<div dir="auto">Oops!! I think I list-replied to an individual e-mail. I appreciate the consideration, not posting a proposal-debunk, but I don’t consider the proposal debunked.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Anyway, I’d mistakenly assumed that I was replying to a posting, but now that I’ve sent my reply to the list, I might as well leave it there, when there’s more to add.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Even if randomness determines which of the 3 candidates gets eliminated 1st, there’s a 2/3 probability that BF loses.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…backfire is equally likely as success.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But it isn’t random:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You’ve insincerely bottom-ranked CW.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…thereby increasing hir probability of being the 1st eliminated.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…&, with 3 candidates, you’ve upranked Bus from bottom, decreasing hir chance of being 1st eliminated.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">An optional added rule could specify that the 1st elimination is of whichever of the 2 candidates with worst base-method count-score is pair-beaten by the other.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What if there are more candidates? What if there’s an additional Bus?<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Then BF loses, no matter who is eliminated.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s fact obtains when there are more than 1 Bus, but no candidates who aren’t CW, BF or a Bus.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I’ll collectively refer to CW, BF & Bus(es) as “the principals”.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Any candidates who aren’t principals, I refer to as “other candidates”.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If there’s an other candidate who pair-beats the Bus, & gets eliminated 1st, of course that takes down the Bus. But the same thing could happen to any one of the principals.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The possibility the takedown of a principal by 1st elimination of an other somewhat dilutes the greater likelihood of CW being the 1st eliminated principal, & of Bus not being the 1st eliminated principal.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Because of the burial-thwarting effect of having more than 1 Bus, then, with many candidates, the buriers have the problem of burying CW to make the strategic cycle, without creating more than 1 Bus.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Could the buriers get lucky & succeed? Sure.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But then you’re raising the philosophical question:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If a strategy doesn’t have a positive result-change expectation, is it really a strategy?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Michael Ossipoff </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Oct 8, 2023 at 01:14 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto">There’s good reason to choose Coombs as the “base-method”, the elimination-method to which to apply CT-.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The use of Coombs maximizes the lowering of the base-method count-score for the buried CW. (We haven’t discussed fractional vs whole, but my first impression is that whole would best deter & thwart burial.)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…making the CW more likely to get eliminated 1st. …thereby taking-down the buriers’ favorite (BF), & electing the less-liked candidate whom under whom the buriers buried CW.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">(Let’s call that candidate “Bus”, because the buriers are throwing CW under the bus.)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That wasn’t the scenario in your example, but BF still lost.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">When there’s only one Bus, which of course is the case in all 3-candidate cases, then whether or not BF wins, & the burial succeeds, depends on who is eliminated 1st.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"> Could there be a 1-Bus example in which Bus gets eliminated 1st, thereby taking down CW & electing BF? Yes, but, with Coombs as base-method, the burial of CW is particularly likely to give CW the worst base-method count-score. …& thereby the 1st elimination. …thereby taking down BF & electing Bus.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So the burial is likely deterred, unless the buriers have very detailed & reliable predictive information.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I’m not a fan of LNHa, but when speaking of advantages of STE (Successive Topcount Elimination), one of course mentions LNHa among them.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But, though we need rank-balloting, & STE is a rank-method, & obviously people who enact STE don’t want or intend to bury their favorite under a disgusting lesser evil, & though I’d accept STE’s top-end defensive strategy-need in order for people to have rank balloting so that they won’t elect despicable POS lesser evils…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…I’m not going to defend STE anymore…or vote for its enactment…or participate in its enactment campaign…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…because we do such things for principle…</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…&, if principle means anything, we don’t condone lying & dishonesty.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">FairVote is still using the lie that STE don’t have a spoiler problem.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…using that lie not only with voters, but also to get money from donors.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I couldn’t bring myself to help that lie-based project or its proposal.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Did you know that FairVote is claiming that it’s Condorcet that has the spoiler problem?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I guess, to borrow from a famous statement, that proves that there’s no such thing as an unutterably blatant lie.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So, as I said, I won’t defend STE or in any way support its enactment campaigns.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Oct 7, 2023 at 23:16 C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p><br>
Michael,<br>
<br>
