably not optimal, and Approval Sorted Margins with
explicit approval would be too complex for a public
proposal. I'd be happy with Condorcet//Top-ratings as a
public proposal.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Smith//Implicit-approval seems to perform well in a
number of situations, but not appreciably better enough to
make it worth the effort of trying to get people to accept
something more complicated than Condorcet/Top-ratings. I
also noticed that there were cases where
Smith//ASM(implicit) would get different results (better,
IMO) than Smith//Implicit-approval.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jan 19, 2024 at
4:05 PM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite">How is the average calculated?</blockquote>
<br>
We interpret the ratings ballots as score ballots, giving
zero points for the bottom rating (which is default for
unrated),<br>
1 point for the next highest, 2 points for the next above
that and so on. <br>
<br>
Then for any given ballot we add up the scores of the
candidates in the Smith set and divide that by the number
of candidates<br>
in the Smith set and interpret that ballot as approving
those Smith set candidates it scores higher than that
average score.<br>
<p>That simulates the best approval strategy if the voters
only know which candidates are in the Smith set.<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">What advantage does Approval
Sorted Margins have over Smith//Implicit-Approval?</blockquote>
<br>
Do you mean Approval Sorted Margins using ranking ballots
with an explicit approval cutoff? <br>
<br>
Assuming yes, it uses a more expressive ballot, it is less
vulnerable to Defection strategy, and burial strategies
are more<br>
likely to have no effect rather than backfire.<br>
<br>
In the method I proposed, omitting the ASM step and just
electing the candidate with the highest approval score
(derived<br>
as specified) would I concede make for a simpler method
that is nearly as good.<br>
<br>
I worry a bit that with all methods that begin with
eliminating or disqualifying all candidates who aren't in
the Smith set or <br>
just "elect the CW if there is one", over time if there is
never a top cycle then the top-cycle resolution method
could stop<br>
being taken seriously.<br>
<br>
An attractive feature of ASM is that it is a Condorcet
method that a lot of the time would work fine without
anyone needing<br>
to know if there is top cycle or not.<br>
<br>
If the Approval order is A>B>C and A pairwise
beats B and B pairwise beats C no-one needs to enquire
about the pairwise<br>
result between A and C.<br>
<br>
If we want something super simple to explain and sell,
then Condorcet//Top Ratings and Condorcet//Approval
(voted above bottom)<br>
are both not bad and much better than STAR.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<p><br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 18/01/2024 10:13 am, Ted Stern wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Jan 16,
2024 at 7:27 AM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p>Ted,<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"> 3. Otherwise, drop ballots that don't contain ranks above last for
any member of the Smith Set.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>Why not simply drop all ballots that make no
distinction among members of the Smith set?<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I believe it passes LNHelp.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Douglas Woodall showed some time ago that
Condorcet and LNHelp are incompatible. I can't
find<br>
his proof, but it says so here:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion</a><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><span> </span>The<span> </span></span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_criterion" title="Condorcet criterion" style="text-decoration:none;color:rgb(51,102,204);background:none rgb(255,255,255);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Condorcet criterion</a><span style="color:rgb(32,33,34);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><span> </span>is
incompatible with later-no-help.</span></blockquote>
<br>
From your post again:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">It probably fails Participation ..</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
It has been known (for a longer time) that
Condorcet and Participation are incompatible.<br>
<br>
So since we know for sure that your method meets
Condorcet, we also know that it doesn't meet <br>
Later-no-Help or Participation.<br>
<br>
Using a multi-slot ratings ballot for a
Condorcet method of similar complexity I like:<br>
<br>
*Eliminate all candidates not in the Smith set.<br>
<br>
Interpret each ballot as giving approval to
those remaining candidates they rate above
average (mean <br>
of the ratings given to Smith-set members).<br>
<br>
Now, using these approvals, elect the
Margins-Sorted Approval winner.*<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It seems to me that Smith//Implicit-Approval or
Smith//implicit-approval-sorted-margins would be
affected by a couple of factors:</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>How is the average calculated? Do you
normalize scores? In other words, if a ballot
has non-Smith candidates in the first, say,
three ranks, do you up-rank the Smith
candidate scores on that ballot by three?
Also, if there are ranks below the top that
contain only non-Smith candidates, do you
collapse those ranks or leave the relative
rank spacing on the ballot between Smith
candidates untouched?</li>
<li>Approving Smith Candidates with scores above
the mean has similarities to Median Ratings.
It would be more similar and probably more
stable to use the trimmed mean -- drop the top
and bottom 25% of scores. This would give you
an average score closer to the median. </li>
</ul>
<div>What advantage does Approval Sorted Margins
have over Smith//Implicit-Approval? I like ASM
but fear it is probably too complex for any
advantage it gives you.</div>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div> <br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Has Smith//Median Rating been proposed before?</pre>
</blockquote>
Not that I know of.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<h1 style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br>
</h1>
<b style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Ted
Stern</b><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><span> </span></span><a href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Pairwise%20Median%20Rating&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOSm%3Deni2SuD5YRMrYBu4Gn9%2BYQ2NrqC_sXG8QFPrcVApQ%40mail.gmail.com%3E" title="[EM] Pairwise Median Rating" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">dodecatheon at gmail.com</a><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
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Jan 2 15:12:26 PST 2024</i><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"></span>
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<hr style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Continuing my search for a summable voting method that discourages burial
and defection, I've come across this hybrid of Condorcet and median ratings
that acts like Smith/Approval with an automatic approval cutoff. I'm
calling it Pairwise Median Rating (PMR), but it could also be described as
Smith//MR//Pairwise//MRScore:
1. Equal Ranking and ranking gap allowed (essentially a ratings method
with rank inferred). For purposes of this discussion, assume 6 slots (5
ranks above rejection).
