<html><head></head><body><div class="ydp941989a1yahoo-style-wrap" style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;"><div></div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">On non-deterministic methods, they can give potentially a better level of proportional representation than deterministic methods, while still keeping some degree of local representation. If you have constituencies with 5 or 6 representatives and use e.g. STV, then parties/ideologies with 10% of the support nationally would likely keep missing out and win far less than 10% of the seats. Non-deterministic methods can mean that on average things balance out.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">If you use the simple random ballot method, things would still be pretty bad. With just one representative per constituency, quite a lot of people are likely to be represented only by a lunatic fringe candidate. But with 5 or 6 winning candidates, popular candidates will still generally win through, and there will be a balance of representation in each constituency.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Proportional methods can also get quite complex, but this can be massively reduced with a non-deterministic method. For example, COWPEA Lottery uses approval voting. To elect candidates you simply do this:</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>Start with a list of all currently-unelected candidates. Pick a ballot at random and remove from the list all candidates not approved on this ballot. Pick another ballot at random, and continue with this process until one candidate is left. Elect this candidate. If the number of candidates ever goes from >1 to 0 in one go, ignore that ballot and continue. If any tie cannot be broken, then elect the tied candidates with equal probability.</span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><span>It also has very good criterion compliance. If you accept non-determinism and ballots that aren't just ordinal, then probably the best of any known candidate-based proportional method. </span><a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/COWPEA" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/COWPEA</a></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Wednesday, 8 November 2023 at 18:18:24 GMT, Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com> wrote:
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<p>
</p><p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Why
has theorem Arrow gained so much traction over the years?</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"> </span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">The
short answer, history is written by the victors.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">The
history answer takes some explaining but is evident enough.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">New York</span><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">, for instance,
had a Personal Representation society, by the late nineteenth
century. In fact
the organised campaign writings, of its early successes, over
a century old,
have been bought-up, and are still subject to publishers pay
walls, of little
if any commercial value and contrary to the public interest.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">By
the 1937 edition of Proportional Representation. The key to
democracy. Clarence
Hoag and George Hallett were introducing a single transferable
vote to the
boroughs of </span><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">New York</span><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">These
two campaigning great men, both mathematicians in their day
job, did not get a
mention in Wikipedia, when I last looked.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">As
a result of battering-ram referendums with the money and
publicity on their
side, The Machine virtually abolished the key to democracy.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Massachusetts</span><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"> legislature forbad
other cities than </span><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Cambridge</span><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"> to use their electoral
reform. There are several home-rule bills but they are bogged
down in state
committee.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Kenneth
Arrow stepped in, in the nineteen fifties, to effectively
finish the job of The
Machine. He took the Kurt Godel Incompleteness theorem an
extreme step further
by advertising an “Impossibility theorem,” which he himself,
cited in
Scientific American, belatedly admitted it did not amount to.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">In
other words, he by-passed, nearly a century of election method
study, stemming
from Thomas Hare and John Stuart Mill. That tradition
continues and so does the
naïve ignorance of it.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">As
a Scottish STV programmer commented, theorem Arrow does not
even apply to
proportional representation, but merely to bare majority
elections.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Any
theorem is only as good as its assumptions, and those of the
Impossibility
theorem neglect the possibility that statistical methods might
be more accurate
than deterministic ones, as is indeed the case in physics.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Regards, <br clear="none">
</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;">Richatrd Lung.</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"><br clear="none">
</span></p>
<p class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:Rounded MT;"><br clear="none">
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</p>
<div class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-cite-prefix">On 07/11/2023 13:35, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br clear="none">
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<blockquote type="cite">
<div class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpd48923f3yahoo-style-wrap">
<div dir="ltr">As is often the case, I think
the importance of Arrow's Theorem is overstated in that
article. Arrow's Theorem essentially says "With a few
reasonable background assumptions, no ranked-ballot method
passes Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives." But this was
already known for centuries from the Condorcet Paradox. I
don't really know why it's gained so much traction over the
years, as it was nothing like the paradigm shift people credit
it as.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br clear="none">
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Toby</div>
<div><br clear="none">
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<div id="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yahoo_quoted_9697965469" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yahoo_quoted">
<div>
<div> On Tuesday, 7 November 2023 at 04:29:31 GMT, Forest
Simmons <a shape="rect" href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><forest.simmons21@gmail.com></a> wrote: </div>
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<div id="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204">
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<div>Rob,
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Thanks for clearing up a lot of the confusion...
