<div dir="auto">LNHa is an unnecessary bott-end criterion. But it’s nice to have it in IRV.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">LNHa is the only way I’d ever consider ranking, or in any way voting for, Joe.</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 00:25 C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>
<div>
<br>
Quoting from the paper:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:Merriweather,serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(34,34,34)">Two
criteria which are both highly regarded but are inversely
correlated are Favorite Betrayal and Later No Harm</span></blockquote>
<br>
Later-no-Harm is not especially "highly regarded" by me. It
encourages the expression of preferences that may not be serious
and/or are just<br>
honouring unprincipled preference-swap deals. But at least Hare (aka
IRV, aka the Alternative Vote, now promoted in the US as RCV) also
meets Later-no-Help, so there is no crazy <br>
random-fill incentive.<br>
<br>
If "inversely correlated" is supposed to mean that the two criteria
are incompatible, then that is false. MinMax Pairwise Opposition
meets both.<br>
<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method#Variants" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Minimax_Condorcet_method#Variants</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">Minmax(pairwise
opposition) does not strictly satisfy the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Condorcet_criterion" title="Condorcet criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Condorcet
criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span>or<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Smith_set" title="Smith set" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Smith
criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">.
It also fails the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Plurality_criterion" title="Plurality criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Plurality
criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">,
and is more indecisive than the other Minmax methods unless
combined with a tiebreaking rule. <br>
<br>
However, in return it satisfies the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Later-no-harm_criterion" title="Later-no-harm criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Later-no-harm
criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">,
the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Favorite_Betrayal_criterion" title="Favorite Betrayal criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Favorite
Betrayal criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">,
and in the three-candidate case, the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Participation_criterion" title="Participation criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Participation
criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">,
and the<span style="font-family:sans-serif"> </span></span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Chicken_Dilemma_Criterion" title="Chicken Dilemma Criterion" style="text-decoration:none;background-image:none;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(51,102,204)" target="_blank">Chicken
Dilemma Criterion</a><span style="font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(32,33,34)">.</span></blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-family:Merriweather,serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(34,34,34)">As
we will show, STAR Voting incentivizes both honest and
expressive voting by counting all ballot data given. The scoring
round incentivizes voters to give their favorite(s) five stars.
The runoff incentives voters to also give intermediate scores
because showing honest preference order ensures their full vote
will go to the finalist they prefer in the automatic runoff.
Compare this with Instant Runoff Voting, which can actually
incentivize Favorite Betrayal because, in order to pass Later No
Harm, it ignores down-ballot voter preferences which could have
been relevant.</span></blockquote>
<br>
I would say that STAR's failure of Favorite Betrayal is quite a lot
worse than IRV's. Suppose you (as the voter) are sure that your
Greater Evil will be in the top-2 and that if the other finalist<br>
is your Favorite then GE will win, but that your lesser-evil
Compromise has a much better chance of beating GE in the final than
your Favorite. Then obviously you have an incentive to give<br>
your favourite zero stars to try to keep him/her out of the final.<br>
<br>
The scenario in IRV where you get punished for top-ranking your
sincere favourite I consider to be a bit less likely, and at least
in that case the voter can still rank Favorite well above bottom.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p style="box-sizing:inherit;margin-bottom:32px;margin-top:0px;word-break:break-word;font-family:Merriweather,serif;font-size:18px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(34,34,34)"><span style="font-family:Merriweather,serif"> </span>Counting
the full ballot for some voters while ignoring relevant ballot
data for others (as Later No Harm requires) gives voters a false
sense of agency, may erode trust in the system and in voting
reform in general, and is out of keeping with the spirit of one
person, one vote.</p>
<br>
</blockquote>
<p>Complete garbage.</p>
<p>With STAR Push-over strategy is more tempting and much less
risky than it is with IRV. Suppose you are sure that your
favourite (or at least a candidate you find acceptable) will make<br>
the final but are fearful that the other finalist will be able to
pairwise beat that candidate. <br>
<br>
In that case you obviously have incentive to give at least 4 stars
to all the candidates you think would pairwise lose to the
candidate you like.<br>
<br>
And what is supposed to be the excuse for failing Condorcet?<br>
<br>
Let me suggest some good methods that use the same ballot
information as STAR.<br>
<br>
Smith//Approval (more than 1 star)<br>
<br>
Condorcet//Approval (more than 1 star)<br>
<br>
Smith//Approval (above average rating of Smith-set members)<br>
</p>
<p>Approval (above average rating of remaining candidates)
Elimination<br>
<br>
The last two might be too complicated and the last one probably
fails mono-raise, but they are all vastly better than the
nightmare festival of Push-over and Compromise<br>
that is STAR.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
</p>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p><br>
<br>
</p>
<b style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Toby
Pereira</b><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span></span><a href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20%22STAR%20voting...%22%20paper%20by%20Wolk%2C%20Quinn%20%26%20Ogren&In-Reply-To=%3C1752916145.11797420.1704300809944%40mail.yahoo.com%3E" title="[EM] "STAR voting..." paper by Wolk, Quinn & Ogren" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal" target="_blank">tdp201b
at yahoo.co.uk</a><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
<i style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Wed
Jan 3 08:53:29 PST 2024</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
</p>
<hr style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)"> Thank you for posting this. A few things jump out to me.
They briefly discuss the advantages, but the 0 to 5 scoring does still seem fairly limited. They say that it conveys more information than a ranked ballot, but that's not something they've given an objective measure for. You can make a distinction between fewer candidates on a STAR ballot than on a ranked ballot, but you can indicate strength of preference. Amongst that, what's the measure of amount of information? Rob - you mention about whether rating is more intuitive than ranking. My general understanding is that for a small number of candidates, it's easier to rank, but for a large number it's easier to rate, as you just have to have a general opinion of each one rather than an exact pecking order of them all.
On pass/fail criteria, it's interesting that they consider the Equality criterion (where it should be possible to exactly cancel out a vote with an opposite one) to be one that should be passed completely, while generally saying that it's more about not failing any criterion badly. But also, some criteria are easier to pass than others. So by using this reasoning it's easy to hide behind quite a bad criterion failure. E.g., passing participation limits your options for voting methods, whereas I consider independence of clones to be a lot "cheaper". STAR fails independence of clones. In general, I'm not sure a method has to give much up to pass independence of clones.
And this also brings me to my next point - the simulation model. The voting method can change which candidates choose to stand, but I don't think this is modelled by them. STAR's clone failure could cause parties/factions to field two candidates in an attempt to lock out the run-off.
I wouldn't call myself anti-STAR, but I'm not completely convinced by it as a method.
Toby
On Friday, 29 December 2023 at 21:20:24 GMT, Rob Lanphier <<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com" target="_blank" style="font-family:monospace">roblan at gmail.com</a>> wrote:
Hi everyone,
There's a paper regarding STAR voting that was recently made "open access":
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09389-3" target="_blank" style="font-family:monospace">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09389-3</a></pre>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div>