2. In rank notation for this method, '>>' refers to a gap. So 'A >> B'
means A gets top rank while B gets 3rd place. Similarly '>>>' means a gap
of two slots: 'A>>>B' means A is top ranked while B is in 4th place.
3. [Smith]
1. Compute the pairwise preference array
2. The winner is the candidate who defeats each other candidate
pairwise.
3. Otherwise, drop ballots that don't contain ranks above last for
any member of the Smith Set.
4. [Median Rating]
1. Set the MR threshold to top rank.
2. While no Smith candidate has a majority of undropped ballots at or
above the threshold, set the threshold to the next lower rank,
until there
is no lower rank.
3. The winner is the single candidate that has a majority of
undropped ballots at or above the threshold.
5. [Pairwise]
1. Otherwise, if more than one candidate passes the threshold, look for
a pairwise beats-all candidate among candidates meeting the MR threshold.
(i.e. Condorcet on just the MR threshold set).
2. If there is one, you have a winner.
6. [MR Score]
1. Otherwise, the winner is the Smith set candidate with the largest
number of ballots at or above the Median Rating threshold (their MRscore).
This method is essentially Smith//Approval(explicit) with the approval
cutoff automatically inferred via median ratings
Step Smith.3, dropping non-Smith-candidate-voting ballots, could be
considered optional, but by doing that, you ensure Immunity from Irrelevant
Ballots (IIB), aka the zero ballot problem that affects other Median Rating
/ Majority Judgment methods. In other words, the majority threshold is
unaffected by ballots that do not rank a viable candidate. It is possible
to do this summably if need be.
PMR either passes the Chicken Dilemma criterion without adjustment, or
there is a downranking strategy for defending against defection.
Consider the following examples from Chris Benham's post re MinLV(erw)
Sorted Margins (
<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html</a>
):
><i>* 46 A>B
</i>*>* 44 B>C (sincere is B or B>A)
*>* 05 C>A
*>* 05 C>B
*>>* A>B 51-49, B>C 90-10, C>A 54-46.
*
With sincere ballots, A is the Condorcet Winner (CW). With B's defection,
there is a cycle, and there is no CW. The Smith set is {A, B, C}. The MR
threshold is 2nd place, and A and B both pass the threshold. A defeats B,
so A is the winner and B's defection/burial fails.
><i>* 25 A>B
</i>*>* 26 B>C
*>* 23 C>A
*>* 26 C
*>>* C>A 75-25, A>B 48-26, B>C 51-49*
C wins with PMR (MR threshold is first place). B would win with most
other Condorcet methods.
><i>* 35 A
</i>*>* 10 A=B
*>* 30 B>C (sincere B > A)
*>* 25 C
*>>* C>A 55-45, A>B 35-30 (10A=B not counted), B>C 40-25.
*A wins with sincere voting. When B defects to try to win, which it
would do with most other Condorcet methods, B wins. With PMR, C wins,
an undesirable outcome for B.
Here is another example from Rob LeGrand
(<a href="https://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html</a>). It's not a
good example for chicken dilemma resistance, but it does demonstrate
differences from Schulze, MMPO, RP and Bucklin:
# example from method description page
98:Abby>Cora>Erin>Dave>Brad
64:Brad>Abby>Erin>Cora>Dave
12:Brad>Abby>Erin>Dave>Cora
98:Brad>Erin>Abby>Cora>Dave
13:Brad>Erin>Abby>Dave>Cora
125:Brad>Erin>Dave>Abby>Cora
124:Cora>Abby>Erin>Dave>Brad
76:Cora>Erin>Abby>Dave>Brad
21:Dave>Abby>Brad>Erin>Cora
30:Dave>Brad>Abby>Erin>Cora
98:Dave>Brad>Erin>Cora>Abby
139:Dave>Cora>Abby>Brad>Erin
23:Dave>Cora>Brad>Abby>Erin
The pairwise matrix:
against
Abby Brad Cora Dave Erin
for Abby 458 461 485 511
Brad 463 461 312 623
Cora 460 460 460 460
Dave 436 609 461 311
Erin 410 298 461 610
There is no Condorcet winner. The Smith set is {Abby, Brad, Dave, Erin}.
Abby wins with Schulze, MMPO, while Brad wins with Ranked Pairs, Erin
wins with Bucklin.
In PMR, with a threshold of 3rd place, Abby, Brad, and Erin all pass
the threshold. Brad defeats Abby and Erin to win. But Brad's threshold
score of 484 is only slightly over the 50% mark of 460.5, so the Dave
voters hold the balance of power. Dave defeats Brad pairwise, so Dave
voters might not be as happy with a Brad victory, and Abby might be
able to persuade Dave voters to downrank Brad but not Abby. If
successful, Brad drops 44 points in MRScore and is no longer in the MR
threshold set. Abby defeats Erin, so Abby wins.
* 21:Dave>Abby>>Brad>Erin>Cora (Brad -> 4th place)*
30:Dave>Brad>Abby>Erin>Cora
98:Dave>Brad>Erin>Cora>Abby
139:Dave>Cora>Abby>Brad>Erin
* 23:Dave>Cora>>Brad>Abby>Erin (Brad -> 4th place)*
PMR passes Condorcet Winner, Condorcet Loser, IIB, and is cloneproof.
I believe it passes LNHelp. It probably fails Participation and IIA.
There are probably weird examples where changing one vote changes the
MR threshold. But overall, I think it has a good balance of incentive
to deter burial and deliberate cycles.
Has Smith//Median Rating been proposed before? It seems like a simple
modification to MR on its own.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
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</blockquote>
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</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>