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<p>Colin,<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Asking what's wrong with bullet voting is equivalent to asking what's
wrong with FPTP.</pre>
</blockquote>
No it isn't. That's like comparing people choosing to remain
silent with people not being allowed to speak.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>The answer is not that it subverts the system, but that
it withholds information the system would use to good effect. </pre>
</blockquote>
Unlike FPP, voluntary bullet voting provides the "information"
that those voters were given the opportunity to<br>
rank some candidates above equal-bottom and chose not to.<br>
<br>
The lower preferences of the supporters of candidates with
sufficient first-preference support to get on the<br>
final ballot are (as far as I can see) completely irrelevant, so I
can't imagine what "use to good effect" in this<br>
case that you have in mind.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in
ranked preference ballots to a reasonable depth.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
There is no "reasonable depth" other than exactly what the voter
chooses.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>In this case, it seems
to me that they're being put to unconscionable lengths for what is only
a primary, and they have no way of knowing where to stop.</pre>
</blockquote>
If they are really so clueless as to how the system works they can
take advice from <br>
their favourite candidates/parties. Most will suggest they just
bullet vote. I would<br>
think very few would advise them to rank more than three
candidates.<br>
</p>
<p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better; but I
had hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved roughly the
benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost of voting to depth
one.</pre>
</blockquote>
Your suggested method transfers some power from voters to
candidates, which I find<br>
unconscionable. In that circumstance (along with it being just a
primary) the supposed <br>
"benefits of voting to depth four" are imaginary.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><b>Colin Champion</b> <a
href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3Cb8010a11-93a6-b05a-97ff-69e3a052cd49%40routemaster.app%3E"
title="[EM] Condorcet meeting">colin.champion at
routemaster.app </a><br>
<i>Tue Aug 29 11:31:42 PDT 2023</i>
<p></p>
<br>
<hr>
<pre>Asking what's wrong with bullet voting is equivalent to asking what's
wrong with FPTP. The answer is not that it subverts the system, but that
it withholds information the system would use to good effect. The whole
of ranked voting theory is based on exploiting the information which
bullet-voters withhold.
I think Chris's summary of how his system might work is fair.
Supporters of minor parties give their first preferences accordingly,
and compromise with a mainstream candidate for their second preferences.
Supporters of mainstream parties (the majority) bullet vote. They don't
consider the merits of little-known alternatives because it's too much
effort, and because minor parties get squeezed out by the election
method in any case. This is very much like PR based on plurality (with a
little compromising thrown in), and unlike PR by STV except insofar as
FPTP is its limiting case.
But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in
ranked preference ballots to a reasonable depth. In this case, it seems
to me that they're being put to unconscionable lengths for what is only
a primary, and they have no way of knowing where to stop.
Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better; but I
had hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved roughly the
benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost of voting to depth
one.
CJC</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre>One of the agenda items is "rules for reducing a large field of
candidates to a field of 2 to 5". This seems to me an important topic,
since voters cannot be expected to vote in the way ranked preference
methods assume if the number of candidates is large. Presumably
proposals have been made for addressing it; unfortunately I haven't seen
them.
One which occurs to me is this. There are two rounds, the first of which
may have up to (say) 20 candidates and reduces the number to (say) 6,
and the second of which uses ranked preferences to find a single winner
from the 6.
In the first round, each candidate nominates up to 3 "alternates"
from the rest of the field; these are listed in order against his name
on the ballot. The ballots use FPTP format - choose *one* option - but
are processed as multiwinner STV ballots in which a vote for A is
treated as a vote A>B>C>D, where B...D are his alternates. Surplus votes
are not transferred. Choose the 6 winners as the survivors to the second
round.
I dare say there exist better ideas, but I thought I'd mention it.
CJC</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
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