</p><blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">... there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
to one's own favorite,</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
Say sincere is<br>
<br>
46 A<br>
44 B<br>
10 C<br>
<br>
A is the CW (as well as being every other type of winner).<br>
<br>
Now suppose the B voters all decide to bury against A by ranking C
second:<br>
<br>
46 A<br>
44 B>C<br>
10 C<br>
<br>
Now C has the lowest Borda score and the lowest "top count", so
if we are using<br>
IRV/RCV or Baldwin C is eliminated, "taking down" A and leaving B
elected.<br>
<br>
The "offensive strategy" has succeeded. This is the same
outrageous failure of <br>
the Later-no-Help and Plurality criteria that we see with Margins.<br>
<br>
I'm not clear how Coombs (or your preferred version of it) handles
truncation.<br>
<br>
Is the "bottom count" Fractional (in other words based on the
symmetrically completed ballots)<br>
or Whole (so that truncated ballots give a whole vote to each of
the bottom-counts of the truncated<br>
candidates)?<br>
<br>
In this case neither version eliminates C, but I'd be surprised if
examples couldn't be made of<br>
them also failing those criteria.<br>
<br>
You implied that you are a fan of Later-no-Harm. If that is the
case I don't think you will find a better<br>
method than plain IRV/RCV<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Here are 3 elimination-methods that eliminate 1 candidate at a time:
…
RCV/IRV: Eliminates lowest topcount
…
Coombs: Eliminates highest bottomcount
…
Baldwin; Eliminates lowest Borda-score.
…
Any one of those can be the “base-method” .</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><b style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Michael Ossipoff</b><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span></span><a href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20My%20CTE%20post%20to%20EM&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5CU-zc3Y%3DC%3DrFWagy3zVw5Px6KPaULqW89gHdxshRZh8A%40mail.gmail.com%3E" title="[EM] My CTE post to EM" target="_blank">email9648742 at gmail.com</a><br>
<i>Fri Oct 6 14:33:40 PDT 2023</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span>
<p><br>
</p>
<hr>
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)"> When I said:
"There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite."
I meant, there's no offensive strategy for changing the winner from the CW
to one's own favorite.
On Fri, Oct 6, 2023 at 5:21 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com" style="font-family:monospace" target="_blank">email9648742 at gmail.com</a>>
wrote:
><i style="font-family:monospace"> Name of Method:
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> CW,Takedown-Elimination (CTE)
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> or
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Simmons-Ossipoff Method
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Okay yes, I like the 2nd one.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> It adds an enhancement to any of several already-existing
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> elimination-methods.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Here are 3 elimination-methods that eliminate 1 candidate at a time:
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> RCV/IRV: Eliminates lowest topcount
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Coombs: Eliminates highest bottomcount
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Baldwin; Eliminates lowest Borda-score.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Any one of those can be the “base-method” .
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Method rule:
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Ranked balloting. Equal-rankng & truncation allowed.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> 1) Check for a CW & elect hir.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> 2) If none, do the base-method.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> 3) During the doing of the base-method:
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> When the base-method’s rule eliminates a candidate, eliminate additionally
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> anyone who is pair-beaten by that candidate. …& additionally any
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> candidate beaten by that 2nd candidate.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> That’s takedown & secondary takedown.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> 4) If anyone becomes un-pairbeaten due to elimination of who beats hir,
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> s/he wins.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> 5) Continue till only one candidate remains uneliminated.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> [end of count-rule definition]
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Though it was Forest who introduced the unprecedentedly gamechanging
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Takedown, & applied it to Coombs & Baldwin, the bombast in this post is all
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> mine.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Obviously a CW wins if voting is sincere.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> There’s no offensive strategy for changing the CW to one’s own favorite.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> There’s no need for defensive strategy to protect the win of a CW.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> While MinMax(wv), Schulze, RP(wv) & Smith//MinMax(wv) require defensive
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> truncation to deter burial strategy against the CW, the above-defined
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> method requires no such defensive strategy, & voters can rank all the way
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> down to the bottom if they want to.
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> PS. I added a statement that, for the purposes of takedown & secondary
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> takedown, "pair-beaten" should probably mean "pairbeaten according to the
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> rankings before any eliminations."
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> …
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace">
</i>><i style="font-family:monospace"> Michael Ossipoff</i></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<p></p>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>