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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">It seems to me that the
position is this. Condorcet voting works well under certain
assumptions, which include voters sincerely ranking all candidates
in order of preference. Strategic voting turns out to be less of a
problem than one might fear, but drastic truncation is fatal.<br>
The merits of Condorcet voting lie partly in its not penalising
minor parties, so you'd expect it to lead to an explosion in the
number of candidates. <br>
So you're organising a presidential election, hoping to take
advantage of the merits of Condorcet voting, and you expect 500
candidates to put themselves forward. What do you do?<br>
One no-brain solution is to run a Condorcet election with 500
candidates. Another is to rely on administrative procedures, eg.
only the 5 candidates with most supporting signatures get onto the
ballot. This isn't a bad idea; something like it is widely
practised. I think the Virginia meeting is intentionally allowing
it as an option. Can we do better?<br>
<br>
There are no particular constraints or objectives on a first round
- what matters is how well the system as a whole performs.<br>
It may be that Forest is trying to get only centrist candidates
through to the second round. I think this is a bad idea. The
second round cannot elect a bad candidate in his scheme, but
non-centrist voters are likely to feel they have nothing to play
for and stay at home. The result of the second round will
therefore be skewed and delegitimised. <br>
The problem lies in the questionable performance of ranked
voting with large fields. It seems to me that both Chris and
Forest are trying so hard to get the optimum set of survivors to
the second round that instead of solving the problem they end up
shifting it to the first round. <br>
CJC<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 01/09/2023 00:39, C.Benham wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:e0052419-a8f7-dc76-2dc7-bbab5ff31956@adam.com.au">
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<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
I gather you envisage a high-turnout primary election with the
final being held as soon as practicable afterwards.<br>
<br>
On the issue of whether or not we sometimes dispense with the
final because one candidate was so dominant in the primary,<br>
we could have a rule about the winners final-two IRV count (or
maybe some alternative, like minimum pairwise support) as a
proportion<br>
of the total number of eligible voters.<br>
<br>
If that is too low, then maybe we can have a final anyway, say
between the IRV winner and the candidate with the most pairwise
opposition<br>
to the IRV winner (and maybe if that isn't the IRV last-2
runner-up that candidate also if that pairwise result was
"sufficiently", according to<br>
some rule we make up, close).<br>
<br>
There should be no simple rule that says we always have a final
if the turnout for the primary is below X%, because that could
sometimes cause <br>
some faction of voters to have a strategic incentive to abstain
from the primary. <br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/09/2023 6:37 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfqbA9cyd8-W-mmi1gd1ZYkbxdnUG3--4eOkt8Yzh922jg@mail.gmail.com">
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charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="auto">Say the finalists are the IRV winner together
with any and all of its "enemies" (defined as those candidates
that defeat it pairwise).
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If the IRV winner has no enemies, no need for
any further runoff beyond the Instant Runoff that just
popped out the IRV winner.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If the IRV winner has precisely one enemy,
then the two-candidate final runoff will be a no stress
sincere choice for the voters.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Otherwise, you have a potentially interesting
runoff with "around 3 to 5 candidates" to put the Condorcet
Meetng through its paces.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">fws</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 31, 2023, 11:51
AM Forest Simmons <<a
href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">Could the Implicit Approval winner ever be a
Condorcet loser?
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Highly unlikely, especially in the context
of too many candidates, etc. But if so, every other
candidate would have a short beatpath to it ... so no
narrowing of the field would occur.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So it would be better to use the IRV
winner or the MaxMax Pairwise Support winner as the
short beatpath target ... the winner of the simplest
method that satisfies the Condorcet Loser Criterion.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Aug 30, 2023,
11:30 PM Forest Simmons <<a
href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com"
target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">Voters strictly rank as many candidates
as they care to.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The implicit it approval of a
candidate is the number of ballots on which it out
ranks at least one other candidate.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Let S be the set of candidates tied
for most implicit approval.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A candidate will advance to the final
ballot if and only if it has a beatpath of two or
fewer steps to some member of S.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">fws</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
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