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<p>Hello Forest, and EM list,<br>
</p>
<p>Like Pierre-Simon Laplace, I do not support the Condorcet
criterion. The reason, as reported by JFS Ross, was that
preferences are not of equal importance. Laplace did a proof of
this, favoring Borda, while, it appears, recognising it can be
gamed. Gregory method cannot be gamed but depends on proportional
rpresentation using weighting in arithmetic proportion for surplus
transfers; a standard statistical technique.<br>
</p>
<p>A binomial count [introduced by myself] (an election count
repeated as an exclusion count with preferences reversed) means
that the exclusion count, as well as the election count, is a
rational count, with no irrational redistributions unsanctioned by
the voters, Binomial STV is a one-truth system, in accord with
standard scientific practise, applying similarly to single and
multi-member systems, tho the JS Mill (and Lani Guinier)
definition of democracy essentially requires Proportional
Representation by "Mr Hare's system."<br>
</p>
<p> There is no certain winner. No divine right of a "winner" only
the most representative candidates. Popular elections are
voter-centred not contestant-centred.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 03/11/2023 13:35, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfqmnTzk5gMbgYnqCQC_5no1TnspjNYVGF3oOmV7XgYnpw@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="auto">
<div><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Oct 30, 2023, 6:21
PM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p><br>
Why do we support the Condorcet criterion? For me
there are three reasons:<br>
<br>
(1) Failure to elect a voted CW can give the voters
who voted the CW over the actual winner<br>
a potentially very strong, difficult (if not
impossible ) to answer complaint.<br>
<br>
And those voters could be more than half the total.<br>
<br>
(2) Always electing a voted CW is (among methods that
fail Favorite Betrayal) is the best way to minimise<br>
Compromise incentive.<br>
<br>
(3) Limited to the information we can glean for pure
ranked ballots (especially if we decide to only refer<br>
to the pairwise matrix), the voted CW is the most
likely utility maximiser.<br>
<br>
If there is no voted CW , then the winner should come
from the Smith set. Condorcet is just the logical<br>
consequence of Smith and Clone Independence
(specifically Clone-Winner).<br>
<br>
Some methods are able to meet Condorcet but not Smith,
but hopefully they get something in return.<br>
(For example I think Min Max Margins gets
Mono-add-Top and maybe something else).<br>
<br>
So coming to the question of which individual member
of the Smith set should we elect, I don't see that a<br>
supposed, guessed-at "sincere CW" has an especially
strong claim, certainly nothing compared to an actual<br>
voted CW.<br>
<br>
Suppose sincere looks like:<br>
<br>
49 A>>>C>B<br>
48 B>>>C>A<br>
03 C>A>>>B<br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto">My favorite burial proof method is to elect the
nemesis of the nemesis of the (repeated) Submidway Approval
Elimination winner.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Max Approval is 52</div>
<div dir="auto">Min Approval is 3</div>
<div dir="auto">Midway is 27.5</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So we eliminate C.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Updating approvals we have 52 for A and 48 for
B. Midway is 50. B is the only Sub Midway candidate so A is
the SubMidway Approval winner.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The nemesis of A is C, and C has no nemesis
because it not pairbeaten. We respect the Condorcet Criterion
and elect C, a very weak CW.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">There is no way out of it if we want a Condorcet
Criterion Compliant method.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p> <br>
Suppose that all voters get about the same utility
from electing their favourites. In that case A is the
big utility<br>
maximiser.<br>
<br>
Now suppose that this is say the first post-FPP
election, and the voters are all exhorted to express
their full<br>
rankings, no matter how weak or uncertain some of
their preferences may be, because we don't want
anything <br>
that looks like the (shudder) "minority rule" we had
under FPP.<br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">This reminds me of the practice omanipulative
judges in the US warning jurors to ignore their sacred right
of "Jury Nullification" (inherited from English Common Law).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Those lying (by intimidation) judges are a
disgrace to their office ... and should be stripped of their
holy robes ... imho.</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p> <br>
So they vote:<br>
<br>
49 A>C<br>
48 B>C<br>
03 C>A<br>
<br>
C is the voted CW. For some pro-Condorcet zealots,
this is ideal. No sincere preferences were reversed or
<br>
"concealed", resulting in the election of the "sincere
CW".<br>
<br>
(In passing I note that in most places if the
non-Condorcet method IRV/RCV were used, A would be
uncontroversially<br>
elected probably without anyone even noticing that C
is the CW.)<br>
<br>
Backing up a bit, suppose that instead of the voters
being exhorted to fully rank no-matter-what, they are
given the<br>
message "this election is for a serious powerful
office, so we don't want anything like GIGO ("garbage
in, garbage out")<br>
so if some of your preferences are weak or uncertain
it is quite ok to keep them to yourself via truncation
or equal-ranking."<br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That warning should be mandatory ... as should
an honest effort to "fully inform" a jury of their most sacred
rights predatimg even the Magna Carta.</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p> <br>
So they vote:<br>
<br>
49 A<br>
48 B<br>
03 C>A<br>
<br>
Now the voted CW is A. Should anyone be seriously
concerned that, due to so many voters truncating, that
some other<br>
candidate might actually be the "sincere CW"?<br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Your example shows the wisdom of electing the
ballot CW when there is one.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">In fact, all of our burial resistant methods