and for putting the current status in perspective.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I like the comparison of the "impossibilities of
voting" with the impossibilities of faster than
light travel, etc. The 2nd law of thermodynamics is
especially relevant... because as Prigogene showed
in the 70's, the impossibility of decreasing entropy
in closed systems still allows for local pockets of
possibility ... that make life possible .... until
the "heat death" of our island space-time big bang
remnant ... while miriads of new "inflationary
bubbles" appear from random virtual quantum
fluctuations.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>We used to "know" that the event horizon was a
boundary of no return .... nut now evaporation of
black holes through quantum tunneling is taken for
granted.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>In the early 1800's Gauss proved the
impossibility of trisecting an arbitrarily given
angle .... inside the rules of classical geometric
ruler and compass constructions.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>But it turns out that (as any first year topology
student can show) any angle can be transformed into
atrisectable one by an arbitrarily small
perturbation.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I'm fact, once you learn the binary point
expansion of 1/3 ..., you can get within a relative
error tolerance of 1/2^n precision with n
bisections... bisections being the first
constructions you learn in geometty.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Pockets of possibility like these .... adequate
"For All Practical Purposes" pervade mathematics ...
including the mathematics of voting systems.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Sometimes you have to discover new tools not
included in the classical tool kit. In the case of
angle trisections, if you are allowed to make a few
marks on the ruler... hen the general ruler and
compass trisection suddenly resolves itself.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Thanks,</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Forest</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
<div class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_quote">
<div id="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204yqt91197" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204yqt7468526250">
<div dir="ltr" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_attr">On Sun,
Nov 5, 2023, 11:34 PM Rob Lanphier <<a shape="rect" href="mailto:roblan@gmail.com" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">roblan@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Hi folks,</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I just wrote a letter to the editor(s) of
Scientific American, which I've included
below. My letter was in a response to the
following article that was recently published
on their website:<br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/see-how-math-could-design-the-perfect-electoral-system/" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/see-how-math-could-design-the-perfect-electoral-system/</a></div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Y'all may have other thoughts on the
article.<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
<div>Rob<br clear="none">
<div class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_attr">----------
Forwarded message ---------<br clear="none">
From: <b class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_sendername">Rob
Lanphier</b> <span><<a shape="rect" href="mailto:roblan@gmail.com" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">roblan@gmail.com</a>></span><br clear="none">
Date: Sun, Nov 5, 2023 at 11:22 PM<br clear="none">
Subject: Regarding using math to create a
"Perfect Electoral System"<br clear="none">
To: Scientific American Editors <<a shape="rect" href="mailto:editors@sciam.com" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">editors@sciam.com</a>><br clear="none">
</div>
<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>To whom it may concern:</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I appreciate your article "Could Math
Design the Perfect Electoral System?",
since I agree that math is important for
understanding electoral reform, and
there's a lot of good information and
great diagrams in your article:</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/see-how-math-could-design-the-perfect-electoral-system/" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/see-how-math-could-design-the-perfect-electoral-system/</a></div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>There's some things that the article
gets wrong, but the good news is that
the article title and its relation to <span>Betteridge</span><span>'s
law. This law states </span>"Any
headline that ends in a question mark
can be answered by the word <i>'</i>no<i>'</i>."
The bad news: the URL slug
("see-how-math-could-design-the-perfect-electoral-system")
implies the answer is "yes". The answer
is "no"; Kenneth Arrow and Allan Gibbard
proved there is no perfect electoral
system (using math).</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I appreciate that your article
highlights the mayoral election in
Burlington, Vermont in 2009. That is an
important election for all voters
considering FairVote's favorite
single-winner system ("instant-runoff
voting" or rather "ranked-choice voting,
as they now call it). When I
volunteered with FairVote in the late
1990s, I remember when they introduced
the term "instant-runoff voting". I
thought the name was fine. After
Burlington 2009, it would seem that
FairVote has abandoned the name.
Regardless, anyone considering
instant-runoff needs to consider
Burlington's experience.<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Sadly, your article describes
"cardinal methods" in a confusing
manner. It erroneously equates
cardinal's counterpart ("ordinal
voting") with "ranked-choice voting".
Intuitively, all "ordinal methods"
should be called "ranked choice voting",
but during this century, the term has
been popularized by FairVote and the
city of San Francisco to refer to a
specific method formerly referred to as
"instant-runoff voting". These days,
when Americans speak of "RCV", they're
generally referring to the system known
on English Wikipedia as "IRV" (or
"Instant-runoff voting"):</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting</a><br clear="none">
</div>
<br clear="none">
<div>There have been many methods that use
ranked ballots, including the methods
developed by Nicolas de Condorcet
and Jean-Charles de Borda in the 1780s
and the 1790s. I'm grateful that the
Marquis de Condorcet's work is featured
so prominently in your article.
