<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Aug 30, 2023, 12:17 AM Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p><br>
Kristofer,<br>
<br>
IMHO this is all far too complicated and completely wrong-headed.<br>
<br>
For one thing, it seems to assume that major candidates have some
interest in,<br>
or in some way benefit from, displacing minor candidates off the
final ballot.<br>
<br>
In fact, with voluntary voting, they are just as likely to be
harmed by them doing that<br>
as helped. Major moderate wing candidates can benefit by minor
(sure loser) more extreme <br>
candidates on the same wing being on the ballot, because they
inspire more voters to turn out<br>
who will help that moderate wing candidate to defeat the other
major candidate/s.<br>
<br>
So with your suggested method, a candidate could lose the election
because it did too well in<br>
the primary.<br>
<br>
I only recently saw the first message in this thread, and was a
bit surprised that the N suggested<br>
was so small and elastic ("2-5").<br></p></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto">So voters just rank as many as they feel like, as Chris suggested.... then ...</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">... initialize a set finalists with the IRV winner, the MaxMinPS winner, the Implicit Approval winner, and possibly others. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Then expand this set by including every candidate that pairwise beats at least one of its current members ... and continue to expand it in this way until it has reached or surpassed some minimum target size ... or until every candidate with a beatpath to the set has already been incorporated ... whichever condition obtains first.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Note that two expansions already includes every Landau candidate ... so we could make that our hard cutoff without much loss.</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><p>
<br>
My suggested solution assumed a fixed N. I would have no problem
with 7, certainly at least 5.<br>
<br>
If we are happy to have N elastic because we don't want any very
weak candidates on the ballot,<br>
then we can do IRV-style eliminations and vote transfers until the
lowest tally of any not eliminated<br>
candidate meets some arbitrary threshold and then we stop.<br>
<br>
Or we can combine that with saying we are going to have at most X
candidates.<br>
</p>
<p>I think I prefer a quite high fixed number. Lots of candidates
can help inspire turnout and make for<br>
a wider and more interesting "battle of ideas".<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</p><blockquote type="cite"><b>Kristofer Munsterhjelm</b> <a href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3Ca4347551-24f9-f38b-be5b-bb3da1a4f5e3%40t-online.de%3E" title="[EM] Condorcet meeting" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">km_elmet at t-online.de </a><br>
<i>Mon Aug 28 12:37:50 PDT 2023</i>
<p></p>
<ul>
<li><b>Messages sorted by:</b> <a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-August/date.html#4835" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">[
date ]</a> <a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-August/thread.html#4835" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">[
thread ]</a> <a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-August/subject.html#4835" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">[
subject ]</a> <a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2023-August/author.html#4835" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">[
author ]</a> </li>
</ul>
<hr>
<pre>On 8/28/23 19:24, Forest Simmons wrote:
><i> For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
</i>><i>
</i>><i> But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
</i>><i>
</i>><i> Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
</i>><i> the average primary ballot?
</i>
Here's a similar approach with an idea to preserve a kind of clone
independence:
Use STV, but don't eliminate candidates when they're elected, just
reweight the ballots according to surplus instead.
When a candidate is elected again, he only appears once in the final
outcome, but the number of candidates in the outcome is reduced by one
instead. In effect, the duplicate election leads to the election of a
"hole" that takes up a spot without assigning any candidate to that spot.
Say N = 5, so that the Droop quota is 1/6. Then a candidate with
above-majority support (say 1/2 + epsilon) gets three such quotas, and
is elected three times: once to get into the finalist set, and twice
more to reduce the number of other candidates from four to two.
The idea is that if the candidate were to be cloned, then these clones
would occupy three spots of the outcome, so the result is the same; just
in one case, there's only one winner from that bloc and two "holes",
while in the other case, there would be three winners from the bloc.
I would probably reserve one of the five spots for the primary CW,
though. Ideally it would use a proportional ordering or a pairwise STV
variant, but then we're moving into "deluxe, complex method" territory.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<p></p>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>