<div dir="auto">Okay, but I’m just saying that having to specify a tiebreaker loses some brevity & simplicity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…&, should my candidate win instead of yours because one issue-space persuasion had more candidates running than another one did?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">My candidate beats more candidates than yours does, merely because their faction was more split.</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 16:36 Sass <<a href="mailto:sass@equal.vote">sass@equal.vote</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">It already covers some scenarios that do not have a Condorcet Winner. Other scenarios should be framed as ties; that allows us to be wonky (or random) with our tiebreaking mechanic without scrutiny from the public. For Ranked Robin, the tiebreaker is to elect the tied candidate with the best average rank. Put another way, call the tied candidates finalists and the finalist with the greatest sum of margins over other finalists is elected. In the case of two finalists, this just elects the finalist preferred over the other, which would be the most palatable to the public.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 4:11 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do some of the other simple Condorcet versions.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <<a href="mailto:sass@equal.vote" target="_blank">sass@equal.vote</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="ltr">What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing the favorite. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned here:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most favorite candidate.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense that the middle is between Democrat & Republican.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of offensive strategy.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that Condorcet is ideally capable of.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of Condorcet.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">(On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will keep trying.)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the electorate are.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <<a href="mailto:sass@equal.vote" target="_blank">sass@equal.vote</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="ltr">Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices.<div><br></div><div>The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the candidate preferred over the most others:</div><div><a href="https://rankedrobin.org" target="_blank">https://rankedrobin.org</a></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM <<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
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Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)<br>
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800<br>
From: Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM list <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa==<a href="mailto:1B4KrR1LrDjw2m%2BTn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com" target="_blank">1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"<br>
<br>
That question was recently asked.<br>
<br>
Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.<br>
<br>
So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization.<br>
<br>
Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, in<br>
the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its<br>
particularly great unfamiliarity.<br>
<br>
Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure our<br>
thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an<br>
evil.<br>
<br>
How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in<br>
various nonpolitical votes.<br>
<br>
Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a<br>
voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.<br>
<br>
?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened for<br>
RCV.<br>
<br>
But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in<br>
the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the<br>
pursuit of an initiative.<br>
<br>
Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as:<br>
<br>
MinMax(wv)<br>
CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).<br>
<br>
Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.<br>
<br>
Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the<br>
defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t wish<br>
to beat the CW via burial.<br>
<br>
That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to<br>
find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of<br>
initiative-enactment.<br>
<br>
Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that<br>
focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to<br>
approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.<br>
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Message: 2<br>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 20:07:35 +0000<br>
From: "Bob Richard [lists]" <<a href="mailto:lists001@robertjrichard.com" target="_blank">lists001@robertjrichard.com</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?<br>
Message-ID: <<a href="mailto:em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894@3fe7043c.com" target="_blank">em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894@3fe7043c.com</a>><br>
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<br>
A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of <br>
Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn <br>
why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing <br>
mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve <br>
traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, <br>
county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this <br>
part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?<br>
<br>
--Bob Richard<br>
<br>
------ Original Message ------<br>
>From "Michael Ossipoff" <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
To "EM list" <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM<br>
Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?<br>
<br>
>That question was recently asked.<br>
><br>
>Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.<br>
><br>
>So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an <br>
>organization.<br>
><br>
>Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few <br>
>candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. <br>
>Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity.<br>
><br>
>Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure <br>
>our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t <br>
>too-vote an evil.<br>
><br>
>How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in <br>
>various nonpolitical votes.<br>
><br>
>Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a <br>
>voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.<br>
><br>
>?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened <br>
>for RCV.<br>
><br>
>But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, <br>
>in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, <br>
>for the pursuit of an initiative.<br>
><br>
>Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such <br>
>as:<br>
><br>
>MinMax(wv)<br>
>CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).<br>
><br>
>Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.<br>
><br>
>Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the <br>
>defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t <br>
>wish to beat the CW via burial.<br>
><br>
>That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to <br>
>find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of <br>
>initiative-enactment.<br>
><br>
>Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that <br>
>focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked <br>
>to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
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