<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body>
<p>Michael,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4">C:
I reject all that. I think a better way too start looking at
things is to assume that we have three factions of voters
(each with<br>
its own candidate) that strongly prefer their favourites to
the other two candidates who they consider to be about equally<br>
bad (and/or uninteresting) and so they are not inclined to do
anything except bullet vote (Later-no-Harm or not).</font>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">M: But your assumption was that there’s a
“sincere CW”. So now you’re contradicting yourself &
saying that there isn’t, due to indifference?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
In the scenario I specified, there is a sincere CW. It is the
candidate that is voted the CW (also the FPP winner).<br>
<br>
Nearly everyone always assumes that (as long as the balloting
rules allow voters to rank as many candidates as they wish and
especially if the method<br>
meets the Condorcet criterion) that a voted CW is always the
sincere CW.<br>
<br>
So the assumption of "a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts" I was
referring to is that when there is no voted CW (because there is a
voted top cycle) there<br>
is very likely a "sincere CW" (and that that is a big deal).<br>
<br>
So then they hypothesise about the voted top cycle being created
by some "offensive strategy" (aimed at thwarting the election of
this sincere CW<br>
"rightful winner") that needs to be thwarted and/or deterred.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">M:The whole strength, value & point of
Condorcet, & rank-balloting in general, is that we don’t
have to express preference-strength, & that
preference-strength is irrelevant to the method’s purpose
& the voter’s intent & interest.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
Obviously the individual voter would like to see their strongest
pairwise preferences have as much effect as possible, more than
their weaker ones.<br>
Assuming that not all the voter's pairwise preferences have
exactly the same strength, we can logically infer that the
strongest ones are those for candidates they vote below no others<br>
versus those they vote above no others.<br>
<br>
The points and value of rank-balloting in general I would say: to
minimise the number of involuntarily "wasted" votes, to elect the
candidate that most likely maximises utility,<br>
to minimise incentives for voters to falsify their preferences (or
to conceal any of their serious preferences) and to minimise
undesirable nomination incentives.<br>
<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/12/2023 4:12 pm, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAOKDY5AtcUv9ycMtQhO=PNmFeOuzwVsQPYfTiTj=kk1tojA-Vw@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Dec 7, 2023 at 20:13
C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><br>
<font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4">The way a lot of
Condorcet enthusiasts see things is that voters
naturally have a sincere full ranking of the candidates<br>
(or certainly those with any hope of making it in to the
Smith set), that we should assume that all those implied
pairwise<br>
preferences are equally strong, or if not they are all
nonetheless equally important.<br>
<br>
</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">Incorrect.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…or, if “a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts” believe
that, then “a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts” are mistaken.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The whole strength, value & point of
Condorcet, & rank-balloting in general, is that we don’t
have to express preference-strength, & that
preference-strength is irrelevant to the method’s purpose
& the voter’s intent & interest.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So, no, there’s no reason to assume anything
about preference-strength, even if you & “a lot of
Condorcet enthusiasts” do.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
And that "normally" if all the voters give these
rankings there will be a "sincere CW", </font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">“Normally” there is a “sincere CW”. That’s why
“normally” there’s a “voted CW”.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4">but if
the used method (that meets<br>
the Condorcet criterion) fails to elect this candidate
due to some of voters declining to give their full
strict rankings creating a<br>
top cycle which the method resolves by electing someone
else then there is some huge problem.</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">If the “used method” is MinMax(wv),
CW,Implicit-Approval, or MDDA, then truncation of the CW won’t
prevent hir election. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">(…but maybe, if there’s humongous indifference
in which case it doesn’t matter a whole hell of a lot).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But is there “some huge problem” if the “sincere
CW” loses? Nah , not unless voters care about their expressed
pairwise preferences being counted & contributing to the
winner by the definition of pairwise-count.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
<br>
I reject all that. I think a better way too start
looking at things is to assume that we have three
factions of voters (each with<br>
its own candidate) that strongly prefer their favourites
to the other two candidates who they consider to be
about equally<br>
bad (and/or uninteresting) and so they are not inclined
to do anything except bullet vote (Later-no-Harm or
not).</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">But your assumption was that there’s a “sincere
CW”. So now you’re contradicting yourself & saying that
there isn’t, due to indifference?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If so, then we needn’t cry if a nonexistent
“sincere CW” isn’t elected.</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
<br>
<br>
That has two big advantages. One, that probably it is
more realistic. We are looking to replace FPP and most
voters would<br>
probably be happy to continue voting for just one
candidate.</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">You don’t live here. Pretty much everyone you
talk to here says that they dislike having to vote for one,
when that one is a despicable lesser-evil.</div>
</div>
<div
style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important">
<div
style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important">
<div class="gmail_quote"
style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
<br>
<br>
And two, with this model there can be no controversy
as to who should win. Every method has no choice
other than to<br>
elect the candidate with the most votes.</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto">That sounds like the definition of
Vote-For-1 (VF1), but of course it’s meaningless in
reference to other methods.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
<br>
I think one mistake that Blake Cretney made quite a
while ago (stemming from the mind-set I described at
the beginning)<br>
was to classify truncation as a variety of Burial
strategy.</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Then Blake Cretney was mistaken. Truncation
(failure to express felt-preferences below some
rank-position) can be strategic, or lazy, careless,
hurried, etc.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…&, if strategic, it could be offensive
or defensive strategy.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(74,77,80)">
<div
style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(255,255,255)"
dir="auto">
<p dir="auto"
style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>
</p>
<p><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4">The voting
method should be very happy to assume that presumed
(or imaginary) strict "preferences" that the voter
chooses not to<br>
express on the ballot for whatever reason (barring
some over-strong truncation or compromise
incentives) simply don't exist.</font></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It isn’t the voting system’s job to assume
things.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">What’s Condorcet’s job?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It’s to count all of everyone’s
voted-preferences & elect the winner that they point
to.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Maybe you aren’t aware of it, but opponents
of Condorcet always reject it because offensive strategy
can defeat a “sincere CW”.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…& so it’s desirable to either elect a
“sincere CW” despite offensive strategy (…as does
MinMax(wv) if there’s strategic, lazy or hurried
truncation of the “sincere CW”.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…or deter burial strategy, as do MinMax(wv),
CW,Implicit-Approval, & MDDA.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…via defensive truncation.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">…& as the autodeterrent methods (when
the best ones are found) will do, without any use of
defensive strategy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Maybe it must be explained to some people
that the purpose of Condorcet is to elect that candidate
who is preferred to all the others by more voters than
prefer that other to hir.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That’s how we count & honor every
pairwise preference voted by every voter.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That’s the 1-&-only defined-purpose of
the pairwise-count Condorcet methods.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">You could design the completion-method for
that defined purpose, or you could choose it to do
something pretty under the assumption that there’s no
“sincere CW”. That’s nice.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Of course that’s entirely your choice. But
if you say that choice other than yours is wrong, then
you’re wrong.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(74,77,80)!important;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important">
<div
style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important"
dir="auto">
<p dir="auto"><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
<br>
On the other hand egregious failures of
Later-no-Help should be looked on as being
"suspiciously convenient".<br>
<br>
I think it could be useful to have a version of
Later-no-Help that has been weakened enough for it
to be compatible with Condorcet.<br>
<br>
More later.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</font></p>
<br>
<p><font style="color:rgb(0,0,0)" size="4"><br>
<br>
</font><br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>