<div><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"></div></div></div><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Dec 7, 2023 at 20:13 C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>
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<font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)">The way a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts see things
is that voters naturally have a sincere full ranking of the
candidates<br>
(or certainly those with any hope of making it in to the Smith
set), that we should assume that all those implied pairwise<br>
preferences are equally strong, or if not they are all
nonetheless equally important.<br><br></font></p></div></blockquote></div><div><div dir="auto">Incorrect.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…or, if “a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts” believe that, then “a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts” are mistaken.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The whole strength, value & point of Condorcet, & rank-balloting in general, is that we don’t have to express preference-strength, & that preference-strength is irrelevant to the method’s purpose & the voter’s intent & interest.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So, no, there’s no reason to assume anything about preference-strength, even if you & “a lot of Condorcet enthusiasts” do.</div></div><div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
And that "normally" if all the voters give these rankings there
will be a "sincere CW", </font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><div><div dir="auto">“Normally” there is a “sincere CW”. That’s why “normally” there’s a “voted CW”.</div></div><div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)">but if the used method (that meets<br>
the Condorcet criterion) fails to elect this candidate due to
some of voters declining to give their full strict rankings
creating a<br>
top cycle which the method resolves by electing someone else
then there is some huge problem.</font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><div><div dir="auto">If the “used method” is MinMax(wv), CW,Implicit-Approval, or MDDA, then truncation of the CW won’t prevent hir election. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">(…but maybe, if there’s humongous indifference in which case it doesn’t matter a whole hell of a lot).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But is there “some huge problem” if the “sincere CW” loses? Nah , not unless voters care about their expressed pairwise preferences being counted & contributing to the winner by the definition of pairwise-count.</div></div><div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
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I reject all that. I think a better way too start looking at
things is to assume that we have three factions of voters (each
with<br>
its own candidate) that strongly prefer their favourites to the
other two candidates who they consider to be about equally<br>
bad (and/or uninteresting) and so they are not inclined to do
anything except bullet vote (Later-no-Harm or not).</font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><div><div dir="auto">But your assumption was that there’s a “sincere CW”. So now you’re contradicting yourself & saying that there isn’t, due to indifference?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If so, then we needn’t cry if a nonexistent “sincere CW” isn’t elected.</div></div><div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
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<br>
That has two big advantages. One, that probably it is more
realistic. We are looking to replace FPP and most voters would<br>
probably be happy to continue voting for just one candidate.</font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><div><div dir="auto">You don’t live here. Pretty much everyone you talk to here says that they dislike having to vote for one, when that one is a despicable lesser-evil.</div></div><div style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important"><div style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important"><div class="gmail_quote" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
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And two, with this model there can be no controversy as to who
should win. Every method has no choice other than to<br>
elect the candidate with the most votes.</font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">That sounds like the definition of Vote-For-1 (VF1), but of course it’s meaningless in reference to other methods.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
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I think one mistake that Blake Cretney made quite a while ago
(stemming from the mind-set I described at the beginning)<br>
was to classify truncation as a variety of Burial strategy.</font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Then Blake Cretney was mistaken. Truncation (failure to express felt-preferences below some rank-position) can be strategic, or lazy, careless, hurried, etc.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…&, if strategic, it could be offensive or defensive strategy.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(74,77,80)"><div style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(255,255,255)"><p dir="auto" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(255,255,255)"></p></div></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(74,77,80)"><div style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(255,255,255)" dir="auto"><p dir="auto" style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></p><p></p>
<p><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)">The voting method should be very happy to assume
that presumed (or imaginary) strict "preferences" that the voter
chooses not to<br>
express on the ballot for whatever reason (barring some
over-strong truncation or compromise incentives) simply don't
exist.</font></p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It isn’t the voting system’s job to assume things.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What’s Condorcet’s job?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It’s to count all of everyone’s voted-preferences & elect the winner that they point to.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Maybe you aren’t aware of it, but opponents of Condorcet always reject it because offensive strategy can defeat a “sincere CW”.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…& so it’s desirable to either elect a “sincere CW” despite offensive strategy (…as does MinMax(wv) if there’s strategic, lazy or hurried truncation of the “sincere CW”.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…or deter burial strategy, as do MinMax(wv), CW,Implicit-Approval, & MDDA.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…via defensive truncation.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…& as the autodeterrent methods (when the best ones are found) will do, without any use of defensive strategy.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Maybe it must be explained to some people that the purpose of Condorcet is to elect that candidate who is preferred to all the others by more voters than prefer that other to hir.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s how we count & honor every pairwise preference voted by every voter.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s the 1-&-only defined-purpose of the pairwise-count Condorcet methods.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You could design the completion-method for that defined purpose, or you could choose it to do something pretty under the assumption that there’s no “sincere CW”. That’s nice.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Of course that’s entirely your choice. But if you say that choice other than yours is wrong, then you’re wrong.</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(74,77,80)!important;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important"><div style="background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)!important;border-color:rgb(255,255,255)!important;color:rgb(255,255,255)!important" dir="auto"><p dir="auto"><font size="4" style="color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
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On the other hand egregious failures of Later-no-Help should be
looked on as being "suspiciously convenient".<br>
<br>
I think it could be useful to have a version of Later-no-Help
that has been weakened enough for it to be compatible with
Condorcet.<br>
<br>
More later.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
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