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<p>Forest,<br>
</p>
<p>I think we are imagining different real world scenarios here as
well as having different philosophical attitudes.<br>
<br>
I have in mind say a country's presidential election with the
primary being held well before the final, with very many
candidates (say in the tens)<br>
and with most of the voters knowing nothing or next to nothing
about most of the candidates.</p>
<p>The purpose of the primary then is just to weed out candidates
with insignificant core support to reduce the field to a
"manageable" size and to<br>
reduce the amount of research serious voters need to do to give an
adequately informed vote.<br>
<br>
Candidates who do very poorly in this primary scenario have the
potential to win a strong following in the course of the
relatively long campaign <br>
period between the primary and the final election.<br>
<br>
So I'm not happy with complicated Condorcet-ish rules for the
primary that are too similar to the method used for the final
election. I see no reason<br>
why the primary "Condorcet loser" shouldn't be on the finals
ballot if he/she is serious and has some low threshold of core
supporters.<br>
<br>
Also I don't like the idea of possibly strategic and/or bigoted
voters having a say about the finals ballot-access of candidates
they hate without any<br>
possible cost or risk to candidates they support.<br>
<br>
One of the things I like about my IRV last N idea is that the
ballot rules are very similar to what I think should be used for
the final election (maybe not <br>
quite identical because for the primary I'm not in favour of
allowing above-bottom equal-ranking or an explicit approval
cutoff).<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/09/2023 4:21 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfqheA9vfqxm47ZW3YZ3j4dVDg+=LUT=OD-qywTU0y-jig@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="auto">Could the Implicit Approval winner ever be a
Condorcet loser?
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Highly unlikely, especially in the context of
too many candidates, etc. But if so, every other candidate
would have a short beatpath to it ... so no narrowing of the
field would occur.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So it would be better to use the IRV winner or
the MaxMax Pairwise Support winner as the short beatpath
target ... the winner of the simplest method that satisfies
the Condorcet Loser Criterion.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Aug 30, 2023, 11:30 PM
Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">Voters strictly rank as many candidates as
they care to.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The implicit it approval of a candidate is
the number of ballots on which it out ranks at least one
other candidate.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Let S be the set of candidates tied for most
implicit approval.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A candidate will advance to the final ballot
if and only if it has a beatpath of two or fewer steps to
some member of S.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">fws</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
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