Condorcet's work was brilliant, and I'm
sure he would have become more prominent
if he hadn't died in a French prison in
the 1790s. Many single-winner methods
that strictly comply with the "Condorcet
winner criterion" are probably as close
to "perfect" as any system (from a
mathematical perspective).<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Most methods that pass the "Condorcet
winner criterion" typically use ranked
ballots (and thus are "ordinal"), but
it's important to note that almost all
"ordinal" methods can use cardinal
ballots. Instant-runoff voting doesn't
work very well with cardinal ballots
(because tied scores cannot be allowed),
but most other ordinal systems work
perfectly well with tied ratings or
rankings. Even though passing the
Condorcet winner criterion is very
important, there are many methods that
come very, very close in reasonable
simulations. I would strongly recommend
that you contact Dr. Ka-Ping Yee, who is
famous in electoral reform circles for
"Yee diagrams":</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Yee_diagram" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Yee_diagram</a></div>
<div>(a direct link to Yee's 2005 paper: <a shape="rect" href="http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/</a>
)</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Note that "approval voting" and
"Condorcet" provide pretty much the same
results in Yee's 2005 paper.
"Instant-runoff voting" seems a little
crazy in Yee's simulations.<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Though Arrow and Gibbard disproved
"perfection", I prefer to think of
Arrow's and Gibbard's work as defining
the physics of election methods. To
explain what I mean, consider the
physics of personal transportation. It
is impossible to design the PERFECT
vehicle (that is spacious, and
comfortable, travels faster than the
speed of light, fits in anyone's garage
or personal handbag). Newton and
Einstein more-or-less proved it.
However, those esteemed scientists' work
didn't cause us to stop working on
improvements in personal
transportation. Buggy whips are now
(more or less) recognized as obsolete,
as is Ford's "Model T".<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Now that Arrow and Gibbard have
helped us understand the physics of
election methods, we can hopefully start
pursuing alternatives to the buggy whip
(or rather, alternatives to "choose-one"
voting systems, often referred to as
"first past the post" systems). <br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>This gets me to the statement from
your article that gets under my skin the
most::</div>
<blockquote class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789ydpafe61227yiv0954465204gmail_quote">
<div>This is called cardinal voting, or
range voting, and although it’s no
panacea and has its own shortcomings,
it circumvents the limitations imposed
by Arrow’s impossibility theorem,
which only applies to ranked choice
voting. <br clear="none">
</div>
</blockquote>
<div> </div>
<div>People who study election methods
refer to "cardinal voting" as a <i>category</i>
of voting methods, of which "range
voting" is just one (which is called
"score voting" on English Wikipedia):</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Score_voting" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Score_voting</a><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>The conflation of "ranked choice
voting" with all ordinal voting methods
is also highly problematic (though I
don't entirely blame you for this). As
I stated earlier, there are many methods
that can use ranked ballots. While this
article may have been helpful for those
of us that prefer ranking methods that
are not "instant-runoff voting" back
when FairVote switched to "ranked-choice
voting" in the early 2010s. Note that
before the fiasco in Burlington in 2009,
FairVote pretty consistently preferred
"instant runoff voting":</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20091111061523/http://www.fairvote.org/" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://web.archive.org/web/20091111061523/http://www.fairvote.org/</a></div>
<br clear="none">
<div>I appreciate that you're trying to
explain this insanely complicated topic
to your readers. When I edit English
Wikipedia (which I've done for over
twenty years), I would love to be able
to cite Scientific American on this
topic. However, I'm not yet sure I'd
feel good about citing this article.<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Rob Lanphier</div>
<div>Founder of election-methods mailing
list and <a shape="rect" href="http://electowiki.org" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">electowiki.org</a><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://robla.net" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://robla.net</a></div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/User:RobLa" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/User:RobLa</a></div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:RobLa" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:RobLa</a><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>p.s. back in the late 1990s, I wrote
an article for a small tech journal
called "The Perl Journal". It's out of
print, but I've reproduced my 1996
article about election methods which I
think holds up pretty well:</div>
<div><a shape="rect" href="https://robla.net/1996/TPJ" class="ydpcdaeb516yiv0491022789moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://robla.net/1996/TPJ</a><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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