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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Test
of elimination counts versus proportional counts.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold""> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">The
elimination count may be described as the possibility of
replacing one less
prefered candidate than another. This is especially the basis of
so-called
Instant Run-off Voting, where the idea is that some candidates
may have more
general support than another, after the run-off. This system is
also known as
the Alternative Vote (AV).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">By
convention, AV is generally reserved for the single-member
constituency or
system case. And the single transferable vote is confined to
multi-member
constituency elections. This means that STV is a broken-backed
system, because
it does not apply to all constituency systems, single-member and
multi-member
constituencies. By the same token, AV is no more than a special
case. It has
never gained multi-member currency, beyond a short lived trial,
for instance in
</span><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">British
Columbia</span><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;
font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold""> in the nineteen fifties.
It has its very
occasional reform advocate for a “bottom-up” election system.
That is to say
for rank choice in a multi-member elimination count system.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">As
Enid Lakeman, in How Democracies Vote, pointed out, the lack of
a proportional
count means that the overall majority voters may win in not just
a single
constituency seat, but in every seat in a multi-member
constituency.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold""> Contrast
this by how a proportional count can make the single
transferable vote
applicable, not only in multi-member constituencies but also
single-member
constituencies. STV, unlike IRV (alias AV), can be made a
consistently
proportional count, whereas IRV/AV cannot maintain a majority
count, by
elimination methods, in more than a single seat constituency.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">The
general rule, to apply beyond the study of election methods, is
to introduce a
one-truth condition to any election system.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">The
worlds existing election systems are two, or more, truth
systems. I won’t
attempt to say how many conflicting “truths” the Additional
Members System (alias
MMP) stands for. But ad hoc hybrid election methods are a bad
idea, for this
reason. (Tho these doubly safe seat systems may be an
inspiration to career
politics.)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Given
that the elimination count does not produce even a bare overall
majority in
multi-member constituencies as well as single-member
constituencies, that
leaves the proportional count alternative to attempt a
single-member count as
well as a multi-member count.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">It
is the case of course that there cannot be proportional
representation in
single-member constituencies. (Not always appreciated by
politicians, terrified,
for their jobs, of any reform in the voting system.)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">It
is rightly appreciated, that with a proportional count, the
voters for any
candidate who has won votes in surplus of the quota (here, of
one half the
voters) cannot have the surplus transferable to the voters next
preferences,
because, by definition, there is no other vacant seat in the
constituency.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Nevertheless,
a transferable surplus in a single-member constituency is a
measure of that
candidates popularity. (It is the “keep value” in Meek method
multi-member
elections.)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Now
here is the novelty. Use Meek method of surplus transfers in
elections, also as
the means of excluding candidates, applied to the voters
reversed preferences. Then,
invert the exclusion preferences, so you have a makeshift
second-opinion
election. You can legitimately do this, because one persons
preference is
another persons reverse preference. In other words, Meek surplus
transfer is as
logically legitimate as an exclusion count as it is as an
election count.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Now
you have two sets of keep values, election keep values and
exclusion keep
values, inverted, to be second opinion election keep values.
Hence their (exclusion
count over election count) ratio serves as an average keep value
(actually, the
square of their geometric mean).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">These
average keep values can serve as the election criterion of from
one to many
candidates. That is to say this “binomial” count of both
rational election and
rational exclusion is consistently applicable to single member
and multi-member
constituencies. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">There
are other considerations, such as the need to count all the
abstentions,
to-weigh the relative importance, to the voters, of electing and
excluding candidates,
and what to do with any “Schrödinger candidate” [Forest Simmons]
both elected
and excluded. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">However,
STV would be no longer a broken backed system but, for the first
time, a one -truth election system. And this is a criterion that
elimination counts, and
official elections in general, fail to meet. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Richard
Lung. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">.</span></p>
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