elect the voted CW when one exists. But when one does not
exist we suspiciously suspect that its absence was most
likely caused by subversion of a CW, since that is by far the
easiest way to create a beat cycle ... whether innocently or
with "malice aforethought."</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p> <br>
For me, if voters have the freedom to fully rank but
for whatever reason choose to truncate (and/or
equal-rank, assuming that<br>
is allowed) a lot of that is fine and the voting
method should prefer not to know about weak and
uncertain preferences.<br>
<br>
The type of insincere voting that most concerns me is
that which produces outrageous failure of
Later-no-Help, achieving by order-reversal<br>
Burial what could not have been done by simple
truncation.<br>
<br>
46 A<br>
44 B>C (sincere is B or B>A)<br>
10 C<br>
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Let's see what our Sub Midway Approval
Elimination burial resistant method does here:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The respective max and min implicit approval
scores are 54 for C and 44 for B. So Midway is 49. Both A and
B have Sub Midway Approval leaving C as the candidate whose
nemesis's nemesis we should elect.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">C's nemesis is B, and B's nemesis is A.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So A is the winner of our burial resistant
method.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">How does this work?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Well, Nanson is very good at fingering the
Burial Faction Favorite, but Poor man's Nanson aka
SubMidApproval Elimination is even better at electing the BFF
than ordinary Nanson or RP wv, although they are both pretty
good at it as this example shows.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Once you have the likely BFF you can follow the
cycle forward one or backward two candidates to the "bus"
under which the buried candidate was buried. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">[Electing this "bus" is what makes the method
backfire on the burying faction ... so electing the strongest
bus (their could be a clone set of them) is the proper aim of
a good burial proof method designer ... to completely deter
potential subverters from even flirting with the idea.]</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Like I said you can go in either direction
around the cycle to get to a "bus" from the BFF candidate ....
but it's better psychologically to elect the syrongest wv
defeater of the strongest wv defeater of the Nanson winner
.... as opposed to saying "Elect the candidate with the most
losing votes against the Nanson winner" .. they are almost
always the same candidate even when Smith has more than three
members.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Like I say, SubMidAolroval Elimination is more
reliable than even ordinary Nanson or RP wv at finding the BFF
candidate. But for the curjous, you can always do a sincere
runoff between the likely strongest Bus (the nemesis of the
nemesis of the likely BFF), and the Smith candidate with the
fewest losing votes against it (i.e.against the bus) the same
as the weakest Smith weakest Smith candidate to defeat the
BFF.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">[It is easy to show that a subverted CW always
defeats the BFF, which beats the bus that beat the buried
candidate that precipitated the insincere cycle resulting from
the burial.]</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">In this example the sincere runoff (were that
option to be taken) would be between the Bus A and the Smith
candidate B with the fewest losing votes to it A.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">For the sincere winner of this runoff we have to
go clear back to the original scenario. And it turns out that
A is the sincere winner of the runoff, because C, the sincere
CW was acting more like a BFF ... so not a finalist in the
runoff!</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p> <br>
Electing B here is completely unacceptable. </p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Right, and now we have a method designed to
automatically avoid that kind of mistake.</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>
<p>Regardless of whether or not the B>C voters are
sincere, there isn't any case that B has a stronger<br>
claim than A.<br>
<br>
I don't like (but it can sometimes be justified) a
larger faction being stung by a successful truncation
Defection strategy of a smaller one, but apart<br>
from that I consider a lot of truncation to be normal,
natural and mostly desirable.<br>
<br>
More later.</p>
<p>Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><b>Forest Simmons</b><span><span> </span></span><a
href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Benefit%20of%20a%20doubt%20runoff%20challenge&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfru_xs%2BEE6kd7Xbb4p%2Bsh3Zijqy-yCmBwNPOdwLP1emgQ%40mail.gmail.com%3E"
title="[EM] Benefit of a doubt runoff challenge"
target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
moz-do-not-send="true">forest.simmons21 at gmail.com</a><br>
<i>Sun Oct 29 21:30:58 PDT 2023</i>
<hr>
<pre>Are the beatcycles that sometimes arise from expressed ballot preferences
... are these cycles more likely to arise from occasional inevitable
inconsistencies inherent in sincerely voted ballots? ... or from ballots
that reflect exaggerated preferences from attempts to improve the election
outcome over the one likely to result from honest, unexagerated ballots (?)
Should Condorcet methods be designed on the assumption that most ballot
cycles are sincere? .... or on the assumption that most are the result of
insincere ballots (?)
Some people think that the question is irrelevant ... that no matter the
answer, the best result will be obtained by assuming the sincerity of the
voted ballots. Others think healthy skepticism is necessary for optimal
results. What do you think?</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="moz-mime-attachment-header"></fieldset>
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</blockquote>
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