<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 10:31 PM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Yes, that fancier Sequential Pairwise ordering method would make it harder for a strategist to guess anything about the comparison-order…when, instead of the candidate’s top-count, it uses the sum of the top-counts of those above him on each ballot.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">By the way this top weighted Borda count is just as efficiently precinct summable as Borda itself: to get respective scores of the candidates multiply the pairwise support matrix on the left by the row vector of top respective counts ... which can be conveniently stored as diagonal elements of the pairwise support matrix whose off diagonal element in the j_th row of the k_th column is the number of ballots on which candidate j outranks candidate k.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This summability is a big advantage. There were lots of complaints about the slowness of RCV vote transfers between elimination rounds.</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">An extra layer of unpredictability for a would-be strategist.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The vulnerability of the simplest-defined procedure would have to be weighed against what polls & focus-groups say about people’s requirement for definition-simplicity & brevity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Undeniably the more multi-layered & unpredictable ordering procedure is more strategy-proof & better.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But it now seems for sure that there are such methods that are sufficiently offensive-strategy-proof or well-protected from offensive-strategy. It’s only a question of how many & which ones.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The Condorcet-IRV-Runoff hybrids hold promise, with merit to always be balanced with what is heard in polls & focus groups about definition-brevity.</div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">One piece of redundancy I recommend in any Condorcet efficient method definition ... start with words to the effect "If there is no majority Top candidate, elect the candidate that is undefeated in every head to head matchup. And in the extremely rare case that no such ideal candidate exists, elect the candidate closest to this democratic ideal as follows:</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So I’m sure that I’ll propose & recommend good Condorcet versions (even if I don’t yet know which ones & how many) over IRV. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…but I’ll nonetheless include IRV among the methods that I offer, because it’s better than a lot of people believe. …though its merit & workability strongly depend on the electorate & the candidate-lineup.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I.e. Because it isn’t Condorcet-complying, it’s necessary that the electorate aren’t timid lesser-evil giveaway voters.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But an electorate that has just enacted IRV in a referendum didn’t do so because they want to rank Lesser-Evil over their favorite. They enacted it because they want to rank sincerely, to express & fully help their favorite.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Let’s support Oregon’s IRV (RCV) referendum next year!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Though IRV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion, it meets Mutual-Majority:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">IRV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority. …The favorite candidate of the Mutual-Majority.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">IRV didn’t “fail” in Burlington & Alaska. It did what it’s supposed to do.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">We don’t yet have a big Condorcet organization, or referenda, initiatives or strong lobbying for it, but let’s support the already ongoing enactment efforts for IRV, now named RCV.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 20, 2023 at 18:24 Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto">So called BTR-IRV, "Bottom Two Runoff IRV" goes along those lines. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You probably remember "Benham" that runs IRV elimination until there remains a candidate undefeated by any of the other remaining candidates.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div>This reminds me of basing the Sequential Pairwise Elimination agenda order on Top preferences ... by using those preferences to "de-clone" the Borda agenda order:<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The agenda order is given by SB(X), the Sum over all ballots B of the first place votes of the candidates ranked above X on B. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The larger SB(X), the later X is (on average) in the rankings, and the rearlier X is in the elimination agenda.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"></div><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 20, 2023, 4:56 AM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div></div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"></blockquote></div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">If,
using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is determined by
giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a later position in the
comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the comparison-order will be…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…&
if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is now in
political-elections…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…Does
that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with
gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD?<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New""><span style="font-family:"Courier New""> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…And,
if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that offensive
strategy?<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New""><span style="font-family:"Courier New""> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…That
seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less
computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods.<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">If,
using voted rankings, Sequential-Pairwise’s comparison-order is determined by
giving, to the candidates with higher top-count score, a later position in the
comparison-order, so that voters don’t know what the comparison-order will be…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…&
if voters’ knowledge of eachother’s preferences is no better than it is now in
political-elections…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…Does
that Sequential-Pairwise election have an offensive strategy with
gain-expectation comparable to what it would have in MinMax, RP & CSSD?<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New""><span style="font-family:"Courier New""> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…And,
if so, is there a defensive strategy to thwart or deter that offensive
strategy?<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New""><span style="font-family:"Courier New""> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;line-height:normal;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:"Courier New"">…That
seems of interest because Sequential-Pairwise is so much less
computationally-demanding than the other pairwise-count methods.<span style="font-family:"Courier New""></span></span></p>
</div></blockquote></div><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
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